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ABSTRACT 
A significant number of Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) 
radars are used in various military applications, from 
guided weapons (such anti-ship missile), to large platforms 
(aircrafts, ships), to large systems (Integrated Air 
Defense Systems – IADS). The purpose of the present thesis 
is to evaluate the performance of netted LPI radar systems. 
To do so, it commences with establishing the theoretical 
background for the LPI radar techniques and detection 
methods. Additionally, it presents existing LPI assets 
along with their operational characteristics to provide the 
reader with a useful tool for comparative analysis of the 
LPI radar market. As this work focuses on LPI radar 
networks, specific emphasis is given to clarifying the 
notion of a netted system; the conceptual and mathematical 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................1 
A. BACKGROUND .........................................1 
B. SCOPE OF THE THESIS ................................2 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS .................................3 
D. METHODOLOGY ........................................3 
E. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY ..............................4 
F. THESIS OUTLINE .....................................4 
II. LPI RADAR THEORY OF OPERATION AND TECHNIQUES ............7 
A. DEFINITIONS ........................................7 
B. LPI RADAR EVOLUTION HISTORY ........................8 
C. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF LPI RADAR OPERATION ...........11 
1. Power Management .............................11 
2. Waveform Shaping .............................12 
3. Antenna Design ...............................14 
a. Low Level Antenna Sidelobes .............14 
b. Antenna Scan Patterns ...................18 
4. Carrier Frequency Selection ..................19 
5. High Receiver Sensitivity ....................20 
6. Processing Gain of LPI Radar .................22 
a. Coherent Processing .....................25 
b. LPI Waveforms ...........................25 
III. EXAMPLES OF AIRBORNE, MARITIME AND LAND-BASED LPI 
RADARS .................................................41 
A. AIRBORNE LPI RADARS ...............................42 
1. AN/APN-232 Combined Altitude Radar Altimeter .42 
2. HG-9550 Radar Altimeter ......................42 
3. GRA-2000 Radar Altimeter .....................43 
4. PA-5429 Radar Altimeter ......................44 
5. CMRA – Cruise Missile Radar Altimeter ........44 
6. AHV-2XX0 Family of Radar Altimeters ..........45 
7. AD-1990 Radar Altimeter ......................45 
8. AN/APS-147 Radar .............................46 
9. AN/APQ-181 Radar .............................47 
10. AN/APG-77 Radar ..............................47 
11. LANTIRN (Low-Altitude Navigation and 
Targeting Infra-Red for Night) ...............48 
12. RBS-15 Mk3 Missile Seeker ....................50 
B. MARITIME LPI RADARS ...............................51 
1. Pilot Radar ..................................51 
2. Scout Radar ..................................52 
3. Smart-L Radar ................................53 
4. VARIANT Radar ................................54 
 viii
5. AN/SPN-46 (V) Precision Approach Landing 
System .......................................55 
C. LAND-BASED LPI RADARS .............................55 
1. TALS--Tactical Automatic Landing System ......55 
2. Eagle Fire Control Radar .....................56 
3. HARD-3D Radar ................................57 
4. POINTER Radar ................................58 
5. PAGE Radar ...................................59 
6. CRM-100 Radar ................................59 
7. JY-17A Radar .................................60 
IV. DETECTION OF LPI RADARS ................................63 
A. ES RECEIVER CHALLENGES ............................66 
1. Radar Processing Gain ........................66 
2. High Sensitivity Requirement .................68 
B. TYPES OF ES RECEIVERS FOR LPI RADAR DETECTION .....69 
1. Crystal Video Receiver .......................71 
2. Instantaneous Frequency Management Receivers 
(IFM) ........................................74 
3. Superheterodyne Receiver .....................77 
4. Channelized Receivers ........................79 
5. Transform Intercept Receivers ................81 
6. Cueing Systems/Hybrid Systems ................82 
C. DETECTION ACCURACY ................................85 
1. Detection Finding Techniques .................85 
a. Rotating Directional Antenna ............85 
b. Multiple Antenna Amplitude Comparison ...85 
c. Watson Watt .............................86 
d. Doppler .................................86 
e. Interferometer ..........................86 
f. Amplitude Angle of Arrival ..............87 
g. Phase Angle of Arrival ..................91 
2. Precision Emitter Location Techniques ........92 
a. Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) .......93 
b.  Frequency Difference of Arrival (FDOA) ..96 
D. SIGNAL PROCESSING ALGORITHMS ......................98 
1. Wigner Ville Distribution (WVD) .............100 
2. Choi Williams Distribution ..................103 
V. JAMMING METHODS FOR LPI RADARS ........................107 
A. CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS ........................107 
1. EA Radar Jamming Waveforms ..................107 
2. LPI Jamming Probability: The Issue of 
Interception ................................108 
B. LPI RADAR JAMMER DESIGN REQUIREMENTS .............111 
1. Bandwidth ...................................111 
2. Radar Receiver Sensitivity Advantage ........113 
 ix
C. ANTIJAM ADVANTAGE OF LPI .........................115 
D. JAMMING ..........................................117 
1. FSK .........................................117 
2. PSK .........................................118 
3. FMCW ........................................119 
VI. NETWORKS AND NETCENTRIC WARFARE (NCW) .................125 
A. INTRODUCTION .....................................125 
B. NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE ..........................125 
C. NCW REQUIREMENTS .................................126 
1. Situational Awareness .......................128 
2. Maneuverability .............................128 
3. Decision Speed and Operational Tempo ........129 
4. Agility .....................................130 
5. Lethality ...................................131 
D. METRICS FOR INFORMATION GRID ANALYSIS ............131 
1. Generalized Connectivity Measure ............132 
2. Reference Connectivity Measure ..............133 
3. Network Reach ...............................133 
4. Extended Generalized Connectivity Measure ...134 
5. Entropy and Network Richness ................135 
a. Entropy ................................135 
b. Network Richness .......................138 
6. Maximum Operational Tempo ...................139 
7. Example .....................................141 
E. NETTED LPI RADAR SYSTEMS .........................150 
VII. NETTED RADAR SYSTEMS -- ADVANTAGES  AND DISADVANTAGES .153 
A. MULTISITE RADAR SYSTEMS CATEGORIZATION ...........153 
1. Type of Targets of Interest .................153 
2. The Degree of Spatial Coherence .............154 
a. Spatially Coherent MSRSs ...............154 
b. Short-Term Spatial Coherent MSRSs ......154 
c. Spatially Incoherent MSRSs .............155 
3. Information Fusion Level ....................157 
a. Radio Signal Integration Level .........157 
b. Video Signal Integration Level .........157 
c. Plot Integration Level .................157 
d. Track Integration Level ................158 
4. Degree of Autonomy of Signal Reception ......159 
a. Independent (Autonomous) Signal 
Reception ..............................159 
b. Cooperative Signal Reception ...........160 
c. Independent - Cooperative Signal 
Reception ..............................160 
5. Station Location and Mobility ...............160 
 x
a. Ground-Based MSRSs With Stationary 
Stations ...............................160 
b. Ground-based MSRSs With Mobile Stations 160 
c. Transmitter (or Receiver) on Platforms, 
Receiver (or Transmitter) Ground-based. 160 
d. All Stations on Platforms ..............161 
e. Shipborne ..............................161 
B. ADVANTAGES OF MULTISITE RADAR SYSTEMS ............161 
1. Capability to Form Coverage Area of Required 
Configuration for Expected Environments .....161 
2. Power Advantages ............................161 
3. Detection of Stealth Targets ................162 
4. High Accuracy of the Position Estimation of 
a Target ....................................162 
5. Possibility of Estimating Target’s Velocity 
and Acceleration Vectors by the Doppler 
Method ......................................164 
6. Capability to Measure Three Coordinates and 
Velocity Vector of Radiation Sources ........167 
7. Increase of Resolution Capability ...........168 
8. Increase of Target Handling Capacity ........171 
9. Increase of “Signal Information” Body .......172 
10. Increase of Jamming Resistance ..............172 
a. Resistance to Sidelobe Jamming .........173 
b. Resistance to Main Lobe Jamming ........173 
11. Increase of Clutter Resistance ..............174 
12. Increase of Survivability and Reliability ...175 
13. Technical and Operational Advantages ........176 
14. Detection of Non-LOS Targets ................176 
C. DISADVANTAGES OF MULTISITE RADAR SYSTEMS .........177 
1. Centralized Control of Spatially Separate 
Stations ....................................177 
2. Necessity of Data Transmission Conduits .....177 
3. Additional Requirements for Synchronization, 
Phasing of Spatially Separate Stations, 
Transmission of Reference Frequencies and 
Signals .....................................178 
4. Increased Requirements to Signal and Data 
Processors and Computer Systems .............179 
5. Necessity for Accurate Station Positioning 
and Mutual Alignment ........................179 
6. Need for Direct LOS Between Stations and 
Targets .....................................180 
7. High Cost ...................................180 
D. SUMMARY ..........................................181 
VIII.SIMULATION SCENARIO ...................................185 
 xi
A. SCENARIO 1: 1 SSJ ................................193 
1. Scenario 1 Time Index 1 .....................193 
a. `SNR – Non-Netted ......................193 
b. `SNR – Netted ..........................194 
c. `JSR – Non-Netted ......................195 
d. `JSR – Netted ..........................196 
e. `S/(J+N) – Non-Netted ..................197 
f. S/(J+N) – Netted .......................198 
2. Scenario 1 Time index 2 (5 LPI Radar + 1 
SSJ) ........................................199 
a. SNR Non-Netted .........................199 
b. SNR Netted .............................200 
c. JSR Non-Netted .........................201 
d. JSR Netted .............................202 
e. S/(J+N) Non-Netted .....................203 
f. S/(J+N) Netted .........................204 
3. Scenario 1 Time index 3 (5 LPI Radar + 1 
SSJ) ........................................205 
a. SNR – Non-Netted .......................205 
b. SNR –Netted ............................206 
c. JSR – Non-Netted .......................207 
d. JSR – Netted ...........................208 
e. S/(J+N) – Non-Netted ...................209 
f. S/(J+N) –Netted ........................210 
Β. SCENARIO 2: 1 STAND-OFF JAMMER & 1 TARGET ........211 
1. Scenario 2 Time Index 1 .....................211 
a. SNR – Non-Netted .......................211 
b. SNR – Netted ...........................212 
c. JSR – Non-Netted .......................213 
d. JSR –Netted ............................214 
e. S/(J+N) – Non-Netted ...................215 
f. S/(J+N) –Netted ........................216 
2. Scenario 2 Time Index 2 .....................217 
a. SNR – Non-Netted .......................217 
b. SNR –Netted ............................218 
c. JSR – Non-Netted .......................219 
d. JSR –Netted ............................220 
e. S/(J+N) – Non-Netted ...................221 
f. S/(J+N) –Netted ........................222 
3. Scenario 2 Time Index 3 .....................223 
a. SNR – Non-Netted .......................223 
b. SNR –Netted ............................224 
c. JSR – Non-Netted .......................225 
d. JSR –Netted ............................226 
e. S/(J+N) – Non-Netted ...................227 
f. S/(J+N)– Netted ........................228 
 xii
C. SCENARIO 3: 2 STAND IN JAMMERS ...................229 
1. Scenario 3 Time Index 1 .....................229 
a. SNR – Non-Netted .......................229 
b. SNR – Netted ...........................230 
c. JSR – Non-Netted .......................231 
d. JSR –Netted ............................232 
e. S/(J+N) – Non-Netted ...................233 
f. S/(J+N)- Netted ........................234 
2. Scenario 3 Time Index 2 .....................235 
a. SNR – Non-Netted .......................235 
b. SNR – Netted ...........................236 
c. JSR – Non-Netted .......................237 
d. JSR – Netted ...........................238 
e. S/(J+N) – Non-Netted ...................239 
f. S/(J+N)–Netted .........................240 
3. Scenario 3 Time Index 3 .....................241 
a. SNR – Non-Netted .......................241 
b. SNR –Netted ............................242 
c. JSR – Non-Netted .......................243 
d. JSR –Netted ............................244 
e. S/(J+N) – Non-Netted ...................245 
f. S/(J+N) –Netted ........................246 
IX. CONCLUSIONS ...........................................253 
APPENDIX. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF PHASE MODULATING 
TECHNIQUES, FREQUENCY SHIFT KEYING TECHNIQUES AND 
NOISE TECHNIQUES ......................................257 
A. PHASE MODULATING TECHNIQUES ......................257 
1. BPSK Codes ..................................257 
2. Polyphase Codes .............................260 
a. Polyphase Barker Codes .................260 
b. Frank Code .............................261 
c. P1 Code ................................263 
d. P2 Code ................................265 
e. P3 Code ................................267 
f. P4 Code ................................269 
3. Polytime Codes ..............................271 
a. T1(n) ..................................271 
b. T2(n) ..................................273 
c. T3(n) ..................................275 
d. T4(n) ..................................277 
B. FREQUENCY SHIFT KEYING (FSK) TECHNIQUES ..........279 
1. Costas Codes ................................279 
2. Hybrid FSK/PSK Technique ....................281 
3. Matched FSK/PSK Technique ...................283 
C. NOISE TECHNIQUES .................................284 
 xiii
1. RNR .........................................284 
2. RNFR ........................................285 
3. RNFSR .......................................286 
4. RBPC ........................................287 
LIST OF REFERENCES .........................................289 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 xv
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Pulse Compression...............................13 
Figure 2. FMCW............................................14 
Figure 3. Conventional (a) and Low Sidelobe Antenna 
Patterns (b)....................................18 
Figure 4. Atmospheric Attenuation vs Frequency............20 
Figure 5. Linear FMCW Triangular Waveform.................28 
Figure 6. Linear FMCW In-Phase Ramp-up Signal.............31 
Figure 7. AN/APN-232......................................42 
Figure 8. HG9550..........................................43 
Figure 9. GRA-2000........................................44 
Figure 10. AHV-2XX0 Family of Radar Altimeters.............45 
Figure 11. AN/APS-147 Radar (Antenna Under Helicopter 
Cockpit--Red Arrow).............................46 
Figure 12. AN/APG-77 Radar Antenna.........................48 
Figure 13. LANTIRN Pods on F-16--Red Arrows................50 
Figure 14. AN/AAQ-13 Navigation Pod........................50 
Figure 15. Pilot Radar on Visby-class Corvette (Radar 
Antenna--Red Arrow).............................52 
Figure 16. Scout Radar.....................................53 
Figure 17. Smart-L Radar...................................54 
Figure 18. VARIANT Radar...................................54 
Figure 19. AN/SPN-46 (V)...................................55 
Figure 20. TALS............................................56 
Figure 21. Eagle Fire Control Radar........................57 
Figure 22. HARD-3D Radar...................................58 
Figure 23. Pointer Radar...................................58 
Figure 24. PAGE Radar......................................59 
Figure 25. CRM-100.........................................60 
Figure 26. CVR Block Diagram...............................71 
Figure 27. IFM Principle...................................74 
Figure 28. Digital Multioctave IFM Block Diagram...........76 
Figure 29. Digitally Controlled Superheterodyne Receiver 
Block Diagram...................................77 
Figure 30. AN/ALR-56M Radar Warning Receiver (RWR).........79 
Figure 31. Channelized Intercept Receiver Block Diagram....80 
Figure 32. Hybrid Receiver Block Diagram...................82 
Figure 33. Broadband Cavity Backed Spiral Gain Pattern.....88 
Figure 34. Amplitude AOA Pattern Displacement..............88 
Figure 35. Angle of Arrival Measurement by Amplitude 
Comparison......................................89 
Figure 36. Phase Comparison AOA Measurement................91 
Figure 37.  Isochrone Lines; Two Aircraft Time Difference 
of Arrival......................................94 
 xvi
Figure 38. Isochrone Lines; Two Aircraft Time Difference 
of Arrival......................................94 
Figure 39. The Anti-jam Advantage of LPI Communication....116 
Figure 40. The Bit Error Rate in a Digital Receiver Cannot 
Exceed 50 Percent; a 0dB JSR Reaches this Level 
of Errors;.....................................117 
Figure 41. Relationship Between Network Space and 
Challenges.....................................127 
Figure 42. Maneuverability................................129 
Figure 43. OODA Loop......................................129 
Figure 44. Operational Tempo vs. Force Agility............130 
Figure 45. Three-node Network Example.....................134 
Figure 46. Time Spent in Each OODA Cycle Phase............140 
Figure 47. Network Topology...............................142 
Figure 48. Network Topology after EA......................147 
Figure 49. Three-node MIMO Netted Radar System............151 
Figure 50. Netted Mono-static (left) Multi-static (right) 
Increase of Angular Coordinate Measurement 
Accuracy.......................................163 
Figure 51. Netted Mono-static (left) Multi-static (right) 
Target Velocity Vector Measurement by the 
Doppler Method.................................165 
Figure 52. Angular Resolution of MSRS.....................168 
Figure 53. Simulation Network Topology....................185 
Figure 54. Non-Netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=1...193 
Figure 55. Netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=1.......194 
Figure 56. Non-netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=1...195 
Figure 57. Netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=1.......196 
Figure 58. Non-netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time Index=1..197 
Figure 59. Netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time Index=1......198 
Figure 60. Non-netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=2...199 
Figure 61. Netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=2.......200 
Figure 62. Non-netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=2...201 
Figure 63. Netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=2.......202 
Figure 64. Non-netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time Index=2..203 
Figure 65. Netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time Index=2......204 
Figure 66. Non-netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=3...205 
Figure 67. Netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=3.......206 
Figure 68. Non-netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=3...207 
Figure 69. Netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=3.......208 
Figure 70. Non-netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time Index=3..209 
Figure 71. Netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time Index-3......210 
Figure 72. Non-netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=1...211 
Figure 73. Netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=1.......212 
Figure 74. Non-netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=1...213 
Figure 75. Netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=1.......214 
 xvii
Figure 76. Non-netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time Index=1..215 
Figure 77. Netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time Index=1......216 
Figure 78. Non-netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=2...217 
Figure 79. Netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=2.......218 
Figure 80. Non-netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=2...219 
Figure 81. Netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=2.......220 
Figure 82. Non-netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time Index=2..221 
Figure 83. Netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time Index=2......222 
Figure 84. Non-netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=3...223 
Figure 85. Netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=3.......224 
Figure 86. Non-netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=3...225 
Figure 87. Netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=3.......226 
Figure 88. Non-netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time Index=3..227 
Figure 89. Netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time Index=3......228 
Figure 90. Non-netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=1...229 
Figure 91. Netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=1.......230 
Figure 92. Non-netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=1...231 
Figure 93. Netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=1.......232 
Figure 94. Non-netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time Index=1..233 
Figure 95. Netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time Index=1......234 
Figure 96. Non-netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=2...235 
Figure 97. Netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=2.......236 
Figure 98. Non-netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=2...237 
Figure 99. Netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=2.......238 
Figure 100. Non-netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time Index=2..239 
Figure 101. Netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time Index=2......240 
Figure 102. Non-netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=3...241 
Figure 103. Netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=3.......242 
Figure 104. Non-netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=3...243 
Figure 105. Netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=3.......244 
Figure 106. Non-netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time Index=3..245 
Figure 107. Netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time Index=3......246 
Figure 108. Figure BPSK Modulation.........................257 
Figure 109. BPSK Signal Modulated by Barker Code (length 7)259 
Figure 110. Frank Code Phase...............................262 
Figure 111. Signal Phase (Modulated by Frank Code).........262 
Figure 112. P1 Code Phase..................................264 
Figure 113. Signal Phase (Modulated by P1 Code)............264 
Figure 114. P2 Code Phase..................................266 
Figure 115. Signal Phase (Modulated by P2 Code)............266 
Figure 116. P3 Code Phase..................................268 
Figure 117. Signal Phase (Modulated by P3 Code)............268 
Figure 118. P4 Code Phase..................................270 
Figure 119. Signal Phase (Modulated by P4 Code)............270 
Figure 120. T1(2) Stepped Frequency Phase..................272 
Figure 121. T1(2) Modulated Signal Time Domain Waveform....272 
 xviii
Figure 122. T2(2) Stepped Frequency Phase..................274 
Figure 123. T2(2) Modulated Signal Time Domain Waveform....274 
Figure 124. T3(2) Stepped Frequency Phase..................276 
Figure 125. T3(2) Modulated Signal Time Domain Waveform....276 
Figure 126. T4(2) Stepped Frequency Phase..................278 
Figure 127. T4(2) Modulated Signal Time Domain Waveform....278 
Figure 128. I Channel PSD with Noise SNR=0dB...............280 
Figure 129. I Channel PSD with No Noise....................280 
Figure 130. FSK (Costas Only) PSD..........................282 




































LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Phase Modulating Techniques Advantages/ 
Disadvantages...................................34 
Table 2. Phase Modulating Techniques Advantages 
/Disadvantages..................................37 
Table 3. Noise Techniques Advantages/Disadvantages.......39 
Table 4. Examples of LPI Radars..........................41 
Table 5. Intercept Receiver Typical Performance..........70 
Table 6. Typical ES Receivers' Performance Parameters....84 
Table 7. Typical Deployed Intercept Receivers...........106 
Table 8. Modern EA Systems..............................123 
Table 9. Degree of Spatial Coherence Summary............156 
Table 10. Information Fusion Level Summary...............159 
Table 11. Summary of MSRS Advantages for Types of MSRSs..183 
Table 12. Summary of MSRS Disadvantages for Types of 
MSRSs..........................................184 
Table 13. LPI Radar & Target Characteristics.............186 
Table 14. Maximum Detection Range vs. Intercept 
Receiver’s Sensitivity.........................191 
Table 15. Summary of Simulation Results..................247 
Table 16. Barker Codes...................................258 
Table 17. Compound Barker Code for 4cN = ..................258 
 
 xx
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xxi
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ALCM:  Air Launched Cruise Missile 
AOA:  Angle of Arrival 
AOR:  Area of Regard 
AWGN:  Additive White Gaussian Noise 
ARM:  Anti-Radiation Missile 
BPSK:  Binary Phase Shift Keying 
CVR:  Crystal Video Receiver 
CW:   Continuous Wave 
CWD:  Choi-Williams Distribution 
DECM: Deceptive Electronic Countermeasures 
DOA:  Direction of Arrival 
DoD:  Department of Defense 
EA:   Electronic Attack 
ECM:  Electronic Countermeasures 
ELINT:  Electronic Intelligence 
EP:   Electronic Protection 
ES:   Electronic Support 
ESM:  Electronic Support Measure 
EW:   Electronic Warfare 
FDOA:  Frequency Direction of Arrival 
FH:   Frequency Hopping 
FLIR:     Forward Looking Infra-Red 
FM:   Frequency Modulation 
FMCW:  Frequency Modulation Continuous Wave 
FOV:      Field of View  
FSK:  Frequency Shift Keying 
HPBW:  Half-Power Beamwidth 
IADS:     Integrated Air-Defense System 
IFF:  Identification of Friend or Foe 
IFM:  Instantaneous Frequency Management 
 xxii
IR:   Infra-Red 
ISAR: Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar 
JSR:  Jamming to Signal Ratio 
LAN:  Local Area Network  
LPI:  Low Probability of Intercept 
MIMO: Multiple-Input Multiple-Output 
MSRS: Multiple Radar System 
MTI:  Moving Target Indicator 
NCW:  Net-centric Warfare 
OODA: Observation- Orientation- Decision- Action 
OTHT: Over the Horizon Targeting 
POI:  Probability of Intercept 
PSD:  Power Spectral Density 
PSK:  Phase Shift Keying 
PSL:  Peak Sidelobe 
QMFB:  Quadrature Mirror Filter Bank 
RBPC:  Random Binary Phase Code 
RCS:  Radar Cross-Section 
RF:   Radio Frequency 
RMS:  Root Mean Square  
RNFR:  Random Noise Radar plus FMCW 
RNFSR:  RNFR plus sine 
RNR:  Random Noise Radar 
RWR:  Radar Warning Receiver 
SAR:  Synthetic Aperture Radar 
SEI:  Specific Emitter Identification 
SIGINT:  Signal Intelligence 
SNR:  Signal-to-Noise Ratio 
SNJR: Signal to Noise and Jamming Ratio 
SOJ:  Stand-Off Jamming 
SSJ:  Self-Screening Jamming 
STC:  Sensitivity Time Control 
 xxiii
STFT:  Short-Time Fourier Transform 
TDOA:  Time Difference of Arrival 
UV:   Ultra Violet 
WVD:  Wigner-Ville Distribution 
 
 xxiv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xxv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Charalampos Fougias Acknowledgments: 
 
I would like to thank all people who have helped and 
inspired me during my thesis study.  
First of all, I would like to extend my utmost 
gratitude to my advisors Mr. Edward Fisher and Dr. Wolfgang 
Baer for their valuable guidance, mentorship and monumental 
patience.  They were always accessible and willing to help 
with my research.  
Mr. Edward Fisher deserves special thanks because I 
had the fortune to take one of his classes, and during that 
class I was inspired to explore this area of study. 
A special thanks to my “brother-in-arms” in this 
thesis, Charalampos Menychtas, for his contributions, 
timeless investment, and commitment to this thesis. 
I would like to thank the Hellenic Air Force for 
providing me the opportunity to study at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
I would also like to thank my parents for providing me 
countless opportunities and for fostering a learning 
environment in which ethos integrity, discipline and hard 
work measure one’s potential to achieve. 
To my wife, Arieta, thank you for blessing me with 
unconditional love and unending support throughout my 
career and especially here at Monterey, California far away 
from family and friends. Few, if any, men share my luck. 
 xxvi
To my daughter, Kalia, thank you for bringing me such 
joy and inspiration to keep going. 
Last, I would like to dedicate this thesis to my wife 
Arieta and my daughter Kalia.  
 
Charalampos Menychtas Acknowledgments: 
 
I would like to thank the Hellenic Navy for giving me 
the opportunity to compete for, and earn postgraduate 
education at the Naval Postgraduate School. My studies in 
this institution have broadened my horizons both as an 
officer and as an individual and have asserted my view that 
knowledge is the most powerful weapon.  
I am deeply indebted to the NPS faculty, which 
willingly assisted my academic inquiries and pursuits 
throughout my studies. Among the various professors I had 
the honor of being taught by, my thesis advisors, Mr. 
Edward Fisher and Dr. Wolfgang Baer, deserve the greatest 
of appreciation for their insightful comments and 
continuous support that made this project feasible. 
I would also like to express my acknowledgements to 
Major Fougias, for his contribution and fruitful 
cooperation on this thesis work. 




The “classic” situation between radar and intercept 
receivers has been that the latter has no difficulty 
detecting and jamming the radar, and even sometimes its 
sidelobes, at long ranges. To counter that performance 
degradation, radar engineering is focused in concealing the 
radar emissions from the adversary (the analogy of that 
situation, at the target level, is to have low target Radar 
Cross Section [RCS] to achieve minimal returns to the radar 
receiver, to adopt special tactics to avoid detection, 
etc.). Several radar techniques have been developed to 
conceal radar from intercept receivers: power management, 
wide operational bandwidth, frequency agility, antenna 
sidelobe reduction, and advanced scan patterns 
(modulations). The types of radars that utilize such 
techniques are called Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) 
radars. 
In this “Radar versus Jammer” game, both sides have 
exhibited remarkable adaptability: the jammer industry has 
replied with more sophisticated intercept receivers that 
try to match the LPI radar processing gain. As a response, 
an increasing number of LPI radars are incorporated into 
integrated air defense systems, IADS modern platforms, and 
weapons, such as anti-ship missiles and littoral weapon 
systems. The next step to improve the EP aspect of such 
systems is to associate a number of LPI assets in a net 
centric sense. 
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Examining the effect of modern jammers in net centric 
vs. non-centric IADS, we can draw useful conclusions on the 
effectiveness of the former: is there a comparative 
advantage of such a system vs. a non-netted one? And if 
there is, can it be evaluated? 
B. SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis provides a comprehensive volume of two 
major elements in Electronic Warfare: LPI technology and 
network configurations. Although the existing literature 
dealing individually with LPI technology is not only wide 
but also constantly updated (Lee 1991, McRitchie and 
McDonald 1999, Kadambe and Adali 1998, Burgos-Garcia et al. 
2000,D. Adamy 2001, Baker and Hume 2001, Skolnik 2001, Gau 
2002, Lynch Jr. 2004, Wiley 2006,Pace 2009), scholarly 
efforts providing insights in network configurations of 
such assets is, by comparison, less extensive. In this 
context, this thesis intends to fill this literature gap 
and provide a more comprehensive volume covering both 
academic realms on the same work.1 
To do so, it commences with establishing the 
theoretical background for LPI radar techniques and 
detection methods. Additionally, it presents the existing 
LPI assets along with their operational characteristics, 
thus providing the reader with a useful tool for 
comparative analysis of the LPI radar market. As this works 
                     
1 The 2008 paper of Chen and Pace presents a basic framework for 
simulation of network enabled radar systems, but, apart from being 
limited in breadth, its scope is limited in the evaluation of the 
jamming effect in general radar topology. Y. Q. Chen and Phillip E. 
Pace, “Simulation of Information Metrics to Assess the Value of 
Networking in A General Battlespace Topology,” in Proc. of the IEEE 
International Conf. on System of Systems Engineering (IEEE, June 2008). 
  3
intends to elucidate the concept of LPI networks, special 
emphasis shall be given to clarifying the notion of a 
netted system; the theoretical and mathematical background 
of such is presented in a separate chapter. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Primary: 
What is the jamming effect on a netted LPI radar-based 
IADS versus non-netted IADS?  
 
Secondary: 
What is LPI radar and how does it gain its advantage?  
What is netted radar network and how does it gain its 
advantage?  
How are LPI radars most effectively netted? 
How effective is EA on LPI netted networks? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis research will 
consist of the following steps. 
Articles, books, periodicals, thesis, IEEE, and DoD 
documents related to the subject will be collected and 
thoroughly examined. MATLAB simulation regarding the IADS 
configuration under evaluation shall be applied to assist 
the comprehensive aspect of the thesis. With the MATLAB 
simulation, we will design an LPI IADS system that can be 
operated in netted or autonomous configuration, and we will 
examine its overall behavior under different jamming 
operational techniques. The answers to questions stated in 
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the above section will be established in a reasonable 
fashion.  
E. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
The results of this thesis will be used to support 
ongoing efforts by the Hellenic Armed Forces. This thesis 
will enhance the perspective and knowledge of Electronic 
Warfare officers, related project officers, and technical 
personnel. The comprehensive approach of the LPI concept 
attempted in this paper will assist the Hellenic Armed 
Forces in evaluating future needs and requirements of 
Electronic Warfare systems on both netted and non-netted 
configurations. 
F. THESIS OUTLINE 
The thesis research and findings are organized in the 
following manner: 
Chapter I comprises the introductory section of the 
thesis. 
Chapter II describes the LPI radar theory of operation 
and techniques (waveforms, modulation) used in this thesis 
work. It gives to the reader the theoretical basis of the 
LPI radar operation. 
Chapter III presents the airborne, maritime, and land-
based LPI radars available in the industry. 
Chapter IV describes detection methods of LPI radars. 
For this purpose EP receivers and signal processing 
algorithms are examined in detail. Examples of EP receiver 
systems used in real operational environments are also 
given. 
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Chapter V discusses jamming methods for LPI radars. 
Chapter VI introduces the idea of networks and 
attempts to clarify the concept of net-centric warfare 
(NCW). 
Chapter VII looks more specifically into netted LPI 
Radar Systems, addressing their advantages and 
disadvantages. 
Chapter VIII employs simulation of selected net 
centric IADS configuration via MATLAB. 
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II. LPI RADAR THEORY OF OPERATION AND TECHNIQUES 
The objective of this chapter is to enlighten the 
reader about the applicable techniques for LPI radar 
systems as well as to give some examples of airborne, 
maritime and land-based LPI radar systems. 
A. DEFINITIONS 
In today’s battlefield, radar faces many threats from 
Electronic Attack (EA) and Anti-Radiation Missiles (ARMs). 
This situation brought about the need for the radar to try 
to “see” the target without enabling the target’s passive 
intercept receiver and/or other enemies’ intercept receiver 
(not on board the target) to intercept the radar’s signal. 
To answer that need, radars were developed that apply 
various LPI techniques. These radars are called LPI radar.  
LPI radar is one form of RF Stealth. It tries to hide 
one’s RF emissions, or its active signature, by 
implementing various techniques such as using very low 
signal levels and/or specially constructed waveforms (those 
will be analyzed later in this thesis). 
Active signature is defined as all the observable 
emissions from a platform: acoustic, chemical (soot and 
contrails), communications, radar, IFF, IR, laser, and 
Ultra-Violet (UV) (Lynch 2004, 3). 
Radar signature reduction requires the use of various 
techniques that can minimize the radar’s radiated power 
density at possible intercept receiver locations. The role 




radar’s active signature because by correct and thoughtful 
tactics implementation one can reduce significantly 
exposure time during emission. 
B. LPI RADAR EVOLUTION HISTORY 
The “classic” situation between radar and intercept 
receivers has been that the intercept receiver has no 
difficulty detecting the radar, and even sometimes its 
sidelobes, at long ranges. That happens because the radar 
transmitted wave has to “travel” twice the distance—from 
radar to target (intercept receiver) and back—for the radar 
to detect the target. In the case of the intercept receiver 
onboard the target, the wave has to travel only the “one 
way” (Skolnik 2001, 7). That can easily be seen by the 
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Where:   
TP = Transmitter Power     
TG = Gain of RADAR Ant 
RDR
RP = RADAR received signal power 
ESM
RP = ESM received signal power   
λ = Wavelength 
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tσ = Target’s RADAR Cross Section (RCS)  
RG = Gain of ESM Receiver Ant 
RDRR = RADAR detection range 
ESMR = Intercept’s receiver detection range 
From the above equations we can clearly see that the 
RADAR received signal power is proportional to 41/ RDRR  
whereas the intercept received signal power is proportional 
to 21 / ESMR . So the considering all other factors between 
RADAR and intercept receiver the same or comparable 
(atmospheric losses, processing gains of both receivers 
etc) the path loss ( 21 / ESMR  versus 41/ RDRR ) created a great 
advantage for the intercept receiver. 
The increased signal processing gain obtainable from 
radar has given radar the potential ability to alter that 
balance, on the assumption that the intercept receiver 
cannot duplicate the radar’s processing gain. 
LPI radar is designed to be difficult to detect by 
passive radar detection equipment (such as a radar warning 
receiver (RWR) or other ESM equipment) while it is 
searching for or tracking a target. This characteristic is 
desirable because it allows finding and tracking an 
opponent without alerting them to the radar's presence. 
LPI radars are generally transmitting weak signals 
that the intercept receiver has difficulty detecting above 
its threshold. 
Many combined features help the LPI radar prevent its 




centered on the antenna (antenna pattern and scan 
patterns), the transmitter radiated waveform and LPI radar 
power management features. 
The capability of LPI radar to stay undetected heavily 
depends upon the intercept receiver’s characteristics and 
vice versa. So in order to understand LPI radars we must 
understand the nature of the ESM receivers. The purpose of 
an ESM receiver is to detect, sort and classify an unknown 
radar (Lynch 2004, 11). 
The ESM receiver achieves the detection of the radar 
signal by having the necessary sensitivity and processing 
power to detect a signal of specific power over a given 
distance.  
Sorting is the task of separating different emitters, 
in a dense signal environment where many signals in 
different or the same frequency band from various 
directions are intercepted, so that they can then be 
classified.   
Classification is the task of identifying emitter type 
(or even the specific emitter) and determining the 
respective weapon system that the emitter is carried on.  
LPI radar uses continuous wave (CW), wide bandwidth, 
low power signals on the order of a few watts (or even 
lower in the order of magnitude of mWatts) making its 
detection difficult. Unlike conventional radars, which emit 
high-energy pulses in a narrow frequency band, LPI radar 
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emits low energy pulses over a wide frequency band. 
Wideband CW techniques include: 
• Linear and nonlinear frequency modulation (FMCW) 
• Phase modulation (Bi-phase codes such as Barker Code, 
poly-phase codes such as Frank, P1, P2, P3 and P4 Code). 
• Frequency hopping (FSK, Costas sequence FSK 
technique). 
• LPI signals are typically modulated by a periodic 
function such as Barker Code, Frank Code, P1 Code, P2 Code, 
P3 Code and P4 Code. 
The purpose of this modulation is to generate a 
“unique” waveform signature that can be detected by the 
radar receiver when scattered back at very low S/N levels. 
C. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF LPI RADAR OPERATION 
Various features and techniques can be implemented 
with radar to reduce its active signature, make it an LPI 
radar and ultimately prevent its detection by modern 
intercept receivers. 
1. Power Management 
Power management is the ability to control the power 
level emitted by the antenna, and limit the power to the 
appropriate range/radar Cross Section (RCS) detection 
requirement (Pace 2009, 16). 
The idea is that since most intercept receivers would 
expect an increase in received power by the radar as the 
distance decreases, the ability of the LPI radar to adjust 
its radiated power to lower levels as the target approaches 
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can make the intercept receiver change its priorities for 
Electronic Attack (EA) on the LPI radar.  
From the LPI radar’s point of view, as can be seen in 
equation 2.1, as the distance from the target is decreasing 
RDRR , the LPI radar by trying to keep the level of its 
received power scattered back from the target RDRRP close to 
its minimum discernable level, with all other factors the 
same, reduces its radiated power level TP .  
From the intercept receiver’s point of view, as can be 
seen in equation 2.2, by decreasing the radiated power TP   
with all other factors the same (including the distance 
between LPI radar and intercept receiver), the received 
power by the intercept receiver ESMRP decreases, which in turn 
is translated by the intercept receiver as an increase of 
the distance between the LPI radar and the intercept 
receiver.  
2. Waveform Shaping 
Conventional RADARs use waveforms comprised of pulse 
trains that have a very high peak power TP  and a low duty 
cycle /ave TDC P P= . These kinds of waveforms are easily 
detectable by intercept receivers. Since the detection of a 
target relies upon the total back scattered power to the 
radar receiver, modern radar use special waveforms that: 
• Disperse the power of one pulse in many pulses (that 
will hit the same target) and integrate them together 
(coherently or non-coherently) taking their added effect, 
as we can see in Figure 1. That is pulse compression (for 
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pulsed radar) and is based on the fact that what matters to 
radar detection is the total amount of energy reflected 
back from the target.  
 
Figure 1. Pulse Compression 
• Disperse the power in low energy pulses over a wide 
frequency band, as we can see in Figure 2. That can be done 
by using a CW waveform properly modulated by techniques 
mentioned earlier. This is the main technique used in LPI 
radar that uses FM modulation ramps, but as we reported 
previously there are other types of modulating the CW wave 
used at an LPI radar. LPI radar has low TP  but high aveP . 
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Figure 2. FMCW 
In general, waveform shaping techniques provide the 
extra processing gain that gives radar its main advantage 
with respect to ESM receivers, but it also forms a power 
management “like” method to reduce the peak power of the 
radar. 
3. Antenna Design 
a. Low Level Antenna Sidelobes 
Radar applications generally demand low sidelobe 
antennas for the following reasons, which are also the 
advantages of achieving low sidelobes (Lynch 2004, 354):  
• If the sidelobes are large enough, they 
radiate a large portion of the total radiated energy of the 
antenna. That fact would cause a reduction of the main beam 
energy and consequently the decrease of the antenna gain. 
• Low sidelobes reduce clutter returns (they 
cover most of the space around the antenna, and since the 
antenna is pointing at the point of interest, their returns 
are mostly unwanted clutter). 
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• Low sidelobes reduce interference (mostly 
from nearby friendly transmitters). 
• Low sidelobes reduce ECM susceptibility and 
probability of intercept (high levels of sidelobes make 
jamming easier and, since they cover most of the space 
around the antenna, can expose it easily at various 
bearings).  
Typical sidelobe levels for conventional radar 
are around -20 dB whereas for LPI radar the acceptable 
level is around -45 dB (Pace 2009, 8). It is rather easy to 
manufacture antennas with sidelobe levels of –35 to –40 dB, 
and with extreme care it is possible to go even lower (–50 
or –55 dB). However, considerably lower sidelobes are 
difficult to achieve, primarily as a result of 
manufacturing tolerances (Lynch 2004, 354). 
One other effect of the ultra-low sidelobe 
antenna, apart from the fact that it will make it difficult 
for an ESM receiver (not located at the target – not a part 
of the target systems) to intercept and locate the radar, 
is that these types of antennas are very directional. In 
other words, they have very narrow Half Power Beam Widths 
(HPBW) both in azimuth and in elevation. According to the 
following formula (Skolnik 2001, 541),this will also give 
the radar antenna a much higher gain and thus require less 
transmitted power, which will also enhance the LPI feature 
of the radar (as 3dB
Horizontalθ  and/or 
3dB













Verticalθ : Radar antenna vertical half power (3dB) beam width 
3dB
Horizontalθ : Radar antenna horizontal half power (3dB) beam width 
TG : Gain of radar antenna 
The combined transmitter/antenna efficiency is 
defined by the Effective Radiated Isotropic Power (EIRP): 
ሺ2.4ሻT TEIRP P G=  
Where:   
TP = Transmitter Power     
TG = Gain of radar antenna 
So for a given EIRP that we have to accomplish, 
if we provide a better antenna design that gives a higher 
gain, then the transmitted power out of our transmitter TP  
can be lower (as TG  increases then TP  also increases for the 
same T TEIRP P G= ). 
 
The general formula for the gain of an antenna is 







= =  
Where:   
effA : Effective area of antenna 
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phA : Physical area of antenna 
ρ : Antenna efficiency factor 
λ : Wavelength 
Of course, the increase in gain of an antenna for 
a given frequency (and wavelength) has to happen either by 
improving its efficiency factor ρ  or by increasing its 
physical dimensions phA . The first factor poses technical 
difficulties (like RF spillover or under-illumination, 




estate” that in the case of airborne applications is a 
major limiting factor (for increasing G  then either ρ  or 
phA  increases). 
A typical polar diagram of low sidelobe antennas 
versus normal antennas is given in Figure 3 (Lynch 2004, 
4). In order to achieve such a pattern for these low 
sidelobes we have to sacrifice some of the main lobe gain 




Figure 3. Conventional (a) and Low Sidelobe Antenna 
Patterns (b) 
Typical technical approaches to reduce the 
sidelobes are the use of parallelogram shapes and separable 
illumination functions. These solutions aid in reducing the 
sidelobes, but more is required to manufacture an antenna 
with really low sidelobes. The most effective technical 
approach that we can apply in order to reduce the sidelobes 
to really low values (-60dB) is amplitude weighting across 
the aperture (or tapering). The disadvantage of this 
process is the decrease of the main lobe gain. The 
amplitude weighting function also needs to be robust in the 
sense that small errors will not destroy the desired 
performance, and the weighting values are achievable with 
real hardware (Lynch 2004, 374). 
b. Antenna Scan Patterns 
When radar is intercepted, the next task is for 
the intercept receiver to identify it. Identification 
happens often by the type of scanning they perform, as 
modern intercept receivers can be programmed to identify 
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scan patterns. That applies also to LPI radar as well. LPI 
radar cannot avoid detection forever and so eventually will 
be detected (intercepted) by the intercept receiver. At 
this point it may be possible to identify by the scan 
pattern.   
The LPI radar can use irregular scan patterns in 
order to avoid identification by the intercept receiver. 
That process can be implemented both in mechanically 
steering antennas and electronically steering antennas, but 
the electronically steered ones provide more flexibility in 
adjusting the scan pattern parameters. Some of these 
techniques include, but are not limited to, creation of 
multiple beams to scan different scan volumes; creating 
beams with different frequencies; use of aperiodic scan 
cycles; or non-scanning single beam transmit/multi-beam 
receive strategies (Pace2009, 10-13). 
4. Carrier Frequency Selection 
Due to atmospheric absorption (mainly due to 2Η Ο and 
2Ο ) certain frequencies have higher attenuation than 
others, as we can see in Figure 4. LPI radar can exploit 
that fact by operating at these frequencies. Due to the 
high absorption of RF energy at these frequencies, the 
incident power at the intercept receiver will be much lower 
compared to other frequencies that are not affected by the 
2Η Ο and 2Ο  molecules, so the probability of intercepting 
LPI radar that operates at these frequencies is much lower. 
Another tactic should be to operate the LPI radar at a 
frequency that the intercept receivers are not accustomed 
to. For long-range LPI systems, such a consideration—
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choosing a carrier frequency in a high atmospheric 
absorption band—is not beneficial because the return signal 
is greatly attenuated. However, for close range LPI systems 
it is an advantage because they can further lower their 
signature apart from practicing power management. 
 
Figure 4. Atmospheric Attenuation vs Frequency2. 
 
5. High Receiver Sensitivity 
Sensitivity is a critical factor in the operation of 
LPI radar. Sensitivity, in general, is defined as the 
product of the minimum signal to noise ratio required at 
the input times the noise power in the input bandwidth 
times the noise figure of a given receiver (D. L. Adamy 
2004, 43); it is the lowest signal the receiver can accept 
and perform its function (i.e. detect targets). The higher 
                     
2Naval Air Systems Command 1999, 5-1. 
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the sensitivity the lower the signal the receiver can 
accept to perform its function. 
The respective formula for the LPI radar receiver is 
the following (Pace 2009, 26): 
0ൌ    ሺ2.6ሻ
R
R R R requiredδ kT F B SNR  
Where: 
Rδ : LPI radar sensitivity 
k : Boltzmann’s constant 
RF : LPIR receiver noise factor 
0T : Standard noise temperature (Kelvin) 
RB : LPI radar receiver bandwidth 
R
requiredSNR : LPI Radar receiver input SNR required 
The relationship between LPI radar max range and 
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TP : Transmitter power 
TG : Gain of transmitting radar antenna 
RG : Gain of receiving radar antenna 
λ : Wavelength 
tσ : Target’s Radar Cross Section (RCS) 
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L : Transmission losses  
Rδ : LPI Radar (LPIR) sensitivity 
 
It is clear from the above formula that for higher 
sensitivity we get higher LPI radar max range (when 
sensitivity increases then Rδ  decreases and maxRR  increases). 
It is imperative for LPI radar to have very high receiver 
sensitivity, since the received signals (scattered back 
from targets) have extremely low power. That happens 
because the initially emitted signals have very low power 
as well. 
Factors that can improve the LPI radar performance 
with respect to the sensitivity of the LPI radar receiver 
are the reduction of the receiver noise figure RF  and the 
design for lower signal to noise ratio required for 
detection. 
6. Processing Gain of LPI Radar 
The definition of processing gain of radar in general 
is the ratio between the signal to noise ratio of the 
processed signal over the signal to noise ratio of the 








RiSNR : Input SNR at the radar signal integrator  
RoSNR : Output SNR at the radar signal integrator 
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At this point, and in order to clarify the concept of 
the processing gain of the LPI radar and how that affects 
the battle of detection between radar and intercept 
receiver, we can consider the maximum interception range of 
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αRL e −= : One-way atmospheric transmission factor
 
RTL : Loss between intercept receiver’s receive antenna and 
receiver 
IRL : Loss between intercept receiver’s receive antenna and 
receiver 
 
We can use both Rδ  and iδ  to quantify the advantage of 
the LPI radar by taking their ratio (Pace 2009, 29-30): 
 ሺ2.10ሻIoI I Ii R
R R Ro Ro I
SNRδ F B PG
δ
δ F B SNR PG
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 
Where: 
RF : LPI radar receiver noise factor  
IF : Intercept receiver noise factor 
IiB : Intercept receiver input bandwidth  
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RoB : LPI radar output receiver bandwidth 
IoSNR : Minimum SNR required at the output of the receiver of 
the intercept receiver for detection. 
RoSNR : Minimum SNR required at the output of the LPI radar 














= : Intercept receiver processing gain 
Taking into account the relationship between sensitivities 
Rδ  and iδ  and maximum ranges maxRR and maxIR  respectively, we 
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For max max/ 1I RR R <  we can say that the LPI radar is quiet and 
cannot be intercepted by the intercept receiver (radar 
prevails).  
For max max/ 1I RR R >  we can say that the intercept receiver 
prevails. 
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and the radar cannot be intercepted beyond the range it can 
detect targets (this is the maximum detection range of the 
LPI radar without being intercepted by the intercept 
receiver, and simultaneously it is the maximum intercept 
receiver detection range). 
The processing gain advantage for LPI radar can be 
achieved by the performance of coherent processing and the 
use of special waveforms. 
a. Coherent Processing 
The LPI radar knows exactly the characteristics 
of its transmitted waveform so it can match its receiver 
and processing to its own signal, whereas an intercept 
receiver operates in a much denser environment (where other 
signals are present) and has to perform detailed parametric 
measurements/calculations in order to identify the 
receiving signal characteristics (D. Adamy 2001). That 
demands much more processing power on the part of the 
intercept receiver or some knowledge – probably from ELINT 
– of the general radar signal characteristics.   
b. LPI Waveforms 
We mentioned previously that the main feature of 
LPI radar is to disperse the power in low energy CW 
waveforms over a wide bandwidth and period of time. That 
produces very low amplitude signals that are covered in the 
noise floor. The general types of LPI radar wideband 
waveforms are the following: 
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• Linear and non-linear Frequency Modulating 
Continuous Wave (FMCW) radar. 
• Phase modulating techniques including 
polyphase and polytime modulation. 
• Frequency Shift Keying (FSK) techniques 
(frequency hopping techniques). 
• Noise techniques 
FMCW waveform, due to its importance and high 
popularity as used waveform in LPI radars, will be examined 
in depth in the present chapter. For the rest of the LPI 
waveforms we will provide a short description and notetheir 
advantages and disadvantages. A more detailed description 
of the other LPI waveforms will be presented in the 
Appendix. 
 
(1) FMCW. CW radar uses unmodulated 
waveforms, and they cannot measure the target’s range and 
speed. By modulating the CW transmit frequency either 
linearly or non-linearly (e.g., with a sinusoidal 
function), range and speed information can be obtained by 
correlating the transmitted signal with the return signal. 
The most popular method of modulating the CW wave is linear 
Frequency Modulation (FM) and especially triangular 
modulation (Skolnik 2001, 195).  
FMCW waveforms, also called “chirps”, are 
the most common among LPI radar because they provide many 
advantages; the most important of which are (Pace 2009, 81-
82): 
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• It has a simple architecture and can be 
implemented with simple solid-state transmitters. 
• Gives high resolution due to the large 
modulation bandwidth. 
• Due to the very high duty cycle and the very 
low peak power, the intercept receiver’s intercept range is 
significantly reduced. 
• Due to the nature of the transmitted 
waveform (deterministic), the form of the return waves is 
predicted and any return wave that does not match the 
transmitted one will be suppressed. So it is resistant to 
interference and jamming. 
• High range resolution can be obtained 
without the need of a wide IF and video bandwidth (the IF 
and video bandwidth can be matched to the data rate instead 
of the RF bandwidth to give the required range resolution). 
• The Sensitivity Time Control (STC) function, 
which controls the attenuation of the returns of closing 
targets in order to avoid saturation, can be easily 
implemented. 
Some problems/disadvantages of linear and 
non-linear FMCW radar are the following (Lynch 2004, 294), 
(Pace 2009, 94-95): 
• To achieve high-resolution systems leads to 
very high bandwidth front-end signal processing. 
• Valid (real) targets can be hidden within 
the transmitter noise sidebands. That can be countered by 
using weighting in the matched filter response. 
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• Power leakage from transmitter to receiver 
will decrease the receiver’s sensitivity, which in turn 
will lead to the “loss” of valid targets. 
• They have high side-lobe levels (to the 
order of 13dB down the value of the peak response). 
Figure 5 shows the form of the triangular 
linear FMCW transmit waveform as well as the form of the 
received signal (Pace 2009, 87). 
 
Figure 5. Linear FMCW Triangular Waveform 
 
For the first section (increasing slope) of 
the triangular FMCW waveform we have the following 
mathematical expressions (Pace 2009, 86-87): 





F Ff t f t
t
= − +   
For 0 mt t< <  zero elsewhere. 
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for 0 mt t< < . 
For the second section (decreasing slope) of 
the triangular FMCW waveform we have the following 
relations(Pace 2009, 87-88): 
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F Fs t a π f t t
t
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪= + −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
 
for 0 mt t< < . 
 
Where: 
cf : Carrier frequency 
ΔF : Modulation bandwidth 
mt : Modulation period 
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The received signal from the target is 
delayed in time by the round trip propagating time and has 
reduced amplitude due to the various losses encountered 
from propagation, scattering, atmosphere and others. The 
mathematical expression of the return signal is the 
following (Pace 2009, 100): 
• For the first section (increasing 
slope) of the triangular FMCW waveform: 
( )21 0 Δ Δሺ ሻ sin 2 ሺ ሻ  ሺ2.20ሻ2 2r c d dm
F Fs t b π f t t t t
t
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪= − − + −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
 
• For the second section (decreasing 
slope) of the triangular FMCW waveform: 
( )22 0 Δ Δሺ ሻ sin 2 ሺ ሻ  ሺ2.21ሻ2 2r c d dm
F Fs t b π f t t t t
t




dt : Round trip propagation time 
 
The received signal then is amplified, 
mixed, and demodulated with the opposite slope “chirp”. 
That is the matched filtering process of the FMCW, and 
results in an output pulse whose amplitude is proportional 
to the square root of the time-bandwidth product ( m Tt B ) 
(Lynch 2004, 293-294). 
The range resolution of the FMCW radar is 







= =  
 
In order for the FMCW radar to have high 
resolution (in other words small ΔR ) the modulation 
bandwidth  has to be high. 
In Figure 6, by using the MATLAB LPIT 
TOOLBOX, we see an example of the in-phase up-ramp FMCW 
signal with parameters 1 ,   7 ,   0 ,  Δ 250 ,c sf kHz f kHz SNR dB F Hz= = = =  
  20 secmt µ= . 
 
Figure 6. Linear FMCW In-Phase Ramp-up Signal 
 
(2) Phase Modulating Techniques. Phase 
modulating techniques (Phase Shift Keying – PSK) have a 
wide bandwidth and achievable low probability ambiguity 
function (PAF) side-lobe levels (Pace 2009, 125). That is 
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the major advantage of the PSK techniques over the linear 
and non-linear FMCW technique discussed previously. 
The choice of the PSK code that will be used 
in LPI radar implementation heavily affects LPI radar 
performance. The designer first has to select the required 
bandwidth (which is the inverse of the selected sub-code 
period) in order to achieve the desired range resolution.  
A trade-off has to be expected here because 
in the case of “big” targets, where we do not need such 
high resolution and the whole target can “fit” in one range 
bin, we can get target detection, but this results in a 
narrow bandwidth signal which is a negative factor since we 
want to avoid our own detection. On the contrary, if the 
designer decides to have a high range resolution, that 
results in dividing the target’s echo in many range bins, 
which requires much larger transmitted power in order to 
detect the target and thus decreases the ability of the 
radar to remain “quiet”(Pace 2009, 126). 
PSK techniques, and mainly polyphase 
techniques that can have an extremely long code period, 
provide high range resolution waveforms and high SNR 
processing gain for radar. In combination with power 
management techniques, these can regulate the maximum 
detection range of radar as well as keep the target’s SNR 
constant while the target is closing(Pace 2009, 126). 
The transmitted signal of the PSK LPI radar 
has the following form (Pace 2009, 126-127): 
 




In phase representation  Ι cosሺ2 ሻ ሺ2.24ሻc κA πf t φ= +   
Quadrature representation sinሺ2 ሻ ሺ2.25ሻc κQ A πf t φ= +  
Where: 
cf = Carrier frequency   
kφ = Phase modulation function 
Within a code period, the signal is phase 
shifted cN  times with phase kφ (which depends on the type of 
the PSK code used), every bt  seconds, (which is the sub-code 
period) according to the specific code sequence. The signal 
characteristics of PSK LPI radar are the following (Pace 
2009, 127): 
 
The total code period is:  ሺ2.26ሻc bT N t=    
The code rate is:     1/ 1/  ሺ2.27ሻc bT T N t= =  









cN tcTR = =
 
 









cN = Number of subcodes.    
bt = Subcode period. 
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cpp= Number of cycles of the carrier frequency per subcode. 
 
A summary of the advantages and 
disadvantages of Phase modulating techniques is presented 
in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.   Phase Modulating Techniques Advantages/ 
Disadvantages 





























1. All waveforms spread the 
signal of LPI radar both 
in frequency and in 
power. 
2. There are many codes and 
code lengths to choose 
from when implementing 
LPI radar. 
3. Provide low probability 
of detection (due to 
very low signal levels). 
4. Provide low probability 
of interception (due to 
very low signal levels). 
5. Large phase values N for 
polyphase codes provide: 
• high range resolution ΔR 
• large compression ratio 
• high processing gain PG 
• low auto correlation 
sidelobes (PSL – Peak 
Sidelobe Level) 
6. Decreased sub-code width 
in polyphase codes 
results in fewer cycles 
per phase and increased 
bandwidth B which also 
contributes to the high 
processing gain. 
7. Perfect PAF (Periodic 
Autocorrelation 
Function) for Frank, P1, 
P3 and P4. 
8. Decreased minimum phase 
state (bit duration) for 
polytime codes gives 
large waveform bandwidth 
1. Polyphase codes 
demand a very 
complex match 
filter at the 
receiver. 
2. Barker codes 
discovered so far 
are only for 
subcode number less 
than 63.  
3. P2 does not have a 
perfect PAF. 




5. Polytime codes do 
not provide such 
low PSL as the 
polyphase ones. 
6. All waveforms 





(3) Frequency Shift Keying (FSK) 
Techniques. Frequency shift keying is another way to lower 
the probability of intercept. It is a kind of Frequency 
Hopping (FH) technique with application to CW radar. The 
whole process is based on the fact that the transmitting 
frequency of radar changes in time over a wide bandwidth. 
It must be noted that in the FSK case of LPI radar we are 
considering the FH as the change in the CW carrier 
frequency cf  over time over a preselected set of 
frequencies. We need to make that distinction because it is 
very easy to confuse the CW radar FH technique with the 
frequency agility technique that is applies to pulsed 
radar. 
Since the intercept receiver does not know 
the next frequency that LPI radar will use (out of the 
predefined set of frequencies – FH sequence), it is 
impossible for the intercept receiver to perform reactive 
jamming on FH LPI radar. 
One significant difference between FSK 
techniques and FMCW techniques is that in FMCW techniques, 
we spread the energy of the wave in various frequencies and 
in this way we present a very low Power Spectral Density 
(PSD) to the intercept receiver. That, demands very high 
sensitivity and other techniques implemented into the 
intercept receiver (to be discussed in later chapters) in 
order to overcome such a low PSD. In the FH techniques 
there is no dispersal of the power in the frequency domain 
but in the time domain over different frequencies, which 
does not lower the PSD of the signal (Pace 2009, 188). 
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The transmitted frequency jf  is chosen from 
the FH sequence { }1 2, ,.... Nf f f  of available frequencies for 
transmission at a set of consecutive time intervals 
{ }1 2, ,.... Nt t t . The FH CW signal is: 
2ሺ ሻ  ሺ2.31ሻjj πf ts t Ae=  
A summary of advantages and disadvantages of 





Table 2.   Phase Modulating Techniques Advantages 
/Disadvantages 
(4) Noise Techniques. Random Noise Radar 
(RNR) is not a new concept but it was not realizable until 
recently due to hardware constraints with respect to 
processing. The development of solid state RF components 
and VLSI circuits helped the advancement of RNR. The idea 

























1. Provide low probability 
of interception (due to  
frequency hopping) 
2. All waveforms spread the 
signal of the LPI radar 
in frequency. 
3. Demand simple 
architecture for 
generating large 
bandwidth B signals. 
4. Demand simple 
architecture for track 
processing. 
5. Ease of implementation 
when using digital 
architecture. 
6. Range resolution ΔR 
depends only on the hop 
rate (which lays on the 
secrecy of the FH 
algorithm used). 
7. Secrecy of the FH 
sequence that is used. 
8. FH performance depends a 
little on the code used 
so a large variety of 
codes can be used as long 
as certain properties are 
met. 
9. Hybrid FSK/PSK signals 
LPI characteristics are 
further increased (as 
long as both FSK and PSK 
properties are satisfied) 
1. Generation of spurious 
frequencies and high 
levels of phase noise 
by using complex 
circuitry that is 
required for the 
generation of such 
waveforms. 
2. Output bandwidth 
limited by the speed of 
digital devices, when 
using digital 
architecture. 
3. Have a higher 
probability of 
detection compared to 
the PSK signals because 
they present a higher 
PSD to the intercept 
receiver 
4. In a dense environment 
with LPI emitters, 
there is high 
probability of mutual 
interference. We have 
to apply special care 
to orthogonality of FH 
sequences in order to 
avoid that. 
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behind RNR is to transmit a random or random-like low power 
microwave waveform. That waveform can also be modulated by 
a lower frequency waveform.  
The main applications of RNR are covert 
surveillance and reconnaissance, target detection and 
tracking, through-the-wall imaging, ground penetration, 
foliage penetration profiling, Synthetic Aperture Radar 
(SAR) and Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR). There 
are various types of noise techniques used; the four best 
known are Random Noise Radar (RNR), RNR plus FMCW (RNFR), 
RNFR plus sine (RNFSR) and Random Binary Phase modulation 
(RBPC)(Pace 2009, 207). 
A summary of the advantages and 














Table 3.   Noise Techniques Advantages/Disadvantages 
 










































































1. Due to the nature of 
their waveforms they 
have good Electronic 
Protection (EP) 
properties. 
2. They transmit waveforms 
with very low 
instantaneous power 
spectral density, so 
they are very difficult 
to detect because they 
are concealed within 
ambient thermal noise. 
3. They provide significant 
processing gain. 
4. Even if they are 
detected, due to the 
randomness of the 
waveform, it is highly 
unlikely to be 
identified. So apart 
from LPI they have also 
Low Probability of 
Identification (LPID). 
5. They are relatively 
inexpensive to build. 
6. The use of wideband 
noise waveforms can 
result in high 
resolution and reduced 
ambiguities in range and 
Doppler estimation. 
 
1. They are susceptible to 
deception jamming 
(repeater techniques). 
2. They cannot 
simultaneously measure 
range and Doppler. 
3. There are a lot of 
considerations regarding 
their electromagnetic 
influence on small signal 
receiver devices as GPS 
receivers, cell phones, 
LANs etc. 
4. The two-dimensional 
sequential search 
required to detect 
targets with unknown 
position, which is a 
necessary feature for 
most military 
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III. EXAMPLES OF AIRBORNE, MARITIME AND LAND-BASED 
LPI RADARS 
This chapter examines LPI radar applications, giving 
examples of airborne, maritime and land-based LPI systems. 
A list of some of today’s LPI radar systems is given in 
Table 4 (Pace 2009, 63). This list does not include only 
early warning, fire control, or navigation radar but other 
types of equipment that use LPI waveforms as well (radar 
altimeters, precision approach landing systems, etc.). 
 
Category System Description 
AN/APN-232 Radar Altimeter 
HG-9550 Radar Altimeter 
GRA-2000 Radar Altimeter 
PA-5429 Radar Altimeter 
CMRA Cruise Missile Radar Altimeter 
AHV-2XX0 Family of Radar Altimeters 
AD-1990 Radar Altimeter 
AN/APS-147 Maritime Surveillance Radar 
AN/APQ-181 Fire Control Radar 
AN/APG-77 Fire Control Radar 
LANTIRN Low Altitude Navigation and 






RBS-15 Mk3 Radar Missile Seeker 
Pilot Surveillance and Navigation 
Radar 
Scout Surveillance and Navigation 
Radar 






VARIANT Surface and Air Target, Gun 
Fire Detection Radar  
AN/SPN-46 (V) Precision Approach Landing 
System 
TALS Tactical Automatic Landing 
System 
Eagle Fire Control Radar 
HARD-3D Fire Control and Surveillance 
Radar 
POINTER Air Surveillance Radar 
PAGE Air Surveillance Radar 




JY-17A Battlefield Surveillance Radar 
Table 4.   Examples of LPI Radars 
  42
A. AIRBORNE LPI RADARS 
1. AN/APN-232 Combined Altitude Radar Altimeter 
The AN/APN-232 is a solid-state, Frequency Modulated 
(FM), Continuous Wave (CW) radar altimeter manufactured by 
Navcom Defense Electronics (pictured in Figure 7). It is 
comprised of a transceiver, signal data converter, antennas 
and an indicator unit. LPI is achieved via automatic power 
management that takes into account the aircraft’s attitude 
and altitude and the terrain type being over-flown, as well 
as via the use of FMCW technology that spreads the radar 
altimeter’s bandwidth over a 100 MHz region and thus 
provides a spread spectrum capability. It provides both 
analogue and digital outputs in order to be compatible with 
different avionics platforms (www.janes.com 2011).  
 
Figure 7. AN/APN-232 
2. HG-9550 Radar Altimeter 
The HG-9550 is manufactured by Honeywell (pictured in 
Figure 8). It is an LPI radar altimeter with capabilities 
that include frequency agility, power management and 
code/pulse repetition frequency jitter. It has the ability 
to vary the system track rate and Electronic Counter-
Counter Measures (ECCM) response as functions of real-time 
inputs. It is also pre-programmable (track rate, ECCM 
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response, sensitivity, altitude range and output formats). 
Its radio frequency sections are based on gallium arsenide 
(GaAs) monolithic microwave integrated circuitry (MMIC) 
(www.janes.com 2011). 
 
Figure 8. HG9550 
3. GRA-2000 Radar Altimeter 
The GRA-2000 is manufactured by BAE Systems and it 
will replace older types of radar altimeters on the 
majority of tactical jets, helicopters and transport 
aircraft employed by the US Department of Defense (pictured 
in Figure 9). It has a modular design that allows 100% 
backward compatibility with legacy radar altimeters and 
thus eliminates A-kit costs (cabling, brackets, etc.) and 
allows the reuse of the existing antennas. 
It has a very simple and durable design (single I/F 
down convert, elimination of multiple power amplifier 
circuits), and uses a highly effective waveform (low power 
output) and advanced signal processing (high processing 
gain) that allows it to extend its accuracy, performance 
envelope (roll, pitch, and altitude), and jamming 
resistance, thereby providing LPI capabilities beyond 
legacy systems. The waveform generation and signal 
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processing are all software controlled, allowing for 
customization (www.janes.com 2010). 
 
Figure 9. GRA-2000 
4. PA-5429 Radar Altimeter 
The PA-5429 is manufactured by the South African 
company Tellumat. It is a pulsed airborne radar altimeter 
that provides altitude above ground level (AGL) for heights 
from 0 to 5,000 ft. It operates in the mid-J-band (~15 GHz) 
and provides both analogue and discrete interfaces. It 
incorporates LPI and comprehensive anti-jamming features 
(www.janes.com 2007). 
5. CMRA – Cruise Missile Radar Altimeter 
The CMRA is manufactured by Honeywell and was 
developed specifically for cruise missile programs, 
including the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) and 
Tomahawk missiles. It is a derivative product in which a 
variety of features from other Honeywell altimeters are 
incorporated. The system has the capability to perform 
terrain correlation and navigation functions (www.janes.com 
1994). 
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6. AHV-2XX0 Family of Radar Altimeters 
These altimeters are manufactured by Thales 
Communications and are designed to meet the latest 
helicopter/transport aircraft (AHV-2100), fighter aircraft 
(AHV-2930) and missiles/UAV (AHV-2500) requirements. They 
use an improved FMCW technique that provides enhanced 
accuracy, integrity, immunity to multipath, and reduced 
power consumption. LPI is achieved through power management 
of the RF output. The combination of a narrow receiver 
bandwidth with high-performance digital signal processing 
provides resistance to jamming (www.janes.com 2010, 
www.thalesgroup.com 2011). A picture of the AHV-2XX0 family 
of radar altimeters is presented in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10. AHV-2XX0 Family of Radar Altimeters 
7. AD-1990 Radar Altimeter 
The AD-1990, manufactured by Selex Galileo, is a 
covert radar altimeter, designed to meet the UK Royal Air 
Force's (RAF) needs in the 1990s. It was a form fit and 
function replacement for the original altimeter of the RAF 
Tornado aircraft. Its digital signal processing techniques 
allow the simultaneous tracking of height, both above the 
ground and above obstacles such as trees. Its covert 
operation (LPI) is achieved by spreading the transmitted 
signal over a very wide bandwidth through the application 
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of pseudo-random phase modulation and adaptive power 
tailoring (power management) which in addition gives a high 
resistance to jamming. It provides both analogue and 
digital outputs (www.janes.com 2010). 
8. AN/APS-147 Radar 
Telephonics Corporation’s The AN/APS-147 is a maritime 
Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR) that equips the 
U.S. Navy's (USN) MH-60R multi-mission helicopter. It uses 
high-throughput signal and data processing and is fully 
programmable. It uses a collection of waveforms and has a 
very low output power compared to traditional maritime 
surveillance radars. The latter, combined with frequency 
agility, provides significant LPI characteristics to this 
radar. Some of its important features are the flexible 
modular design, production of high-resolution images, low 
input power, simple design that provides high reliability 
and maintainability and a fully programmable signal 
processor with multiple waveform exciter and high-
throughput rates (www.janes.com 2010). The AN/APS-147 radar 
onboard a MH-60R helicopter is seen in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. AN/APS-147 Radar (Antenna Under Helicopter 
Cockpit--Red Arrow) 
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9. AN/APQ-181 Radar 
The AN/APQ-181 is manufactured by Raytheon Space and 
Airborne Systems. It is a multi-mode radar for the B-2 
bomber. It operates in the Ku-band (12.5 to 18 GHz) and was 
designed for LPI functionality that complements the stealth 
character of the B-2 bomber. Various individually effective 
design and operating techniques are used in this radar 
that, when integrated together, greatly diminishes the 
effectiveness of enemy intercept receivers. The radar has 
in total 21 operating modes, amongst them precision 
position and velocity update measurement, altitude 
measurement, radar-generated imagery, synthetic aperture 
radar (SAR) mode and production of topographic map-like 
high-quality images. All the previous modes contribute to 
the achievement of a high-accuracy inertial navigation, 
which permits its autonomous navigation without the aid of 
GPS or other external navigation aids as well as the 
precise location and identification of assigned targets. It 
has two antennas, located on the left and right below the 
leading edge of the platform's wing/body at 2.4 m outboard 
of the aircraft center line, that are electronically 
steered in two dimensions and feature a monopulse feed 
design to facilitate fractional beamwidth angular 
resolution (www.janes.com 2010).  
 
10. AN/APG-77 Radar 
The AN/APG-77 is manufactured by Northrop Grumman 
Electronic Systems and Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems 
for the F-22 fighter aircraft. It is an X-band (8 to 12.5 
GHz) multimode Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) 
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radar. Its low observability AESA antenna has approximately 
2,000 transceiver modules that incorporate MMIC technology 
and also provide a low radar RCS. It is advertised to offer 
long-range, multi-target, all-weather, stealth vehicle 
detection, electronic intelligence gathering and multiple 
missile engagement capabilities. It provides all aspect 
air-to-air, dogfight and air-to-surface operating modes 
that are also effective in a heavy clutter environment. 
Unconfirmed sources suggest that it has an operating range 
of 193 km. It has a very high bandwidth when operating in 
intelligence gathering mode (approximately 2 GHz bandwidth 
when it is functioning in a forward-looking, high-gain, 
passive listening mode). It offers Ultra High-Resolution 
(UHR) modes that are claimed to have a 31 cm resolution at 
ranges in excess of 161 km (www.janes.com 2011).A picture 
of the AN/APG-77 radar antenna is given in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12. AN/APG-77 Radar Antenna 
11. LANTIRN (Low-Altitude Navigation and Targeting 
Infra-Red for Night) 
The LANTIRN system is manufactured by Lockheed Martin 
Missiles & Fire Control. It is used by F-16 and F-15E 
fighter aircraft. It is a ground attack integrated system 
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that has two pods: the AN/AAQ-13 navigation pod and the 
AN/AAQ-14 targeting pod. The AN/AAQ-13 navigation pod 
contains a wide FoV (Field of View) FLIR (Forward Looking 
Infra-Red), and the AN/APN-237 Ku-band (12.5 to 18 GHz) 
terrain-following radar from Raytheon. The FLIR uses a 
single MCT (mercury cadmium telluride) array and the 
picture is displayed to the pilot on a wide FoV holographic 
HUD. This provides the pilot with night vision for safe 
flight at low level. The terrain-following radar enables 
the pilot to operate at very low altitudes. It uses 
advanced signal processing to provide wide azimuth 
coverage, which in turn allows more violent maneuvering of 
the aircraft. This is because the system can provide 
directional inputs to the pilot or the flight control 
computer, whereas older systems only provided pitch-up 
commands. The terrain following radar can be linked 
directly to the aircraft's autopilot to automatically 
maintain a preset altitude down to 100 feet while flying 
over virtually any kind of terrain. It has five modes: 
Normal, Weather, ECCM, LPI, and Very Low Clearance (VLC). 
Pictures of the LANTIRN pod aboard and F-16 fighter 
aircraft and the AN/AAQ-13 navigation pod, respectively, 
are given in Figures 13 and 14. 
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Figure 13. LANTIRN Pods on F-16--Red Arrows 
 
Figure 14. AN/AAQ-13 Navigation Pod 
12. RBS-15 Mk3 Missile Seeker 
The RBS-15 is manufactured by Saab Dynamics AB. It is 
a medium range radar guided anti-ship/land-attack missile. 
The RBS-15 Mk2’s radar seeker uses FMCW technology and has 
a very low power output (in the mWatt range) (Pace 2009, 
59). The broadband, frequency-agile radar with its digital 
processing is claimed to provide a high ECCM performance. 
The RBS-15 Mk3 missiles have an improved monopulse high Ku-
band (35 GHz) radar seeker (www.janes.com 2010). Further 
developments (already tested) of the seeker are the 
introduction of an LPI radar using FMCW wave spread-
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spectrum technology, improvements of the angular resolution 
and target discrimination of the seeker through synthetic 
aperture radar (SAR) techniques, as well as studies to 
integrate the seeker with an imaging infra-red (IIR) sensor 
(www.janes.com 2011). 
B. MARITIME LPI RADARS 
1. Pilot Radar 
The Pilot is manufactured by Saab Bofors Dynamics. It 
is an X-band (8 to 12.5 GHz) LPI navigation and threat 
detection radar. It uses the FMCW transmission technique 
and it is suitable for coast guard vessels, fast attack 
craft, fast patrol boats, frigates, submarines and 
coastal/land surveillance applications. It can function 
both in stand-alone and add-on configurations. In the add-
on configuration the Pilot radar uses the X-band antenna of 
the platform’s existing radar, which can be any available 
pulsed navigation radar system. The aforementioned 
capability uses a wave-guide switch that allows either the 
Pilot or the conventional radar's transceiver to use the 
antenna as required. Other important features of the Pilot 
radar are the low average power output, the 2.4 m range 
cell resolution, the resistance to electronic support 
system detection and/or anti-radiation missile attack, and 
the use of a “fully” solid-state transceiver(www.janes.com 
2010).A picture of the Pilot radar onboard a Visby-class 
corvette is given in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15. Pilot Radar on Visby-class Corvette (Radar 
Antenna--Red Arrow) 
2. Scout Radar 
The Scout is manufactured by Thales Netherlands. It is 
an I-band (8 to 10 GHz) LPI surface surveillance and 
tactical navigation radar, and is an improved version of 
the Pilot radar. This improvement has to do mainly with the 
FMCW transmission technique used by the Scout radar. It 
incorporates a dual array antenna that features optimal 
isolation between transmit and receive elements in order to 
maximize range performance. It can function both in stand-
alone and add-on configurations. In the add-on 
configuration, an I-band pulse radar uses the Scout dual 
array antenna (with the addition of a waveguide and 
waveguide switch) for both pulsed and FMCW functionality. 
Other important features of the Scout radar are the low 
average power output (10mW to 1 W selectable by the user), 
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the extremely high range resolution and the use of a 
“fully” solid-state transceiver (www.janes.com 2011).A 
picture of the Scout radar is given in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16. Scout Radar 
3. Smart-L Radar 
The Smart-L is manufactured by Thales Netherlands. It 
is an L-band (1 to 2 GHz) air/surface surveillance and 
target designation radar. It is a multi-beam radar that 
provides medium range detection of small “stealth” air 
targets, long-range detection of conventional aircraft, 
surface surveillance and maritime patrol aircraft guidance 
support. Some of the important features of the Smart-L 
radar are the use of parallel receiver channels, the 
digital beam forming, the broadband frequency operation and 
frequency agility, the low antenna sidelobe values and the 
use of a “fully” solid-state transmitter (www.janes.com 
2011).A picture of the Smart-L radar is given in Figure 17. 
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Figure 17. Smart-L Radar 
4. VARIANT Radar 
VARIANT is manufactured by Thales Netherlands. It is a 
dual-band, 2-D, surveillance and target indication radar. 
It operates in G-band (4 to 6 GHz) and I-band (8 to 10 
GHz). Some of its important features are full coherency, 
pulse Doppler clutter suppression and the use of the FMCW 
technique that provides its LPI characteristics 
(www.janes.com 2011). A picture of the VARIANT radar is 
given in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18. VARIANT Radar 
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5. AN/SPN-46 (V) Precision Approach Landing System 
The AN/SPN-46(V) is manufactured by Textron Defense 
Systems. It is a precision approach landing system that 
provides simultaneous and automatic control for up to two 
aircraft during final approach and landing aboard aircraft 
carriers and other landing platforms. The heart of the 
system is a precision dual-band automatic 
acquisition/tracking radar that features cross-band beacon 
and aircraft skin tracking. It operates in X-band (8 to 
12.5 GHz) and K-band (20 to 40 GHz) (www.janes.com 2010). A 
picture of the AN/SPN-46 radar is given in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19. AN/SPN-46 (V)3 
C. LAND-BASED LPI RADARS 
1. TALS--Tactical Automatic Landing System 
The TALS is manufactured by Sierra Nevada Corporation. 
It is an Automatic Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) 
recovery/tactical automatic landing system that provides a 
day/night, all weather, automatic landing and take-off 
capability for UAVs operating in tactical or fixed-base 
land environments. It operates in K-band (35 GHz ±150 MHz) 
                     
3www.navair.navy.mil 2011 
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and it has a wide bandwidth (up to 20 MHz), which gives the 
radar its LPI characteristics (www.janes.com 2011). A 
picture of the TALS is given in Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20. TALS 
2. Eagle Fire Control Radar 
The Eagle is manufactured by Saab Group. It is a 
“silent” millimetric system that is used in mobile ground 
and naval-based air defense applications. It operates 
within the K-band (35 GHz center frequency) and is 
optimized for low altitude target tracking. Its LPI 
characteristics come from the fact that it uses pulse 
compression, a high gain antenna with low sidelobe values, 
and a low output peak power figure. The manufacturer claims 
that its antenna radiation pattern, in combination with its 
transmission technique, makes it impossible for 
escort/standoff jammers to degrade its performance. It also 
incorporates an operating mode that allows simultaneous 
pulse-to-pulse frequency agility and Moving Target 
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Indication (MTI) (www.janes.com 2010). The Eagle fire 
control radar is seen in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21. Eagle Fire Control Radar 
3. HARD-3D Radar 
The HARD-3D is manufactured by Saab Group. It is an 
all-solid-state 3D-search-and-acquisition radar designed 
for use in short-range air defense systems such as the 
Atlas Short Range Air Defense (ASRAD). The electronically 
scanned beam in elevation achieves the 3D capability of the 
radar. Its LPI characteristics are due to its very low 
electromagnetic signature, (low output peak power 240 W, 
low average power 30 W), its broadband frequency agility, 
the low sidelobes and the narrow antenna beam 




Figure 22. HARD-3D Radar 
4. POINTER Radar 
The POINTER is manufactured by Ericsson Microwave 
Systems. It is an LPI all-solid-state 3D radar that 
operates in X-band and has been designed to integrate into 
short-range air defense missile systems such as the 
Mistral, Stinger and Starburst. The technology implemented 
on the Pointer radar came from the developer’s experience 
with Eagle and HARD-3D radars. The Pointer radar is a 
further development of the HARD-3D radar (www.janes.com 
2005). The Pointer radar is seen in Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23. Pointer Radar 
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5. PAGE Radar 
The Portable Air defense Guard Equipment (PAGE) is 
manufactured by Thales Netherlands. It is a man-
portable/vehicle-mounted J-band (10-20 GHz) low-level air 
surveillance radar designed for use in very short-range air 
defense applications involving both anti-aircraft guns and 
man-portable air defense equipment. It uses the FMCW 
technique, which in combination with its very low power 
output (20 W) can make the system “nearly undetectable” by 
electronic support and radar warning receivers 
(www.janes.com 2011). The PAGE radar is seen in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24. PAGE Radar 
6. CRM-100 Radar 
The CRM-100 is manufactured by Przemyslowy Instytut 
Telecomunikacji (PIT), Poland. It is a “quiet,” LPI, solid-
state, FMCW radar designed to detect and track up to 40 sea 
surface targets and automatically handoff data to a command 
system. Some of its applications are monitoring of “sea 
borders” for “fraud” traffic and illegal immigrants, 
monitoring of economic interest zones, and search and 
rescue. It operates in X-band (8-12.5 GHz) and its transmit 
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power is very low (1mW – 1W). Its LPI characteristics are 
due to the FMCW technique and the power management 
(www.janes.com 2011). The CRM-100 radar is seen in Figure 
25. 
 
Figure 25. CRM-100 
7. JY-17A Radar 
The JY-17A is manufactured by ECRIEE, China. It is a 
battlefield surveillance radar that operates in X-band (8-
12.5 GHz). It is a fully coherent, solid-state sensor 
suitable for ground or vehicle based applications. It is 
designed to detect, localize and identify moving targets on 
the battlefield (including low-flying air vehicles) in 
“severe” electronic countermeasures and clutter 
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environments. Specific role applications include 
battlefield surveillance, artillery fire adjustment, border 
surveillance and high-value asset protection. Its main 
features are the modular design, the LPI functionality, its 
solid-state transmitter, digital pulse compression, pulse-
Doppler filter bank processing and automatic target 

























IV. DETECTION OF LPI RADARS 
As discussed in Chapter II, one of the main 
characteristics of the LPI technology is its wideband 
nature. The concept behind utilizing wideband techniques is 
to spread the radiated power over a large bandwidth, in 
order to produce a Power Spectral Density (PSD) below the 
noise level of the receiver. By reducing the input power at 
the receiver, signal detection relies on extending the 
integration time period, during which a special integration 
procedure must be applied to exclude noise being added in 
the same amount (Burgos-Garcia, et al. 2000).  
Another point of concern for the receiver is the 
element of sensitivity, as the detection of the wideband 
LPI signal has to take place against a background saturated 
with short duration, conventional radar signals in the same 
band (Denk 2006). Without neglecting the centrality of the 
sensitivity factor, the performance trends in radar warning 
receivers are primarily improvements to obtain higher 
dynamic range and higher frequency resolution, not in the 
direction of improved sensitivity (Lynch Jr. 2004). 
Signal processing comprises another critical area of 
consideration for the receiver. LPI radars can integrate 
their reflected signals coherently over the whole of the 
integration time, thus narrowing the receiver noise 
bandwidth and increasing sensitivity. On the other hand, ES 
receivers cannot coherently detect the radar’s signals and 
hence they cannot narrow their bandwidths in the same 
manner (Fuller 1990). In most cases today, the signal 
processor in an intercept receiver is considerably less 
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powerful than its counterpart in radars or data links. 
Based on netted situational awareness, modern processors 
will also be dynamically programmed to threat frequency 
bands (see Chapter V).  
The increased sophistication of modern radar systems 
results in an electro-magnetic environment where the 
receiver should expect very few pulses. Staggered PRF and 
frequency agility techniques, which can be implemented by 
track-while-scan or LPI radar, further complicate the issue 
of identification. This is especially true for LPI CW 
radars and digital pulsed radars that utilize an enormous 
number of complex modulations; as these modulations can 
result in many reports for a single diverse emitter, they 
render accurate identification more difficult (Pace 2009).  
The situation is exacerbated in the presence of ultra-
wideband sources such as spread spectrum communication 
signals, impulse radars and impulse jammers. Sources such 
as ultra wideband SAR and ISAR imaging radar, whether 
intercepted intentionally or not, can significantly raise 
the noise floor of the receiver, disabling the ability of 
the EW receiver to detect the important threats of interest 
(Pace 2009). In addition, the EW receiver must have high 
power detection and protection circuits at the front end to 
protect itself from deliberate destruction by directed 
energy weapons. 
Reaction time is another crucial challenge for LPI 
detectors, especially in the face of modern range Doppler 
imaging missiles: employing sophisticated FMCW modes to 
improve target aiming accuracy and reject eventual decoys,  
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power managed seekers adjust the transmitter power in such 
a manner that the received power at the EW receiver is kept 
constant. 
All aforementioned concerns have been quantified into 
seven generic factors that need to be taken into account 
for the LPI radar signals to be detected by Electronic 
Warfare Support (ES) receivers (Lynch Jr. 2004): 
1. LPI system mainlobe power at the intercept receiver  
2. LPI system sidelobe power level at the intercept 
receiver  
3. Area of mainlobe and sidelobes on the ground or at 
a certain threat altitude  
4. Time of Area of Regard (AOR) illumination for 
mapping, tracking, or targeting 
5. Intercept receiver density and search time  
6. Intercept receiver detection response  
7. Power management strategy 
 
The vital task of detection is followed by 
classification, a process that requires sorting the signal 
into groups having similar parameters that distinguish one 
LPI radar signal from another: 
• LPI radar type  
• Carrier frequency 
• Modulation bandwidth  
• Modulation period  
• Code period  
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• Time and angle of arrival.  
Subsequent correlation with an electronic emission 
library (database) can then aid in signal tracking and 
response management (identification). This process, 
commonly known as Specific Emitter Identification (SEI), 
attempts to fingerprint the emitters that are intercepted. 
Several algorithms have been investigated for doing SEI but 
their details remain classified (Pace 2009, 402). The 
research conducted for this thesis indicates that Fourier 
analysis remains the fundamental tool. Commencing from this 
basic tool, more complex signal processing techniques have 
evolved, such as the Short Time Fourier Transform (STFT), 
which aims at tracking signal parameters over time. More 
sophisticated techniques have also been developed, called 
time-frequency and bi-frequency distributions, to identify 
the different modulation schemes used by the LPI radar 
(e.g., Wigner Ville Distribution (WVD) and Quadrature 
Mirror Filter Bank (QMFB) [Pace 2009, 405-510]).  
A. ES RECEIVER CHALLENGES 
To detect LPI radar signals, ES receivers have to 
overcome two major difficulties: 
• Processing gain of the LPI radar  
• High sensitivity requirement   
1. Radar Processing Gain 
In the second chapter of this thesis, range factor α 
was defined as Iα R= . Assuming IR  to be the detection range 
of the interceptor and rR  the detection range of the radar, 








If 1α > , the radar will be detected by the intercept 
receiver platform. If 1α ≤ , the radar can detect the 
platform while the intercept receiver platform cannot 
detect the radar. 
When the same radar antenna is used to both transmit 
and receive ( Tx RxG G≈ ) and an omnidirectional intercept 
antenna ( 1G = ) is used for the interceptor, then a certain 
energy or average power transmitted range factor α can be 
expressed directly in terms of the radar waveform, antenna 
pattern and radar cross section as: 
  




R RG τB σ
= = ⋅ ⋅  
 
where K  is the constant parameter of the equation, TiG  is 
the antenna gain in the direction of the interceptor, iB is 
the equivalent noise bandwidth of the intercept receiver, τ  
is the integration time of the LPI radar, and σ is the radar 
cross section of the target. This equation indicates that 
the value of α is directly proportional to the square root 
of the radar antenna gain in the direction of the 
interceptor, to the fourth root of the radar cross section 
and inversely proportional to the time-bandwidth factor 
( iτB ), which also comprises the processing gain of the radar 
receiver over the intercept receiver (Lee 1991, 55). 
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2. High Sensitivity Requirement 
Some ES receivers do not have sufficient sensitivity 
for the detection of LPI radar signals. Jim P. Lee states 
that for an over-the-horizon operation (OTHT), system 
sensitivity should be no less than -100dBmi. Accounting for 
the pre- and post-detection bandwidth of the receiver, Lee 
provides a formula different than the one provided in 
Chapter II (Equation [2.6]) for the calculation of 
sensitivity: 
 
( )1Ι 1 22   ሺ4.3ሻγγI i iδ n SNR G B B −=  
Where: 
in : Receiver noise power density  
iSNR : The threshold signal-to-noise ratio 
iG : Intercept receiver antenna gain 
1B : Pre-detection bandwidth 
2B : Post-detection bandwidth, and  
γ : Α parameter ranging between 0 0.5γ< < .(Lee 1991, 55) 
 
In Equation (4.3), the pre-detection bandwidth 1B  
defines the instantaneous bandwidth of the intercept 
receiver over which it can detect signals. The post-
detection bandwidth 2B  defines the maximum modulation rate 
that the intercept receiver can measure. The parameter γ  
determines the effective bandwidth of the receiver and 
  69
varies from a value of 0.5 when 1 2B B< , (characteristic of a 
wide-open, high probability of intercept receiver), to a 
value of 0 when the two bandwidths are comparable 
(characteristic of a high sensitivity search receiver). 
A careful examination of Equation (4.3) reveals that 
the ES receiver has three basic means for increasing its 
sensitivity: increasing the antenna gain, reducing the pre-
detection bandwidth, and reducing the post-detection 
bandwidth. In order to improve sensitivity further, both 
the noise figure and transmission loss of the ES receiver 
should be minimized. 
The first two means involve a probability of intercept 
(POI) loss by reducing either the angular or frequency 
instantaneous coverage. The third merely represents a 
reduction in the measurement bandwidth of the intercept 
receiver. Therefore, for operation against high duty cycle 
LPI waveforms, there is scope within conventional ES 
receivers for increasing sensitivity at negligible cost by 
reducing the post-detection bandwidth without compromising 
the POI (Ruffe and Stott 1992, 200-202). 
B. TYPES OF ES RECEIVERS FOR LPI RADAR DETECTION 
There are six general kinds of intercept receiver 
implementation (see Table 5). The first and simplest class 
is wideband channelized Crystal Video Receivers (CVRs) with 
RF preamplifiers. The second class, which is widely used, 
is Instantaneous Frequency Measuring (IFM), usually 
employing preamplifiers and wideband channelization. The 
third class is digitally controlled scanning 
superheterodyne/homodyne receivers, which are characterized 
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by narrowband filters that are swept over the frequency 
range of interest. Fourth are completely channelized high-
dynamic-range intercept receivers that are characterized by 
wide frequency coverage but broken into reasonably small 
filter bins, implemented with multiple discrete filters to 
provide very high dynamic range. Fifth are transform 
receivers (microscan, Bragg cell, or compressive), which in 
essence form a filter bank from a frequency-dispersive or 
optical device. Sixth and last are hybrids of the above 
types, which allow cueing of high-resolution, high-dynamic-
range analysis receivers.  
 
Table 5.   Intercept Receiver Typical Performance4 
The performance trends in radar warning receivers are 
primarily improvements to obtain higher dynamic range and 
higher frequency resolution, not in the direction of 
improved sensitivity.5 Research indicates that the usable 
sensitivity is always limited by the environment and not by 
Boltzmann’s constant (Lynch Jr. 2004). The second area 
where improvements will occur is signal processing. In most 
cases today, the signal processor in an intercept receiver 
                     
4Lynch Jr., 117. 
5For an argument in favor of improved sensitivity, see: Aytug Denk, 
Detection and Jamming Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) Radars, 
Master's Thesis, Electronic Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
(Monterey: NPS, 2006). 
Parameter/Type CVR IFM Superhet. Channelized Transform Cueing 
Instantaneous 
Bandwidth Excellent Poor Poor Good Good Excellent 
Simultaneous 
signals Poor Excellent Poor Good Good  
Frequency 
Resolution Poor Good Excellent Good Good Excellent 
Dynamic Range Good Fair Excellent Very Good Fair Excellent 
Usable 
Sensitivity Poor Fair Excellent Good Fair Excellent 
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is considerably less powerful than its counterpart in 
radars or data links. Processors also will be dynamically 
programmed to treat frequency bands based on netted 
situational awareness. The rate of the developments in 
signal processing is so great relative to the rest of the 
technology that dramatic improvements in signal processing 
can be expected over the coming decades. What this will 
require of stealth systems is spreading the emissions over 
wider and wider operating bands and creating more complex 
operating and spoofing waveforms. 
1. Crystal Video Receiver 
CVRs are the most common types of intercept receivers, 
one of their most common commercial uses being radar 
automobile speed trap detectors. In fact, the simplest 
ELINT system is the crystal video type consisting of an 
antenna, a detector, and a video amplifier (Wiley, ELINT: 
The Interception and Analysis of Radar Signals 2006, 57-
63). A typical CVR block diagram is provided in Figure 26. 
 
Figure 26. CVR Block Diagram 
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It consists of one or several omni-directional 
antennas, which are frequency multiplexed into a small 
number of RF amplifier channels. (CVRs have broad 
channelization, e.g., X, Ku, IR, and UV). Subsequent to 
this channelization, which typically might be 1 GHz in 
bandwidth, the output is detected and compressed in a log 
compressive video amplifier. The amplitude-compressed 
outputs in each of the bands are then processed with 
respect to pulse train shape, angle of arrival, and general 
frequency of operation. 
In their simplest form, CVRs have too much sensitivity 
and create many false alarms unless thresholds are set very 
high (–35 to 40 dBm). Extra sensitivity can be provided 
with the use of an additional low-noise RF preamplifier: 
from a level of –35 to –55 dBm without a preamp, an RF 
preamplifier may increase its sensitivity down to –85 dBm. 





6.31 2.5 2   ሺ4.4ሻνν RF ν ν
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TSS kTF B B B B
GF
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Where: 
k : Boltzmann’s constant ( 231.38 10   W/K−⋅ ) 
T : Room temperature (290K ) 
F : Noise figure of amplifiers ahead of detector 
νB : Video bandwidth (Hz) 
RFB : RF bandwidth (Hz)  
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A : Diode parameter 
G : Gain of the amplifiers ahead of the detector  









R : Dynamic impedance of the detector (Ω) 
C : Detector sensitivity (V/W) 
 
CVRs are very mismatched in the optimal detection 
sense, but they were designed for high peak power and short 
ranges, for which they are quite adequate. The crystal 
video receiver is characterized by broad instantaneous 
bandwidth and low sensitivity. Front-end bandwidths are 
typically 200 MHz up to 4 GHz. 
The advantages of such a system are that the design is 
simple by military standards, relatively inexpensive, not 
spoofed by complex waveforms, and in a low-density signal 
environment, every bit as good as the more elaborate 
receivers. The principal disadvantage is lack of 
selectivity, which is a severe problem in dense signal 
environments. Its sorting capability is limited, because 
frequency resolution and angle of arrival accuracy is 
usually poor. In addition, sensitivity is usually limited 
by RF preamplifier bandwidth. The sensitivity limitation, 
however, is usually not significant, because the poor 
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selectivity prevents the handling of very many signals so 
that noise limited thresholds can never be approached.  
2. Instantaneous Frequency Management Receivers 
(IFM) 
A leading member of the channelized receiver family, 
IFMs were developed in response to the need to measure the 
frequency on each pulse. IFMs are essentially a CVR with 
the addition of a frequency sensing method, usually 
dividing the signal into two paths with a short delay 
inserted in one of them. The IFM receiver principal can be 
understood from Figure 27. The frequency measuring 
reference in this scheme is a delay line, which results in 
the channelizing of the frequency spectrum to an accuracy 
that is on the order of the reciprocal of the delay line 
time length. 
 
Figure 27. IFM Principle 
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Indeed, by comparing the phase of the signals, the 
phase shift ends proportional to the carrier frequency: 
 
2   ሺ4.6ሻθ πfτ=  
Where: 
θ : Phase shift (radians) 
f : Carrier frequency (Hz) 
τ : Differential delay (sec) 
 
As the frequency is proportional to the phase 
difference, for a given delay, the unambiguous band covered 
is that for which the phase-change is 1/τ  (Wiley, ELINT: 
The Interception and Analysis of Radar Signals 2006, 74). 
Intensity is usually thresholded to control noise. The 
signal above that threshold is usually log compressed by a 
pre-emphasis circuit so that there is a correspondence with 
a range reticle on the display. Modern digital IFMs have 
multiple delay lines with binary ratios and thresholded 
outputs that are encoded into a frequency tag word as shown 
in Figure 28. 
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Figure 28. Digital Multioctave IFM Block Diagram 
The major advantages of an IFM are its good frequency 
accuracy and moderate to good sorting capability in an 
interference-free or low-signal-density environment. In 
addition, IFMs are not confused by wide-bandwidth 
modulations such as chirp and frequency hopping. With a 
low-noise preamp, sensitivities can reach a level of –85 
dBm. In general, however, performance is not degraded by 
noise, but by signal density and processing capacity.  
The major disadvantage of the IFM receiver is its 
complexity, which unavoidably renders it more expensive 
than CVRs. The absence of a high dynamic range frequency 
preselection ahead of the IFM renders it vulnerable to 
overlapping or pulse-on-pulse signal environments. Usually, 
in the presence of overlapping pulses, dynamic ranges are 
never greater than 25 dB, and the more overlapping pulses, 
the greater the number of false targets (Lynch Jr. 2004, 
123). 
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The IFM is generally a good compromise between 
channelized and crystal video intercept receivers for many 
applications. 
3. Superheterodyne Receiver 
This type of receiver is the most widely used design 
in nearly all applications. It uses a local oscillator to 
convert the incoming signal to a fixed intermediate 
frequency (IF). After this mixing process (heterodyning), 
the IF amplifier need operate at only one frequency and its 
characteristics can be precisely controlled (bandwidth, 
center frequency, gain, band edge roll-off, group delay). 
One of the most common channelization schemes used today is 
the digitally controlled scanning superheterodyne design 
(Figure 29). 
 
Figure 29. Digitally Controlled Superheterodyne 
Receiver Block Diagram 
The scanning superheterodyne receiver in Figure 31 
consists of a swept preselection filter: e.g., swept YIG 
resonator, a swept local oscillator, a narrowband 
intermediate frequency filter detector, a logarithmic 
amplitude compressor, and a signal encoder. All subunits 
are digitally controlled by computer as to frequency, sweep 
rate, and threshold by a threat table. The effects of 
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harmonic distortion are reduced with the use of a pre-
selection filter, the bandwidth of which is determined by 
the local oscillator harmonic spacing; the higher the local 
oscillator frequency, the wider the preselector bandwidth 
can be. The controlled frequency synthesizer successively 
locates the narrowband IF filter-detector across the band 
of interest by means of the mixer output signal (usually 
the first difference term). The bandwidth of the IF filter 
is selected to be approximately matched to the narrowest 
pulse to be detected. Subsequent to filtering, the pulses 
are detected and amplitude compressed. Amplitude 
compression is required to compress the typical 1012dynamic 
range down to even 100:1 (Wiley, ELINT: The Interception 
and Analysis of Radar Signals 2006, 125). The encoder 
output usually includes the pulse amplitude, pulse width, 
time of arrival, frequency, and special parameters, i.e., 
CW or FM waveforms. 
The scanning superhet has a single or small number of 
narrowband filters whose frequency locations are swept 
according to some pre-programmed strategy. The tradeoff for 
their improved noise performance—due to their narrowband 
nature—is a large mismatch with respect to the intercepted 
signal. Usually, the sweep rate is low in dense threat 
bands and high in bands in which there are few threats.  
The dynamic range for superhets is extremely high and 
is often limited by the threat table to a value related to 
lethal range. For example, the threshold for the AN/ALR-56M 
Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) is programmed by frequency 
band based on the threat effective engagement range that 
reduces pulse traffic in the receiver.  
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Figure 30. AN/ALR-56M Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) 
4. Channelized Receivers 
In this type of receiver, multiple simultaneous 
frequency bands, roughly matched to the target emitter 
spectrum, are completely processed and detected. As each 
channel is an autonomous radio receiver tuned to a 
particular filter characteristic, the assembly of several 
channels produces a fully parallel receiver with inherently 
high data rate capabilities (Fuller 1990, 1-10). The goal 
is to achieve a large probability of intercept 
simultaneously with a high degree of sensitivity.  
A typical channelized system block diagram is depicted 
in Figure 31. 
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Figure 31. Channelized Intercept Receiver Block Diagram 
It consists of an antenna or set of antennas, 
multiplexers, and filters. RF channels are frequency 
multiplexed to an intermediate frequency where multiple 
local oscillators place 50 to 200 MHz segments of the 
received band into narrow filters. The outputs of these 
individual filters are down-converted again, folded in 
frequency by re-sampling to save hardware, detected, and 
video filtered. Those sampled outputs are encoded in 
amplitude, phase, pulse width, and so on (Lynch Jr. 2004, 
126). 
A channelized receiver’s major advantage is that 
sensitivity is usually limited only by thermal noise, 
because sorting problems are minimized. In addition, 
channelized receivers have excellent frequency resolution, 
which not only provides good sorting capability but also 
minimizes interference in a dense signal environment. 
Finally, the reduced processing load allows dramatically 
improved usable sensitivity and much better emitter 
classification (Lynch Jr. 2004, 128). 
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The disadvantages of such systems occur primarily in 
issues of complexity and cost. Other limitations have to do 
with the spectral purity of the multiplicity of local 
oscillators and signal ambiguity in a dense emitter 
environment caused by folding. The narrow bandwidth may 
also result in some desensitization or false targets when 
chirp, frequency-hopping, or phase-coded signals are 
utilized by the target emitters. 
5. Transform Intercept Receivers 
This type of receiver approximates a Fourier 
transform. Among the most common ways of implementing them, 
are compressive devices such as Brag cells and microscans, 
designed to operate at scan times on the order of the pulse 
lengths from the target emitter class. The microscan 
compressive receiver—practically a channelized receiver— 
suffers the same inherent disadvantages as an IFM receiver: 
limitation in instantaneous dynamic range. As David Lynch 
notes, instantaneous dynamic range limitations can be a 
source of serious implications in dense emitter 
environment. Another inherent shortfall, inevitable due to 
the non-linearities that exist in all receivers, has to do 
with harmonic distortion caused by simultaneously received 
multiple signals. This distortion ends in signal 
misclassification in frequency, direction, amplitude, 
number of pulses present, and so on. An additional side 
effect of nonlinearities is small signal suppression; 
consequently, in an environment in which LPI systems co-
exist with conventional systems, the conventional emitter 
may completely mask the LPI systems (Lynch Jr. 2004, 128). 
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6. Cueing Systems/Hybrid Systems 
Cueing or hybrid systems are a combination of two or 
more of the previous receiver types. Alerting, angle and 
frequency estimates from the first receiver (coarse 
receiver) are used to cue a second receiver with higher 
resolution and dynamic range for tracking, sorting, and 
classification. Adequate signal storage is provided by 
wideband delay lines so that the coarse receiver can 
command the high-resolution receiver to the correct 
frequency band and angular quadrant for high-resolution 
measurement. A typical block diagram is shown in Figure 32. 
 
Figure 32. Hybrid Receiver Block Diagram 
Hybrid receivers are capable of wide coverage while 
still providing high enough resolution to simplify 
processing, which allows higher sensitivity. 
One major advantage of this configuration is its 
higher resolution analysis band, which can separate 
overlapping pulse trains and similar signals with greater 
ease. This happens because the probability of many signals 
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over a narrower angle and frequency space is greatly 
reduced, allowing thus higher sensitivity to be used, as a 
consequence of reduced probability of processor overload.  
The disadvantages of the hybrid class of receiver are 
complexity, cost, and sensitivity to overload if all the 
signals come from the same quadrant and frequency bands 




CVR IFM Superhet. Channelized Transform Cueing 
Frequency 
Coverage 
4-32GHz 1-18GHz 0.5-18GHz 0.2-18GHz 1-10GHz 0.2-35GHz 
Bands 3 5 6 8 4 18 
RF Bandwidth Octave Octave 500MHz 2GHz 1GHz 2GHz 
Video 
Bandwidth 
20MHz 20MHz 10MHz 10MHz 2GHz 10MHz 

























Octave Octave 10MHz 10MHz 3MHz 10MHz 
Frequency 
accuracy 
- 0.001 of band 
center 
0.001 of band 
center 
3MHz 3MHz 3MHz 
Adjacentpulse 
recovery time 
300nsec 50nsec 10μsec 200nsec 200nsec 200nsec 
Coverage scan 
rate 
1sec 1sec 1sec 1sec 0.3μsec 1sec 














Very good sorting 
capability, high 
usable sensitivity, 








































expensive than CVR 
Long scan times, 
narrow bandwidth 
limits, detection of 
wideband modulation, 










poor dynamic range 








Table 6.   Typical ES Receivers' Performance Parameters6
                     
6Lynch Jr., 123-169. 
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C. DETECTION ACCURACY 
1. Detection Finding Techniques 
The three basic ways in which emitters can be located 
are triangulation (determination of two lines of bearing 
from known locations to the emitter), determination of 
distance and one line of bearing, and determination of two 
mathematically described curves that cross the emitter’s 
location (D. L. Adamy. 2004, 156). To measure the direction 
of arrival (DOA) of the emitter signals in the first two 
approaches, Adamy has listed five principal direction 
finding (DF) techniques. 
a. Rotating Directional Antenna 
This technique exploits the relation between the 
gain pattern of a rotating antenna and the angle from its 
bore sight: knowing the pattern of the antenna’s gain, two 
or more intercepts within the antenna main beam are 
sufficient to determine the orientation which would place 
the signal at the antenna bore sight. As the DF accuracy is 
dependent on the size of the beam and consequently on the 
size of the antenna, this approach is very common in naval 
EW assets where the antenna size is not a major concern. 
b. Multiple Antenna Amplitude Comparison 
This approach utilizes the difference in 
amplitude ratio between two differently oriented antennas 
that both intercept the same signal. As no large antennas 
are needed, it is widely used in aircraft radar warning 
receivers (RWRs), yet its accuracy is typically low (50-150)  
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c. Watson Watt 
This technique uses three antennas in line, 
separated a quarter-wavelength apart. The sum and 
difference patterns of the outside antennas generate a 
cardioid vs. angle graph; switching among eventual 
symmetrical pairs causes rotation of the cardioid graph, 
allowing DF measurement. The Watson-Watt approach provides 
moderate DOA accuracy (approximately 2.50RMS). 
d. Doppler 
This technique utilizes a rotating and a non-
moving antenna; the received signal frequency in the 
rotating antenna follows a sinusoidal Doppler shift pattern 
relative to the signal received at the non-moving antenna. 
The direction of signal arrival is the angle at which the 
Doppler shifts from positive to negative. Typical accuracy 
for this technique is 30. 
e. Interferometer 
Interferometry in direction finding is based on 
measuring the phase of a received signal at each of two 
antennas. The emitter bearing is then computed utilizing 
the phase difference between them (D. L. Adamy.2004, 162-
3). 
As the biggest exploitable weakness for stealth 
emitters in intercept receivers is the angle of arrival 
(AOA), a weakness that also cascades into range estimation, 
two major methods have been developed for its measurement: 
amplitude angle of arrival and phase angle of arrival. In 
both methods, there is a signal-to-noise-limited lower 
bound on measurement accuracy. Assuming a matched filter in 
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the presence of white noise (best case), then the lower 










l : Aperture length (m) and 
θ : AOA of the intercepted signal 
f. Amplitude Angle of Arrival 
Due to its simplicity, amplitude comparison is 
the primary method used in most RWRs where broadband 
cavity-backed spiral antennas are used in each in each 
quadrant. For bandwidths around 20 GHz, David Lynch 




Figure 33. Broadband Cavity Backed Spiral Gain Pattern7 
Lynch went on to draw the patterns’ overlap of 
the antennas, as they are all mounted on the same 
interceptor. 
 
Figure 34. Amplitude AOA Pattern Displacement8 
                     
7Lynch Jr., 150. 
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The system structure to estimate the AOA is 
fairly simple: after its filtering, each quadrant signal 
passes through a logarithmic amplifier, and the difference 
between any two quadrants is multiplied by an angle scale 
factor and fitted to a correction curve to estimate angle 
of arrival. For a set of three idealized quadrant antennas, 
the angle of arrival measurement by amplitude would look as 
follows. 
 
Figure 35. Angle of Arrival Measurement by Amplitude 
Comparison9 
Figure 35 shows three idealized quadrant antenna 
patterns; it can be seen that the differences can be used 
to uniquely determine the AOA if the signal-to-noise ratio  
 
 
                                                             
8Lynch Jr., 151. 
9Lynch Jr., 152. 
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is high (recall Equation [4.7]). The mathematical 
calculation of the emitter angle, assuming a 900 antenna 
spacing is given by: 
 











i oQ E e
⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠=  
where: 
iQ : Antenna pattern in the  quadrant 
mk : 28.68πk−  
oE : Peak output voltage of the quadrant antenna and 
amplifiers before log compression 
k :5/ሺ3 ሻBθ  
Εθ : True direction of the emitter 
Βθ : 1/4 Power antenna beamwidth 
 
AOA errors are of course not rare and are 
generally attributed to deviations from ideal logarithmic 
conversion, deviations from ideal gain pattern, component 
temperature, and time drift and amplifier linearity. To 
compensate for this deficiency, which, although not severe, 
is also present in phase comparison AOA, periodic 
calibration (of a magnitude of second to minutes) is 
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performed in most of these systems, and the measurements in 
each frequency band are then corrected by a calibration 
table. 
g. Phase Angle of Arrival 
As per its name, this technique is based on the 
time of arrival difference of the emitter’s signal at two 
or more antennas, by comparing the relative phases from 
each of them with the assistance of a phase discriminator 
as follows. 
 
Figure 36. Phase Comparison AOA Measurement 
The two antennas form a baseline. An incoming 
wavefront from a distant source will arrive as almost a 
plane wave. For a wavefront arriving to the antenna 
baseline at an angle of θ , the distance r  of its source 
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(emitter) to the antenna is sinθl . Assuming a single 
incoming frequency, the measured phase will be: 
2 2
sin sin   ሺ4.10ሻ
o oc f λ
o o
πf πfφ θ φ θ
c cf λ
=
= = ⋅⇒l l  








⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠l
 
It is obvious that for the phase AOA to be 
accurate, the frequency of the arriving signal must be 
correctly measured. The frequency filters before and after 
the phase detector and the frequency discriminator in 
parallel with it aim at providing the most accurate 
possible measurement. Note that at low SNR levels or large 
bandwidth measurement, phase AOA is better than amplitude 
AOA, yet is still quite limited.  
Just as for amplitude comparison AOA, phase 
deviations from an ideal antenna pattern, ideal RF and IF 
conversion, component temperature/time drift, frequency 
discriminator errors, and linearity issues on the amplifier 
and phase detector will result in AOA errors (Lynch Jr. 
2004, 159).  
2. Precision Emitter Location Techniques 
This section will discuss the two most widely used 
targeting techniques: time difference of arrival (TDOA) and 
frequency difference of arrival (FDOA). Although they are 
used in conjunction, often with less accurate location 
systems, each technique will be addressed separately. 
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a. Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) 
The concept of this method is based on our 
knowledge of transmission speed. Knowing that the signal 
travels at the speed of light, all the detector needs to 
know is the exact time the signal left the transmitter. The 
exact propagation distance will be: 
Δ   ሺ4.12ሻd c t=  
Where: 
d : Propagation distance 
Δt : Propagation time 
c : Speed of light (3x108m/sec) 
Obviously, determination of the time of departure 
is feasible only when dealing with cooperative signals. 
When dealing with hostile emitters, we have no way of 
knowing when the signal left the transmitter; the only 
measurable information is the time it arrives at the 
receiver. To overcome this, TDOA suggests measuring the 
difference in time of arrival between two sites whose 
positions are known. If the measuring is done accurately, 
the transmitting site is located along a hyperbolic curve 
(D. L. Adamy. 2004, 164). More specifically, each TDOA 
forms a hyperbola, or isochrone,10 the intersection of which 
provides a potential location of the emitter. A schematic 
                     
10 “An isochrone is a hyperbolic line containing all of the locations 
at which an emitter could be located for a fixed difference in 
propagation path length to the two sites, causing a fixed time 
difference of arrival for a signal”; in: David L. Adamy, EW 102: A 
Second Course in Electronic Warfare (Norwood, MA: Artech House 
Publishers, 2004), 165. 
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diagram of isochrones for various values of TDOA between 
two aircraft is shown in Figure 37. 
 
Figure 37. Isochrone Lines; Two Aircraft Time 
Difference of Arrival 
As depicted above, the location problem is still 
not solved, as a hyperbola is an infinite curve. To 
determine the actual location of the transmitter a third 
receiver is required. 
 
Figure 38. Isochrone Lines; Two Aircraft Time 
Difference of Arrival 
Note that Figure 38 is a two-dimensional 
depiction; in reality, isochrones cover three-dimensional 
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space. Regardless of the depiction, the intersection of the 
same TDOA hyperbolas provides the location of the 
transmitting site. 
According to David Lynch Jr., the root mean 
square (RMS) error lower bound for a time-of-arrival 
estimate, assuming a rectangular intercepted pulse with a 
matched filter in the presence of white noise, is given by 










T : Pulsewidth 
Note that this formula additionally assumes that 
the measuring timebase or clock is orders of magnitude more 
accurate than the measured interval, which is not always 












mc : Multipath scintillation coefficient (typically 2). 
As David Adamy notes, for an accurate measurement 
of the emitter location, it is necessary that the receiver 
sites be precisely known. This task can be executed by GPS; 
yet, for moving receivers, such as ship or aircraft mounted 
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devices, it is necessary to consider the instantaneous 
receiver locations when calculating the isochrone and 
emitter location (D. L. Adamy. 2004, 167). 
 
b.  Frequency Difference of Arrival (FDOA) 
This technique involves the measurement of the 
difference between the received frequencies at two moving 
receivers from a single transmitter, generally stationary. 
As this difference is caused by the Doppler shift, this 
method is also known as Differential Doppler (DD). 
The frequency measured in a fixed receiver from a 







⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
Where: 
Rf : Received frequency 
Tf : Transmitted frequency 
Rν : Receiver speed 
θ : Angle from the receiver velocity vector to the 
transmitter 
c : Speed of light ( 83 10 /secm⋅ )  
In the case of two moving receivers that receive 
the same signal from different locations, the difference 
between the two receives frequencies given by the formula: 
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( )2 2 1 1Δ cos cos   ሺ4.16ሻTff ν θ ν θc= −  
Where: 
Δf : Difference in frequency 
Tf : Transmitted frequency 
1ν : Receiver No1 speed 
2ν : Receiver No2 speed 
1θ : True spherical angle from the velocity vector of 
receiver No1 to the transmitter 
2θ : True spherical angle from the velocity vector of 
receiver No2 to the transmitter 
c : Speed of light ( 83 10 /secm⋅ )  
The intersection between the three-dimensional 
surface defining all of the possible transmitter locations 
which would produce such a Δf , and a plane, such as the 
Earth surface, results in a curve called isofreq. As in the 
TDOA method, the frequency measurement cannot on its own 
define a location; it only defines a curve of possible 
solutions (D. L. Adamy. 2004, 169). Accurate location of 
the transmitter can be determined from the intersection of 
isofreqs from three or more baselines (i.e. triangulation); 
yet, accuracy depends on the precision of the frequency 
measurement as well. For a rectangular intercepted pulse 
with a matched filter in the presence of white noise, the 









T : Pulsewidth 
Accounting for the filter mismatch and multipath 
scintillation, David Lynch Jr. provides a more realistic 










mc : Multipath scintillation coefficient (typically 2). 
B : Detection bandwidth of the intercept receiver. 
 
 










φσ : Phase detector coefficient (usually between 0.52 and 112 . 
D. SIGNAL PROCESSING ALGORITHMS 
As discussed in Chapter II, the main characteristic of 
LPI technology is its sensitivity (δ ). To quantify this LPI 
radar advantage compared to the intercept receiver, Wiley 
introduced the notion of sensitivity advantage, which he 
defined as the ratio for the signal power needed at the 
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intercept receiver ( IRP ) to that needed at the LPI radar 
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Where: 
Tσ : RCS of the target 
TG : Bore sight gain of the LPI radar’s directive transmit 
antenna  
'
TG : Gain of the LPI radar’s transmit antenna sidelobe in 
the direction of the intercept receiver 
IG : Gain of the intercept receiver’s antenna 
rG : Gain of the radar’s receive antenna 
RRL : Loss in the intercept receiver 
IRL : Loss between the radar’s antenna and receiver 
TR : Radar to target range and  
IR : Radar to intercept receiver range. 
 
The formula indicates that the sensitivity advantage 
( advδ ) depends on the intercept receiver characteristics and 
should be a high value, on the order of 50 dB, for a case 
where we have a simple receiver against an LPI radar (Lima 
2002, 2). From the receiver perspective, a way to improve 
the sensitivity and thus enhance the detection process is 
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improving the spectral analysis of the signal: time 
frequency signal processing, correlation techniques and 
algorithms are major tools in the game to overcome the 
processing advantage of the LPI radar. However, increasing 
the sensitivity of the receiver allows for detecting 
sidelobes of the emitter, but at the same time obligates 
the receiver to process a significantly large number of 
signals (Denk 2006). To demodulate the LPI waveform and 
identify the emitter parameters (i.e., carrier frequency, 
bandwidth, modulation period, modulation bandwidth and time 
of arrival), Fourier analysis has been the major tool. 
However, more complex processing techniques have evolved, 
such as short time Fourier (tracks signal parameters over 
time) or time-frequency and bi-frequency distributions. The 
latter two, which aim at identifying the exotic modulation 
schemes of the LPI waveform, include techniques such as the 
Wigner distribution, the Choi-Williams distribution, 
quadrature mirror filtering, and cyclostationary processing 
(Stephens 1996). To introduce the reader to the 
fundamentals of frequency distribution for LPI detection, 
this thesis will address the former two methods; for a 
comprehensive analysis on the issue of frequency 
distribution, the work of Leon Cohen (Cohen 1989) and 
Phillip Pace (Pace 2009, 405-548) can provide further 
useful insights.  
1. Wigner Ville Distribution (WVD) 
The WVD is a three-dimension function that relates the 
amplitude of the signal to a frequency and a time 
component. Its greatest advantage is that it exhibits the 
highest signal energy concentration in the time-frequency 
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plane for linearly modulated signals (Pace 2009, 406); for 
nonlinear frequency modulated signals, higher order time 
frequency representations have been researched (Katkovnik 
and Stankovic 1998).  
The WVD of input signal  is defined as: 








⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∫  
Where: 
t : Time variable and  
ω : Angular frequency variable (2πf ).  
Stankovic and Stankovic showed that windowing the data 
results with a rectangular window, the WVD can be written 
as (Stankovic and Stankovic 1994): 










= + − −∑  
Where: 
ሺ ሻx l : A sample time series with l  a discrete time index 
ranging from -∞ to +∞ 
ሺ ሻw n : A rectangular window-function of length 2 1N −  and 
amplitude 1. 
Substituting the kernel function11  
                     
11A kernel is an arbitrary function named by Claasen and 
Mecklenbrauker in: T.A.C.M Claasen and W.F.G Mecklebrauker, "The Wigner 
Distribution-a Tool for Time-Frequency Signal Analysis; Part Ill: 
Relations With Other Time-Frequency Signal Transformations," Philips J. 
Res. 35: 372-389. In general, the kernel may depend explicitly on time 
and frequency and in addition may also be functional on the signal. 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )*1  ሺ4.23ሻf n x l n x l n w n w n= + − −  
Equation (4.22) becomes (Pace 2009, 406): 










= ∑  
Equation (4.24) renders clear that the choice of N  
affects the resolution of the WVD. Note that the data 




MN +≤  
Sampling the continuous frequency variable ω : 




= = … −  
 
and modifying the kernel indexes to fit the standard DFT 
algorithms as follows: 











⎛ ⎞ =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ∑  
Where: 
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the WVD functions becomes: 
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W l k f n e
− −
=
= ∑  
which is the fundamental equation used to calculate the WVD 
of the detected signals.  
The greatest deficit of the WVD is arguably the fact 
that it contains cross terms (ghost terms) between every 
pair of signal components. Several formulations have been 
suggested to remove them (Kadambe and Adali 1998). In 
addition, WVD is extremely costly with respect to 
computation time, and although hardware improvements are 
being researched—such as more efficient coding algorithms 
in combination with a very fast digital processor of a 
Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) (Milne and Pace 2002)—
extraction of the detailed modulation parameters is still 
expensive. Moreover, the signal must be known for 
relatively large periods of time to derive useful results 
(Denk 2006, 69). Despite these elements, WVD is considered 
to be able to identify frequency and time changes in most 
LPI radar signals (Gau 2002, 147). 
2. Choi Williams Distribution 
The Choi-Williams distribution (CWD) was first 
proposed by Hyung-Ill Choi and William J. Williams in 1989 
(Huyng and Williams 1989) and aimed at minimizing the cross 
terms so prevalent in the WVD.  Choi and Williams realized 
that a careful choice of the kernel function in the three-
dimensional distribution (time-frequency-phase) can 
minimize the cross terms and still retain the desirable 
properties of the self-terms. 
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Indeed, the generalized class of bilinear 
transformation with good resolution in both time and 
frequency, first presented by Cohen(Cohen 1989, 943), was 
simplified by Pace (Pace 2009, 446): 
( ) ( ) ( )1   ሺ4.3, ሻ 0ሻሺ , 2 , Α ,f j ξµ τω ξτC t ω φ π e φ ξ τ µ τ dµdτdξ− −= ∫∫∫  
Where: 
( ),φ ξ τ : Is a kernel function 
and 
( ) *Α ,   ሺ4.31ሻ
2 2
τ τµ τ x µ x µ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
Where: 
( )x µ : Τhe time signal 
( )*x µ : Τhe complex conjugate. 
Substituting the existing kernel function with Choi 
Williams’ suggestion: 
( ) 2 2  ሺ4., 32ሻξ τσφ ξ τ e −=  
where σ  is a positive scaling factor, the CWD of the signal 
becomes: 
( ) ( )ሺ , ሻ 2 , Α ,   ሺ4.33ሻ4iωτx t ω τ





⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫ 12 
Where: 
                     
12 The bracketed term in Equation (4.31) is the estimation of the 
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The discrete form of the Choi Williams distribution 
is: 
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Applying a windowing procedure similar to that in the 
WVD, the CWD takes the form: 
( ) 2ሺ , ሻ  ሺ4.3 ሻ, 62 L j ωnx l ω
n L
CWD S l n e −
=−
= ∑  
with the kernel being: 
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⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞−−⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
=−
= + −∑  
where ሺ ሻW n  is a symmetrical window with nonzero values on 
the interval L−  to L  and, ሺ ሻW µ a uniform rectangular 
window of amplitude 1 for  the range /2M−  to /2M ; the 
choice of N and M determine the frequency resolution of the 
CWD and the range at which the function will be defined. 
The analysis by Choi and Williams proves that decreasing 
the size of ሺ ሻW n , apart from reducing the cross terms, 
affects the frequency resolution of the distribution; in 
other words, there is direct relationship between the 
reduction of the cross terms and the frequency resolution 




















DZ 9001 1-18 100 20 -70 10-30 3 2 Superhet Ground 
BM/KJ 8602 0.7-18 360 60 -40 0 15 1 CVR Airborne 
MCS-93 0.8-18 100 45 -80 10-20 3 1 Superhet Ground 
Strategie 0.8-18 180 45 -80 6 1 1 Interferometer Ground 
Phalanger 1-18 360 45 -50 3 1 1 Int./Transform Airborne 
CR2700 0.5-18 360 20 -80 20-40 1 4-8 Superhet Ground 
Kingfisher 2-18 360 40 -60 0 2 4-8 Int./IFM Airborne 
Sirena/SPO-
10/15/23 
6-21 360 45 -55 0 45 1 CVR Airborne 
NRS-1/pole 
dish 
2-4,8-17 360 45 -70to-35 24-36 0.3 Minutes Superhet Ground 
RPS-1,2,3 0.5-37.5 360 45 -70to-35 20-35 0.3 Minutes Superhet Ground 
RPS-5/twin 
box 
0.5-10 360 45 -80to-50 10-20 5 2-8 Superhet Ground 
Weasel 0.7-18 360 45 -80 10,30 1 4 Hybrid Ground 
Zeus 0.5-18 360 90 -50 0 20/quadrant 2-8 IFM/Hybrid Airborne 
ALR-52 0.5-18 360 15-35 -70 13-26 2 1 IFM Airborne 
ALR-56 0.5-20 360 30 -50 0 20/quadrant 2-8 Superhet Airborne 
ALR-69 0.5-18 360 30 -50 0 20/quadrant 2-8 CVR Airborne 
WLR-11 0.5-18 360 45 -70 0 20/quadrant 1 IFM Ship 
Table 7.   Typical Deployed Intercept Receivers13 
                     
13Lynch Jr., 19. 
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V. JAMMING METHODS FOR LPI RADARS 
A. CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS 
In its modern conception, electronic attack entails 
the offensive use of the EM spectrum to disable the enemy’s 
combat capabilities, involving both nondestructive (soft 
kill) and destructive (hard kill) actions. Jamming is an 
example of a soft kill action that aims to dilute the 
effectiveness of an enemy weapon system through confusion, 
distraction, deception, or seduction. Due to their 
different mechanisms, soft and hard kill systems have 
generally been separately employed; however, to optimize 
performance, both have to be employed in a cooperative 
manner. In this chapter, we address the soft kill type of 
measures, trying to look more specifically into the 
particularities of the LPI radar.  
1. EA Radar Jamming Waveforms 
There are basically two types of radar that must be 
jammed by EA equipment. The first is the surveillance 
radar, which locates the position of a target within a 
large coverage volume. Conceptually, the search radar can 
be modeled as a rotating antenna beam whose main lobe 
sequentially scans the search volume while its sidelobes 
provide response in all directions. The matched filter 
maximizes the received SNR, which then depends on the 
energy received from the target and the receiver noise 
spectral density. 
The second major type is the tracking radar, which is 
usually given high priority in the hierarchy of EA threats 
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because it is associated with the terminal phases of a 
weapon system.14 The function of the EA system is to cause 
the tracking radar to break lock, thus removing the 
guidance information being used by the weapon to converge 
on the target. 
In the EA context presented above, Schleher notes the 
two fundamental ways to introduce jamming into radar 
(Schleher 1999, 147). The first is to raise the receiver 
noise level by injecting external noise through the radar’s 
antenna, through either the main lobe or the sidelobes. The 
second way is to introduce spurious signals into the 
radar’s main lobe or sidelobe in order to confuse or 
deceive the radar with respect to the location of the real 
target. The closer the transmitted false targets replicate 
the actual radar transmitter waveform, the greater the 
radar’s response to these false targets will be. Any 
deviation in either the envelope or the phase structure of 
the jamming signal with respect to the actual transmitted 
waveform will cause a mismatch loss, which must be 
compensated for by an extra jamming power. For this reason, 
deception jammers usually repeat the radar’s signal with 
both a coherently related time delay and frequency 
translation. The probability for achieving this is 
presented in the next paragraph. 
2. LPI Jamming Probability: The Issue of 
Interception 
The most comprehensive work on LPI interception is 
arguably that of Stove, Hume and Baker, who in 2004 
                     
14To say that a tracking radar is locked onto a target implies that a 
weapon is directed at the target. 
  109
presented a paper examining the evolving relationship 
between advanced LPI radar designs and future trends in ESM 
receiving capability. To determine the key factors that 
influence the detection of LPI radar signals, the authors 
computed the performance of ESM and radar systems for a 
number of cases, including not just simple interception, 
but also the extraction of information from intercepted 
signals. The authors concluded that this relationship is 
far from straightforward, being not only probabilistic, but 
also dependent on environmental and operational factors. In 
addition, they demonstrated that it is never possible to be 
completely certain that a radar system has not been 
detected and that the most appropriate way to implement an 
LPI radar design is always closely related to the tactical 
environment in which the radar system will be used.  
The key equation to conceptualize the probabilistic 
nature of LPI signal interception is Shannon’s theorem: 
( )2 1   ሺ5.1ሻC Wlog SNR= +  
For the detection threshold level of 17dB SNR, each 
interception may be assumed to provide the opportunity for 
extracting 5.7 bits of information concerning the LPI 
radar. The authors hypothesized that in order to exploit 
transmissions, the following information is needed: 
• Scan timing, i.e., where the radar is pointing at 
any time,  
• Carrier frequency,  
• Modulation bandwidth,  
• Modulation or code period, 
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• Synchronization, i.e., when the modulation 
pattern starts. 
Assuming that each of these parameters must be known 
to 4 bits precision, 20 bits of information are needed to 
characterize the radar; that is, without trying to 
replicate its waveform in any detail. Denk makes two 
interesting observations: first, the scan timing and 
carrier frequency can readily be derived from the way in 
which the intercept is made. Second, information on the LPI 
radar can effectively be obtained from multiple looks at 
the receiver output (Denk 2006, 87). After this process is 
concluded, 12 bits giving 36dB SNR of information has to be 
recovered from the signal.15 
According to Stove et al. the problem with attempting 
to match the jamming receiver for a single-look 
interception and exploitation is that it is more efficient 
in energy terms to obtain information from separate looks 
at lower SNR. For example, sending 8 bits of information at 
once requires 24dB SNR in the channel’s information 
bandwidth, whereas sending the same information in two 
messages of 4bits each requires twice as much time but only 
12dB SNR; that is a total energy saving of 9dB(Stove, Hume 
and Baker 2004). 
                     
15 According to Stove et al, in some conventional ES receivers this 
sensitivity is achieved through integrating multiple looks, using a 
receiver with a wider bandwidth than the signal’s information 
bandwidth. In: A. G. Stove, A. L. Hume and C. J. Baker, "Low 
Probability of Intercept Radar Strategies," IEEE Proceedings-Radar 
Sonar and Navigation (Artech House) 151, no. 5 (October 2004): 249-260. 
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B. LPI RADAR JAMMER DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 
As the extraction of LPI signal data is necessary for 
its successful jamming, most scholarly efforts address the 
issue of interception (McRitchie and McDonald 1999; Pace 
2009). Jamming techniques for LPI radars, which we discuss 
in the end of this chapter, do not differ from jamming 
techniques for conventional radars. As a consequence, the 
battle between the jammer and the LPI is constrained in the 
interception phase, which precedes that of the actual 
jamming. 
According to Denk, the major factor that determines 
the design, and ultimately the effectiveness, of an LPI 
system is bandwidth (Denk 2006, 88). 
1. Bandwidth 
Denk differentiated between the jammer RF bandwidth 
and the detector video bandwidth, arguing that both 
parameters affect jamming by their comparative size. In 
jammer RF bandwidth, too wide a bandwidth allows too much 
signal to enter the detector and unnecessarily degrades the 
receiver noise figure, while too narrow a bandwidth 
eliminates too much of the signal lowering the average 
power to the detector. In detector video bandwidth, a wide 
video bandwidth provides for fast rise and fall times 
necessary for processing narrow pulses, but this is done at 
the expense of allowing more noise to the detector as well. 
As McRitchie and McDonald note, a carefully designed jammer 
should address both of these design areas (McRitchie and 
McDonald 1999).  
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Another way to look at the effect of bandwidth is 
through the notion of burn through range, a concept that 






min J J r R
B LP G σR
π SJR P G B L
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
Where: 
TP : Peak Power transmitted (W) 
TG : LPI radar antenna gain 
σ : RCS (m2) 
JB : Jammer bandwidth (Hz) 
JL : Jammer system Losses 
SJR : Signal-to-jamming ratio 
JP : Jammer power density (W/Hz) 
JG : Jammer antenna gain  
rB : LPI radar bandwidth 
RL : Jammer power density 
The term /J rB B  represents the ratio between the 
jamming and radar bandwidths. If this term approaches a 
value of 1 to 5, then the jamming is considered spot 
jamming. If
 
   J rB B   then barrage noise is being used. It is 
to the advantage of the jammer ( maxR  is minimum) to be in 
spot jamming mode (Schleher 1999, 151). 
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2. Radar Receiver Sensitivity Advantage 
Picking up the work of Wiley (Wiley, Electronic 
Intelligence: The Analysis of Radar Signals 1976), Gerd 
Schrick studied the relationship between the pre-detection 
bandwidths of the two receivers (interceptor and LPI) and 
the radar receiver sensitivity advantage (Schrick 1990).As 
we showed in Chapter IV, the radar receiver sensitivity 
advantage ( advδ ) is defined as the ratio of the signal power 
at the ELINT receiver ( EP ) to that needed at the radar 
receiver ( RP ) (Equation 4.20). Shrick showed that the 








EB : Intercept receiver (ELINT) bandwidth 
RB : Receiver bandwidth 
EG : Processing gain of ELINT antenna 
RG : Gain of receiver antenna 
Although Schrick expected the intercept receiver 
bandwidth EB  to be larger than RB  for convenience in 
intercepting a variety of signals, he noted that EB  can be 
made to match that of the signal to be intercepted once the 
nature of the signal is known. It is therefore reasonable, 
he concludes, to choose the value of /E RB B  between 1 and 
100 (Schrick 1990, 110). 
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The maximum processing gain of the radar is achieved 
when the target echo is coherently integrated for the 
entire time the transmitted signal strikes the target ( oT ). 
In this case the maximum radar processing gain is R oB T . If 
the radar makes use of both coherent and non-coherent 
integration, the processing gain would be reduced from this 
value. If the coherent integration time is cT , the total 
radar processing gain would be: 
( )( )/  ሺ5.4ሻγR C o CB T T T  
 where γ  is the non-coherent integration efficiency, 
typically 0.7 to 0.8.16 
The intercept receiver processing gain can be as small 
as 1 if there is no post-detection integration (or 
filtering). However, the prudent intercept receiver 
designer would plan to use non-coherent integration for a 
time (TE) comparable to the radar’s integration time, oT . 
This provides a processing gain of: 
( )  ሺ5.5ሻγE E EG B T=  
This strategy provides the best chance of detecting 
the LPI radar but has the disadvantage of obscuring the 
details of the radar’s pulse compression code. Combining 
equations (5.3), (5.4) and (5.5), Schrick reaches the 
following radar receiver sensitivity advantage formula: 
                     
16 The minimum value for γ is approximately 0.5; in: D. K. Barton, 
Radar System Analysis (Norwood, MA: Artech House, 1982). 
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If E oT T=  and E RB B= , the radar receiver sensitivity 
advantage is as small as it can be, which is: 
( )1  ሺ5.7ሻγadv R Cδ B T −=  
At the limit, when the interceptor makes maximum use 
of non-coherent integration and matches the instantaneous 
bandwidth of the radar, advδ  depends only on the time-
bandwidth product of the radar waveform raised to the 1 γ−  
power. With the radar instantaneous bandwidth being 
determined by the range resolution required for a 
particular mission or application, Schrick suggests that 
the best strategy for the LPI radar designer is to make the 
coherent integration time as long as possible (Schrick 
1990, 110).  
C. ANTIJAM ADVANTAGE OF LPI 
As we discussed in Chapter IV, signals associated with 
LPI communications have special modulations designed to 
make them difficult for normal type receivers to detect. 
This spreading is accomplished via one of the basic 
spreading modulation techniques: frequency hopping, chirp, 
and direct sequence spread spectrum. Assuming that the 
jamming signal is spread across the whole spread spectrum 
frequency range for an LPI communication system, Adamy drew 
the anti-jam advantage of the LPI as shown in Figure 39. 
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Figure 39. The Anti-jam Advantage of LPI Communication 
The anti-jam advantage is defined as the amount of 
signal power that must be received at an LPI system 
receiver location to provide the same jamming-to-signal 
ratio (JSR) that would be achieved if the entire jamming 
signal power were within the bandwidth of a non-spread 
system receiver. This is the ratio between the information 
bandwidth and the transmission bandwidth of the LPI signal. 
Bearing in mind that each of the spread spectrum techniques 
requires the input signals to be digital, Adamy noted that 
successful jamming requires only 0dB JSR and significantly 
less than 100 percent duty cycle (D. L. Adamy, Jamming LPI 
Signals 2009). As shown in figure 40, the bit error rate17 
can never be greater than 50 percent, regardless of the 
JSR; increasing the jamming power above this point causes 
very few additional errors. Empirical evidence indicates 
that when the bit error rate is at least 33 percent over a 
few milliseconds, no information can be recovered from the 
jammed signal. 
                     
17 The bit error rate is the number of incorrectly received bits 
divided by the total number of bits received. 
  117
 
Figure 40. The Bit Error Rate in a Digital Receiver 
Cannot Exceed 50 Percent; a 0dB JSR Reaches this Level 
of Errors;18 
In the paragraphs to follow, we present the latest 
trend in jamming LPI. 
D. JAMMING 
1. FSK 
For FSK radars, the anti-jam advantage depicted in 
figure 39 is based on the assumption that the jammer knows 
only the full hopping range and must spread its jamming 
power over that full frequency range. Denk provides an 
interesting example to illustrate this: assume an FSK radar 
that has a 2000 frequency hopping sequence which is random 
or unknown to the ES receiver. The FSK radar can be said to 
have a jamming advantage of 2000, which converts to 33dB. 
This means that it takes 33dB more jammer power to achieve 
a given JSR against this frequency hopper than would be 
required if it were a fixed-frequency conventional radar. 
                     
18D. L. Adamy, Jamming LPI Signals 2009 
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Denk argues that the most effective jamming technique 
for FSK is “follower jamming”, which entails a detection of 
the frequency of each hop and then jamming on that 
frequency (follower). As Adamy notes, this method requires 
a sophisticated and extremely fast frequency measurement 
technique in order to deny the enemy the transmitted 
information in each hop (D. L. Adamy, EW 101: A First 
Course in Electronic Warfare 2001). An extra consideration 
is the fact that the frequency hopping sequence of FSK 
radar is unknown and appears random to the ES receiver. 
Unless this frequency sequence is solved, the possibility 
of a jammer following the changes in frequency is highly 
remote (Denk 2006, 99). 
2. PSK 
Phase coded signals can be affected mostly by VGPO-
type techniques.19 If the jammer introduces an additional 
Doppler shift, this will be interpreted by the radar as an 
additional phase shift, causing a spreading of the received 
signal and thus a decrease in the effective processing gain 
(Denk 2006, 93). If the Doppler shift is enough, a 
corresponding loss of integration gain within the radar 
processor should be expected (Denk 2006, 93; McRitchie and 
McDonald 1999). 
McRitchie and McDonald suggest that range bin masking 
should also be quite effective. They argue that if a 
section of the radar waveform recorded by DRFM or repeater 
                     
19VGPO is a method of capturing the velocity gate of a Doppler radar 
and moving it away from the skin echo. It is similar in essence to the 
RGPO, but is used against CW or Doppler velocity tracking radar 
systems. The CW or pulse Doppler frequency, which is amplified and 
retransmitted, is shifted in frequency (velocity) to provide an 
apparent rate change or Doppler shift. 
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is used by the jammer as its transmit waveform, the 
truncation will cause an increase in the sidelobe levels of 
the processed return. Total signal loss may occur as a side 
effect of the merging of the sidelobes20; however, this will 
degrade the SNR of the true target return, thus causing a 
loss in processing gain (McRitchie and McDonald 1999). 
3. FMCW 
The main characteristic of FMCW radars that renders 
them difficult to detect is their wideband waveforms. 
Potential jammers have a significant problem measuring the 
waveform parameters with sufficient accuracy to match the 
jamming waveform (Pace 2004, 455). The situation is 
exacerbated in a real-world environment, where an FMCW 
radar operates among several radar systems in the same 
frequency band. An extra difficultly derives from the 
deterministic aspects of the FMCW radar. According to Pace, 
the fact the return target signature has a form that can be 
predicated (deterministic) provides the FMCW with 
significant suppression capabilities of many interfering 
waveforms that are uncorrelated (Pace 2009, 455). 
Nevertheless, if the modulation period mt  and 
modulation bandwidth ΔF  can be determined, then coherent 
deception jamming is feasible and very effective, since the 
jammer waveform looks like the radar waveform (Pace 2004, 
455). Relevant literature suggests two major coherent 
deception EA techniques: 
                     
20 According to Denk, the merging of the sidelobes can create a 
threshold problem; in Aytug Denk, Detection and Jamming Low Probability 
of Intercept (LPI) Radars, Master's Thesis, Electronic Warfare, Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) (Monterey: NPS, 2006), p.93. 
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The first is by producing false range targets. In an 
FMCW radar, this can be achieved by slightly shifting the 
return frequency. Such a shift is expected to create an 
equivalent shift in the apparent range of the signal as it 
passes through the radar processor. 
The second coherent EA technique is VGPO. Employed in 
most Deceptive Electronic Countermeasure (DECM) systems, 
VGPO signals repeat a frequency-shifted replica of the 
received radar signal, initially programmed so that the 
repeated signal is within the passband of the Doppler 
filter containing the target return. This is designed to 
allow the jammer to capture the Doppler filter containing 
the target through the radar’s automatic gain control (AGC) 
action. The repeated jammer signal is then swept in 
frequency until the maximum expected Doppler frequency of 
the radar is achieved. Then the repeated signal is switched 
off, forcing the victim radar to reacquire the target 
(Schleher 1999, 22).   
Adamy suggests two approaches: the first requires 
prediction of the frequency-versus-time characteristics of 
the signal and the use of a jammer to direct energy to the 
receiver at the same frequency as the FM signal it is 
attempting to receive. This will allow the maximum jammer-
to-signal ratio (JSR) to be achieved for any given jammer 
power and jamming geometry (D. L. Adamy 2001). 
The second approach is to cover all or part of the 
modulation range with a broadband jamming signal. This 
jamming technique focuses the jamming power over a fraction 
of the frequency modulation range that will allow the JSR 
ratio in the jammed portion to cause a high rate of bit 
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errors in the digital modulation which is carrying the 
signal’s information. The fraction of the jammed range 
depends on the jammer power, the effective radiated power 
of the modulated transmitter, and the relative ranges of 
the transmitter and the jammer to the jammed receiver.  
Noting that the SNR in the LPI receiver is already at 
quite a low value, McRitchie and McDonald propose that a 
narrow band Doppler noise may also be quite effective. A 
Digital RF Memory (DRFM) can be used to focus the available 
power of the jammer and inject Doppler noise only a few KHz 
wide, matching to the instantaneous bandwidth of the FMCW 
radar (McRitchie and McDonald 1999). 
In the following table, we present the currently 
deployed EA systems with the caveat that a measure of 








 Platform Function Characteristics 
ALQ-99E EA-6B, EF-111A Support Search Radar Jamming, 10 transmitters, analysis 
receivers, directional antennas 
ALQ-162B A-4, A-6, A-7, F-
4, F-14, F-18 
Self-
protection 
Coverage through I/J band, 1-kW peak power, 4% 
to 5% duty, track radar jamming, typical 60-
degree fore/aft coverage, repeater transponder 
modes 
ALQ-136 Army Helicopters Self-
protection 
I/J-band jammer, AA artillery radar jammer, 
threat programmable 
ALQ-131 F-16C, F-111, A-7, 
A-10, F-15,  F-4 
Self-
protection 
Dual mode pod jammer, CVR/ SHR analysis 
receiver, phased array 
ALQ-161 B-1B Self-
protection 
Coverage through I band, search and track radar 
jamming, monopulse and Doppler radar jamming, 







CW jammer, chopped repeater lightweight, threat 







Covered frequency range in two bands, pulse/CW 






High powered transmitters, power management, 
integrated with ALR-56C 
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 Platform Function Characteristics 
ALQ-172 B-52G/H Self-
protection 
Track/search radar jamming, steerable jam beams, 
software programmable, phased array antenna, 
monopulse radar jamming 
ALQ-184 (V) F-4, F-15. F-16, 
A-7, A-10, F-111 
Self-
protection 
Pod jammer, Rotman lens, medium power miniature 
TWTs, transponder and repeater jamming, high ERP 
SLQ-32V (3) Ships Self-
protection 
Lens fed array, crystal video and IFM receivers, 
medium power miniature TWTs, tactical display, 
transponder and receiver jamming, high ERP 
Table 8.   Modern EA Systems21 
                     
21Schleher 1999, 145. 
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VI. NETWORKS AND NETCENTRIC WARFARE (NCW) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As with other sensors, LPI radar systems can be 
networked together as part of a network-centric warfare 
(NCW) architecture to gather and share surveillance and 
targeting data. In the case of LPI systems, this capability 
is “covert” in nature. In this chapter, we discuss the NCW 
notion on the three-layer architecture suggested by Phillip 
E. Pace: the information layer, the sensor layer, and the 
weapons layer. To point out the centrality of the NCW 
notion in the modern battlefield, our analysis commences by 
distinguishing between the concepts of platform-centric 
warfare and network-centric warfare. It is followed by a 
quantification of the NCW operational value, where central 
notions such as Connectivity Measure, Network Rich, and 
Network Richness are introduced.  
B. NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE 
Network centric warfare is defined as military 
operations that exploit state-of-the art sensor information 
and network technologies to integrate widely dispersed 
human decision makers, weapons, situation and targeting 
sensors, and forces into a highly adaptive comprehensive 
system to achieve unprecedented mission effectiveness (Pace 
2009, 320). 
In a platform-centric architecture, a single asset is 
the epicenter of operations. Peripheral weapons, each with 
its own sensor(s) establish what Pace calls a “stovepipe 
communication system,” transmitting the data back and 
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forth. The numerous platforms needed in architectures of 
this type limit the Command and Control (C2) capabilities 
as well. 
Evolving from the platform-centric concept, NCW 
integrates a distributed system of C2, sensors and weapons 
into a grid, in order to collect, process, and disseminate 
an uninterrupted flow of data among the various nodes. Its 
main characteristic is the exponential effect it has on the 
combat power of the overall architecture: for N  number of 
nodes, it gives a total force value of 2N , compared to N  
for a platform-centric system (Pace 2009, 321).   
C. NCW REQUIREMENTS 
Among the several prerequisites for establishing a 
viable NCW operation, bandwidth is arguably the most 
central: next to a wideband transmit/receive capability to 
sustain the compression and transportation of large amounts 
of data, a wideband Local Area Network (LAN) that will 
process and distribute the data to the various sensors and 
weapons is required. Along with bandwidth requirements, the 
issue of information processing capability and information 
management is also critical. Having these elements in mind, 
several questions arise regarding the formation of an NCW 
architecture (Pace 2009, 322): 
• How do different degrees of networking affect the 
strategic, operational and tactical outcome? 
• What is the optimal network topology (physical, 
virtual, arrangement of nodes)? 
• How will the network impact the C2? 
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• What is the correct balance of sensors, shooters 
and network technology? 
• How can degradation of network processing be 
quantified (i.e., in the event of an electronic 
attack)? 
As Pace notes, the complexity of the relationships 
between the network space and the battle space makes 
answering these questions difficult; a schematic depiction 
is provided in Figure 41. 
 
Figure 41. Relationship Between Network Space and 
Challenges22 
To establish a solid theoretical foundation prior to 
quantifying the metrics for information grid analysis, we 
provide the definitions of the various NCW requirements.  
                     
22Pace 2009, 323. 
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1. Situational Awareness 
Situational awareness is “the ability to have accurate 
real time information of friendly, enemy, neutral and non-
combatant locations; a common, relevant picture of the 
battlefield scaled to specific levels of interest and 
special needs” (Stein, Garska and McIndoo 2000). 
In practice, situational awareness is built by 
continuous snapshots that are gathered from the theater of 
operations and sent to the C2 center. The refreshing of the 
snapshots, deriving mainly from the number of the nodes and 
their processing capabilities, results in greater 
information flow; consequently, situational awareness is 
mainly determined by information processing capability 
(Kruse, Adkins and Holloman 2005).  
2. Maneuverability 
In the NCW context, maneuverability is defined as the 
capability to perform a strategic or tactical movement. To 
clarify this generic definition, Pace approaches the 
maneuverability concept considering three of its 
properties: speed, safety and cost. The effect of speed on 
maneuverability is obvious—the greater the speed, the 
greater the capability of movement. Safety has the opposite 
effect, as all additional precautions reduce the tempo. 
Last but not least, high maneuverability networks require 
complex, and thus, costly assets and structure. Studying 
the various aspects of battle topology situational 
awareness, Chen and Pace schematically depict their 
interaction with maneuverability as shown in Figure 42. 
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Figure 42. Maneuverability23 
3. Decision Speed and Operational Tempo 
The notion of the Observation-Orientation-Decision-
Action (OODA) loop was first developed by John Boyd in his 
monumental work entitled A Discourse on Winning and Losing, 
commonly known as “The Green Book” (Boyd 1987). A central 
concept in military strategy, the OODA loop is shown in 
Figure 43.  
 
Figure 43. OODA Loop 
To quantify the maximum network operational tempo—an 
important attribute when considering the fusion of netted 
radar data—Pace examines each phase separately. In the 
observation-orientation phase, the characteristic tempo Tλ , 
is defined as “the speed in which the situational awareness 
is processed in order to orient (or adjust) the force to 
                     
23Chen and Pace 2008. 
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the current situation” (Pace2009, 323). Moving to the 
decision phase, the decision tempo cλ  refers to the “speed 
to make a decision for action”, and is mathematically 
described as the sum of the characteristic tempo Tλ  and the 
deployment tempo dλ . After the deployment, the overall speed 
at which the situational response is made is the sum of the 
characteristic tempo and a fighting tempo fλ . The maximum 
operational tempo ΛOODA is the defined as the inverse of the 
maximum frequency to complete the OODA cycle. 
4. Agility 
Highly affecting the operational tempo, agility in the 
NCW context is defined as “the ability of an organization 
to sense and respond to advancement opportunities in order 
to stay ahead and competitive in a turbulent battlefield 
quickly.” To better convey the notion of agility, Pace 
graphically depicted the interrelation between operational 
tempo and force agility as in figure 44. 
 
Figure 44. Operational Tempo vs. Force Agility24 
                     
24Pace 2009, 325. 
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Pace did not provide any formulas or other means to 
quantify agility, which, along with maneuverability and 
situational awareness, remain abstract terms in relevant 
literature.25 A careful study of the definition and Figure 
46 indicate that the higher the operational tempo, the 
higher the agility of the force. 
5. Lethality 
Another abstract term utilized by Pace to assess the 
various NCW requirements is lethality, which is defined as 
“the ability to damage an enemy” (Pace 2009, 325). 
Obviously the use of the term is not constrained to the NCW 
realm but can also pertain to non-netted configuration, 
that is asset-to asset- confrontation. For the purpose of 
this thesis, lethality, where used, shall represent a 
measure of jamming effectiveness against LPI assets, 
whether in netted configuration or not. 
D. METRICS FOR INFORMATION GRID ANALYSIS 
As previously discussed, the total capability of the 
network is greatly affected by the number of nodes. 
However, quantification of this capability has been 
difficult to achieve as, among other issues, each node 
differs significantly from each other; consequently, 
relevant analysis has often provided misleading results 
(Ling, Moon and Kruzins 2005). In this section, we 
introduce the latest metrics designed to quantify the 
general value inherent in the information network topology.   
                     
25 Our research indicates that these terms appear only in Philip 
Pace’s work: Phillip E. Pace, Detecting and Classifying Low Probabilty 
of Intercept Radars, 2nd Edition (Norwood, MA: Artech House, 2009). 
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1. Generalized Connectivity Measure 
The generalized connectivity measure of a network of 
sensors or weapons is defined as the sum of the value of 
all the nodes and their connections scaled by the lengths 
of the routes and their directionality (P. E. Pace, 2009, 
325). Its mathematical expression is (Ling, Moon and 
Kruzins 2005): 







C t t L d t
= = =
=∑ ∑∑  
Where: 
TN : The number of nodes in the network 
µN : The total number of nodes connected to the node μ  
,µ νN : The total number of possible routes26 connecting the 
pair of nodes µ  and ν . 
( )µK t : The capability value of node μ; ( ) 0µK t ≥  
,µ ν
γL : The information flow parameter of the route γ  
connecting nodes µ  and ν : , 0µ νγL ≥ . It depends on the length 
of the route and it is also a function of time. The 
functional dependence of ,µ νγL  on the length of the route δ  
(number of links27), can be simplified by separating it into 
a time independent component, and a time dependent 
coefficient, scaled by the route length d  raised to the 
                     
26 The term route refers to the possible connection from one node to 
another. 
27 The term link represents the direct connection between any two 
nodes. One route contains one or more links. 
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power ξ . The value of 
( ),µ νγF t , is a minimum of zero and 
reaches a maximum of one the route γ .. Eqn. (6.1) then 
becomes: 






µ µ ν µ ν
γµ ν




C t t L
d= = =
=∑ ∑ ∑  
2. Reference Connectivity Measure 
Reference connectivity measure refers to a fully 
connected network, that is, a network that has all nodes 
fully connected with bidirectional links where each of the 
nodes has a capability value of
 
1µK = : (Ling, Moon and 
Kruzins 2005). Consequently, the resulting reference 
network has the highest connectivity measure of any network 
with the same number of nodes. 
The reference connectivity measure depends only on the 
total number of nodes. Its mathematical expression is: 








⎛ ⎞− − …⋅ ⋅−⎜ ⎟= − + +…+⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
 
The term ( )1T TN N −  represents the number of possible 
connections in a given network with TN  nodes. The numerator 
in each of the terms inside the square brackets is the 
number of possible routes of the length given in the 
denominator.  
3. Network Reach 
Network reach is dimensionless term created to provide 
a means of normalizing the connectivity measure (Ling, Moon 
  134
and Kruzins 2005). As Pace notes, normalization by the 
reference network allows us to investigate the varying 
degrees of network connection, the non-identical 
nodes/links and the effect of broken symmetries (Pace 2009, 
329). The latter becomes significant in cases of reduced 
network performance, such as when evaluating the effect of 
EA on the whole architecture. The formula for network reach 







4. Extended Generalized Connectivity Measure 
The concept of the generalized connectivity measure 
was developed in order to analyze network architectures 
with routes not able to maintain full capability in the 
flow of sensor information (Chen and Pace June 2008). In 
the network shown in Figure 45, the limited capability 
value of nodes 2 ( )2 0.5K =  and 3 ( )3 0.5K =  constrain the 
information flow when data follows the route: node 1→ node 
2 →node 3. 
 
Figure 45. Three-node Network Example 
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To account for this limitation, Pace suggests an 
extended definition of connectivity measure as (Pace 2009, 
333): 















γK : The µK  with the lowest capability value (bottleneck) in 
route γ . 
γK  considers the starting node and exchangers but not 
the receiving node because in military networks, many nodes 
only receive data, without equivalent processing capability 
for transmitting.  
Pace concludes that, by comparing MC  to RMC , and by 
disabling nodes in the reference and the real network and 
recalculating both values, the robustness of network can be 
quantified. This comparison can provide a clear 
representation of the real network under attack (Pace 2009, 
333). 
5. Entropy and Network Richness 
a. Entropy 
The concept of entropy is central to our 
analysis, as it is directly linked to the calculation of 
the information rate λ. In information theory, entropy is a 
measure of the uncertainty associated with a random 
variable. The concept of entropy was analytically studied 
by Claude E. Shannon, who, in his monumental 1948 work on 
communication signals, studied entropy in the context that 
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quantifies the expected value of information contained in a 
message. Applying Shannon’s approach to net-centric 
architecture, we note that at each node, the data exchange 
rate has a direct impact on the operational tempo of the 
grid. Assuming a set of J possible sample values by: 
{ }1 2, ,   ሺ6.6ሻJS x x x= …  
and assuming that the probability of the source output jx  
is jp , the amount of information sent when the  message 
is transmitted is: 
( ) ( )2  ሺ6.7ሻjI j log p= −  
where jp  is the probability of transmitting the  message. 
Shannon’s entropy (or uncertainty) of the source is 
described by the formula:  






H S E I j p log p
=
= = −∑  
The information rate of the source is then: 
( )/   ሺ6.9ሻHλ bits sec
T
=  
where T  is the time required to send the message. A related 
measure is the channel capacity or: 
( )( )2 1 /   ሺ6.10ሻC Blog SNR bits sec= +  
where B  is the channel Bandwidth and SNR the signal-to-
noise power ratio (not in dB) at the receiver input 
(Shannon 1948). Pace notes that the channel capacity can be 
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used as a unifying principle for both electronic attack 
(EA) and electronic protection (EP) actions in EW: all EA 
actions can be considered an attempt to reduce the 
bandwidth of an adversary signal and/or to reduce the SNR 
and all EP actions as an attempt to increase bandwidth 
and/or increase SNR (Pace 2009, 333).  
To demonstrate this, Pace provides three 
examples: 
Example 1: When an LPI emitter uses frequency 
hopping as an EP measure, protection against jamming 
necessitates a large total bandwidth; if the same emitter 
wants to protect against interception only, then only a 
small instantaneous bandwidth is required. In this case, 
the large total bandwidth makes it difficult for the jammer 
to set on the transmission frequency, thus limiting the 
reduction in SNR to that provided by barrage jamming. 
Example 2: Applying repeater or gate stealing EA 
techniques requires a certain reduction of SNR within the 
bandwidth of the victim’s receiver to be effective. The 
corresponding EP technique might utilize a combination of 
guards and filters to recognize and eliminate the unwanted 
jamming signal, thereby protecting the SNR. 
Example 3: To avoid adversary exploitation, a LPI 
emitter uses a very large bandwidth with low average power 
density, which reduces the probability of intercept. 
However, the energy over the bandwidth can be summed to 
extract the information from the signal. Therefore, the 




bandwidth to transmit the information at fast enough rates. 
The jammer can achieve high SNRs only over small portions 
of the bandwidth.  
b. Network Richness 
Within the sensor network, each node is able to 
process the information at its own rate; by combining the 
various node information rates, we can quantify the 
network’s richness. The information rate Tλ  of a node µ  is 
the rate at which the network information is processed by 
the node. The minimum information rate
 
min
µλ , of the node is 
the minimum rate that information must be processed for 
generating decision-level knowledge from the sensor network 
data. From Shannon’s information entropy theory, the 
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Using the knowledge function, Ling et al. defined 
the network richness QR  as the average rate at which 
information entropy (or knowledge) is generated from the 
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Equation (6.12) leads us to two major 
observations: 
• If a node cannot provide data at a rate above 
its minimum value , it degrades the overall 
value ( )µ µλ Q λ .  
• There is little advantage to generating sensor 
data faster than knowledge can be generated and 
absorbed. 
6. Maximum Operational Tempo 
The maximum information exchange rate of a network is 
determined by the following factors:  
• The number of nodes;  
• The communication and sensor technologies 
employed;  
• The information data transfer rates, and  
• The network topology.  
To quantify this rate within an OODA loop, Pace 
introduces the term characteristic tempo Τλ , a concept that 
relates the network topology to its ability to gather 
situational awareness. In a net-centric architecture 
characteristic tempo is defined as the product of the 
network reach RI  and the network richness QR  (Pace 2009, 
336): 
 ሺ6.13ሻT R Qλ I R=  
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Figure 46 shows the tempo parameters of the sensor 
network OODA loop:  
 
Figure 46. Time Spent in Each OODA Cycle Phase28 
The variable 1Δt  represents the time from observation 
to orientation and is limited by the information exchange 
time; 2Δt  is the time from orientation to decision and is 
dominated by the decision speed; 3Δt  is the time from 
decision to action and must be greater than the information 
exchange time (command time) and deployment time; 4Δt  is the 
time from action to observation and is always greater than 
the sum of information exchange time and fighting time. 
The lower limits for each of the Δ it  presented above 
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Where: 
Tλ : Characteristic tempo 
2C
λ : Decision tempo 
dλ : Deployment tempo 
fλ : Fighting tempo 
Using the aforementioned parameters, the maximum 
tempo of the network to perform an entire OODA loop 
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7. Example 
To demonstrate the interrelation of the aforementioned 
parameters, a network-enabled example is provided below: A 
nuclear submarine (capability value 1submarineK = ) has launched 
a cruise missile to destroy an adversary Multiple Launch 
Rocket System (MLRS) as shown in Figure47. 
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Figure 47. Network Topology 
To follow up with the damage report, a tactical UAV 
flies to the target and a Global Hawk UAV covers the 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) 
component. Due to its limited connectivity and signal 
rerouting options, the cruise missile capability value is 
assumed to be   0.4cruiseK = .
29 The Global Hawk also has a limited 
rerouting capability and is given a capability value of 
  0.9HawkK = .30 
Assuming each link to have a flow component of either 
1 or 0. (i.e., 1,0F L= = ), the reference connectivity measure 
is:  
                     
29 Note its unidirectional link to the Global Hawk. 
30In reality, no tactical UAV is fast enough to follow a cruise 
missile; the choice of the assets is imaginary and aims at visualizing 
an operational scenario, not at providing a real-combat configuration. 
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To calculate the network reach, we break our process 
into five steps. 
Step I: Calculating 
1νF
d∑  : 
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This example manifests the centrality of two elements 
in the network reach concept regarding a net-centric 
architecture: the number of nodes and the capability value. 
The number of nodes affects the network reach, and thus the 
overall performance of the network by means of the 
parameter 
µνF
d∑ ; if we increase the number µ  of nodes, the 




increase accordingly. The capability value affects the 
bracketed term by means of altering the multiplying factor 
iK  inside it.  
As the capability value iK  is the parameter that is 
mostly affected by EA, to better comprehend its impact on 
network performance, we recalculate the network reach 
assuming that a hostile jammer degrades the Global Hawk 
performance into   0.6HawkK = , and the UAV performance into 
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The situation can be exacerbated if the EA is so 
effective that it ultimately takes one link down. Assuming 
that the link removed is the one connecting the aircraft 
carrier to the cruise missile, the network topology will be 
as follows:  
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Figure 48. Network Topology after EA 
Since the number of nodes is unaltered, the reference 
connectivity measure remains the same: 
( ) 32RMC EA =  
To calculate the new network reach, we work similarly: 
Step I: Calculating 
1νF
d∑ : 
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The performance of the network is significantly lower 
in the presence of EA, as expected, since a crucial network 
link was taken out. In comparative terms, the example 
renders clearly that the absence of a link affects the 
performance of the network; in this case by a factor of 
approximately 68% (0.3219 compared to 0.2208 ). The 
deficiency of the “network reach” term, as introduced and 
defined by Pace, lies in the fact that there is no absolute 
value that can be used as a reference for evaluation. In 
other terms, it is a useful tool of evaluating similar, or 
nearly similar networks, but provides no clue regarding the 
performance of an individual network. 
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E. NETTED LPI RADAR SYSTEMS 
Despite recent advantages in mono-static radar systems 
(collocated single transmitter and receiver), two major 
disadvantages are inherent: they offer little to counter 
stealth technology and they only offer a single perspective 
for each radar (Hume and Baker October 2001). The 
development of stealth technology has primarily been aimed 
at defeating the mono-static radar by the use of absorbing 
materials and non-reflective structural designs that 
minimize the scattered energy reflected into the 
hemisphere, in the direction from which the signal arrives. 
The limited energy returned to the emitter from the stealth 
target makes it very difficult to detect the target. In 
addition, due to terrain obscuration, ground based or low-
flying mono-static radar systems often do not have a line 
of sight (LOS) to the target and therefore cannot provide 
detection. 
Due to this single perspective, the richer information 
contained in multiple perspectives is missed. When a number 
of cooperative radar systems are distributed spatially and 
networked together, they can provide the opportunity to 
view the target from a number of different aspect angles. 
In multi-frequency radar networks, each radar performs a 
significant amount of local preprocessing. Outcomes of the 
local preprocessing can then be delivered to a central 
processor through a communication link. The preprocessing 
limits the amount of information that needs to be passed on 




different frequencies to cope with interference rejection, 
but each receiver is unable to process the information from 
all transmitters. 
Netted radar systems, sometimes referred to as 
Multiple-Input-Multiple-Output (MIMO) radar systems, 
consist of a number of distributed radar systems  (transmit 
and receive sensors) each having the ability to transmit 
independent orthogonal waveforms (to avoid interference) 
and the ability to receive and process synchronously all 
waveforms that are transmitted. Figure 49 depicts an 
example of a MIMO netted radar system with three radar 
nodes connected by a network:  
 
Figure 49. Three-node MIMO Netted Radar System31 
All three radars have acquired and are tracking the 
target with their antenna beams. The LPI Emitters R1, R2, 
                     
31Pace 2009, 346. 
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and R3 each transmit a different waveform but receive and 
process all three waveforms that are collected from the 
target. The use of the network allows each node to share 
its target information non-coherently (using orthogonal 
waveforms) or coherently. The implementation of networked 
radar systems has become feasible due to recent advantages 
in large bandwidth wireless networks, high capacity 
transmission lines, multichannel electronically scanned 
antennas, high-speed, low-cost digital processors, and 
precise synchronization systems (Teng et al. 2007). 
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VII. NETTED RADAR SYSTEMS -- ADVANTAGES  
AND DISADVANTAGES 
A. MULTISITE RADAR SYSTEMS CATEGORIZATION 
A Multisite Radar System (MSRS) is one that includes 
several spatially separated transmitting, receiving and/or 
transmitting-receiving facilities where information of each 
target from all sensors are fused and jointly processed 
(Chernyak 1998, 3). This definition covers both multi-
static radars (radars that have one transmitter and several 
receiving stations spatially separate from each other) as 
well as multi-radar systems that are comprised of many 
transceiver radars spatially separate from with each other. 
The latter is also called a netted radar system.  
Netted radar systems can be realized by the 
interconnecting different types of transceiver radars. This 
thesis examines netted radar systems realized by 
interconnecting several LPI radars (netted LPI radars). 
The two main differences between netted LPI radar 
systems and a single LPI radar are the several spatially 
separated stations (LPI radars) and the fusion (joint 
processing) of the target information. These two features 
give netted LPI radars their main benefits. 
MSRSs can be further classified by the following 
attributes (Chernyak 1998, 3-6). 
1. Type of Targets of Interest 
These can be divided into active, passive and 
active/passive. This classification is heavily dependent on 
the characteristics of the target of interest. If the 
  154
target is a radiating target then it can be served by a 
passive MSRS; if the target is non-radiating it can be 
served by an active MSRS. The active/passive MSRS can serve 
both radiating and non-radiating targets. 
2. The Degree of Spatial Coherence 
The spatial coherence of an MSRS is the ability to 
maintain a strong dependence between signal RF phases 
between separated stations32. Spatial coherence of an MSRS 
is actually the phase stability of its equipment. MSRSs are 
classified into three categories. 
a. Spatially Coherent MSRSs 
These provide almost full utilization of the 
electromagnetic field spatial structure. They require 
precise time synchronization, precise frequency control and 
precise phase control; this demands they be implemented 
with many stations (several dozen or more), creates 
difficulties in the inter-station phasing implementation, 
and are very complicated and expensive to build. To build 
such MSRSs, usually the designers keep the station base-
length small, which leads to the loss of critical waveform 
information by the MSRSs and thus reduces the advantages of 
the spatial coherence. 
b. Short-Term Spatial Coherent MSRSs 
In these MSRSs the equipment phase stability is 
maintained within short time intervals, mainly for the used 
                     
32 We must distinguish between the spatial coherence of the MSRS and 
the spatial coherence of the signal at the inputs of the MSRS receiving 
stations. The latter depends on the baselengths between stations, 
signal wavelength, target size and fluctuation of the propagating 
medium. 
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signal duration at least. The inter-station phase shifts 
are assumed to be random and mutually independent and in 
this context they do not contain useful information. The 
joined signal processing in these kinds of MSRSs can use 
all the information contained in the signal complex 
envelopes in plots and tracks from different stations. 
Consequently they do not require inter-station phase 
control, but they require time synchronization and 
frequency control. These facts permit their implementation 
with a few stations only, reducing complexity and 
implementation cost compared with the spatially coherent 
system. The resolution and accuracy characteristics no 
longer depend on carrier frequency, but on frequency 
bandwidth. The loss of information--compared to the 
spatially coherent system--can be compensated for by 
increasing the baselines. 
c. Spatially Incoherent MSRSs 
In these MSRSs, the inter-station phase 
information and its changes in time are not used. They 
utilize information contained only in signal real envelope 
relations, plots and tracks from separated stations. Only 
time synchronization of the separated stations is 
necessary. These types of MSRSs are much simpler than the 
other types of MSRSs but due to the loss of the phase 
information there are certain power and information losses. 
Of course, the spatial incoherence does not rule out the 
temporal coherence of each station before information 




radial velocity in each radar). Table 9 summarizes the 
characteristics of the degree of spatial coherence design 
criterion of an MSRS. 
 
MSRS Type Advantages Disadvantages 
Spatially 
coherent 
• Full utilization 
of the EM field spatial 
structure. 
 
• Require precise time 
synchronization, frequency 
control and phase control 
• Complicated. 
• Expensive. 





• Utilize the 
information contained 
in the signal complex 
envelopes 




with a few stations 
only 
• Reduced complexity 
and implementation cost 
compared with the 
spatially coherent ones 
• They require precise 







only in signal real 
envelope 
• Only time 
synchronization of the 
separated stations is 
necessary 
• They are simpler 
than the other types of 
MSRSs 
• They have the 
least cost compared to 
the other types of 
MSRSs. 
• There are certain 
power and information 
losses due to the loss of 
the phase information. 
Table 9.   Degree of Spatial Coherence Summary 
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3. Information Fusion Level 
MSRSs can be categorized into four classes. In each 
class, both analog and digital transmission lines can be 
used. 
a. Radio Signal Integration Level 
All signals, noise and interference are subject 
to joint processing. Information is either transmitted 
immediately by the stations as raw data or after 
preliminary linear filtering. This type of fusion level 
requires high capacity wideband transmission lines. 
b. Video Signal Integration Level 
After phase elimination at each station, all 
signals, noise and interference are subject to joint 
processing. The required capacity of the transmission lines 
is slightly reduced but there are certain power and 
especially information losses. This type of fusion leads to 
no spatial coherence, which is why it’s seldom used. 
c. Plot33 Integration Level 
There is initial information processing at the 
station level (signal thresholding and parameter 
estimation) and only useful information is transmitted for 
fusion. The partial processing done at the stations has to 
do with the preliminary decision of existence or not of a 
target; the final decision is made at the fusion center  
 
                     
33 A plot is a result of individual target detection and parameters 
measurement or a measurement of target’s coordinates and their 
derivatives when an “instantaneous” target state is estimated without 
taking into account previous measurement results. 
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(decentralized or distributed detection). This in effect 
reduces greatly the required capacity of the transmission 
lines. 
d. Track Integration Level 
Apart from the initial information processing at 
the station level, secondary information processing occurs 
resulting in target track information. Those track data are 
then transferred to the fusion center where false tracks 
are eliminated and true track parameters are estimated more 
accurately. The required transmission line capacity is 
similar to the plot integration level. Table 10 summarizes 
the characteristics of the information fusion level design 




MSRS Type Advantages Disadvantages 
Radio signal • No information 
losses. 
 
• Require high capacity 
transmission lines. 
• Require complicated 
fusion processing.  
Video signal • All information 
but phase is 
transmitted to the 
fusion center. 
• Require high capacity 
transmission lines but 
with less capacity than 
those for radio signals. 
• There cannot be 
spatial coherence with 
this type of fusion. 
Plot • Only useful 
information is 
transmitted to the 
fusion center (plot). 
• Require low 
capacity transmission 
lines. 
• Reduced power and 
information 
characteristics of the 
MSRS.   
Track • Only track data 
are transmitted to the 
fusion center. 
• Require low 
capacity transmission 
lines. 
• Reduced power and 
information 
characteristics of the 
MSRS 
Table 10.   Information Fusion Level Summary 
4. Degree of Autonomy of Signal Reception 
MSRSs can be categorized into three classes; in each 
class both analog and digital transmission lines can be 
used. 
a. Independent (Autonomous) Signal Reception 
Stations (radars) of this MSRS type are designed 
to receive scattered signals from targets illuminated by 
the same radar only. These are generally spatially 
incoherent MSRSs that use the plot or track level of 
fusion. They are often called netted radar. 
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b. Cooperative Signal Reception 
Stations (radars) of such an MSRS are designed to 
receive and process echoes from targets illuminated by any 
radar or MSRS station. They provide better power and 
information characteristics than do independent ones. An 
example of such an MSRS is a multi-static radar with one 
transmitting and many receiving stations. 
c. Independent - Cooperative Signal Reception 
Stations (radars) of such an MSRS are designed to 
do both independent and cooperative signal reception. 
5. Station Location and Mobility 
MSRSs can be categorized into five classes. 
a. Ground-Based MSRSs With Stationary Stations 
These systems, even though they may be comprised of 
mobile ground stations, require the stations’ positions to 
be fixed during MSRS operation. 
b. Ground-based MSRSs With Mobile Stations 
These systems are comprised of mobile ground 
stations that can change positions during the MSRS 
operation. 
c. Transmitter (or Receiver) on Platforms, 
Receiver (or Transmitter) Ground-based. 
These systems have one part of the MSRS 
(transmitter or receiver) on a platform (i.e., aircraft, 
satellite) and the other (receiver or transmitter 
respectively) fixed on the ground. 
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d. All Stations on Platforms 
All stations (transmitters, receivers or 
transceivers) are placed on platforms (aircraft, vehicles, 
satellites). 
e. Shipborne 
All stations (transmitters, receivers or 
transceivers) are placed on ships. 
B. ADVANTAGES OF MULTISITE RADAR SYSTEMS 
The advantages of a MSRS system over a mono-static 
radar or a number of radars that are not integrated in a 
system are briefly discussed here (Chernyak 1998, 9-21; 
Pace 2009). 
1. Capability to Form Coverage Area of Required 
Configuration for Expected Environments 
It is apparent that the actual geometry of an MSRS 
(that can also be tailored to each specific application), 
in combination with the fusion algorithms that are used, 
gives an area coverage advantage over a mono-static radar 
or a system of radars that are not integrated.  
2. Power Advantages 
Adding transmitting and/or receiving stations to a 
mono-static radar (and thus forming an MSRS) upgrades the 
total power and/or sensitivity of the system. There are 
also some other significant advantages in the case of 
cooperative signal reception (as described in paragraph 4.b 
above), where if the baseline distances are sufficiently 
long or when the target is illuminated by sufficiently 
separated stations, there is a significant power gain due 
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to fluctuation smoothing. That gain can also be obtained by 
MSRSs that apply independent signal reception (as described 
in paragraph 4.a above) but use different carrier 
frequencies. 
3. Detection of Stealth Targets 
Stealth technology primarily aims to defeat the mono-
static radar by the use of radar absorbing materials (RAM) 
and non-reflective structural designs that minimizes the 
scattered energy reflected back into the hemisphere from 
which the signal arrives. Most stealth assets are designed 
to hide their front aspect angle from radar. Having a 
netted radar system (MSRS) (which covers an area from 
various aspect angles), can in effect negate the advantage 
of a stealth asset because some number of the stations 
comprising the MSRS will view the target from a number of 
different aspect angles.  
4. High Accuracy of the Position Estimation of a 
Target 
An MSRS can estimate target coordinates through range 
measurements from several spatially separated stations 
(either several mono-static netted radars or multi-static 
radar system). As one can see in Figure 50, for the 
respective MSRS category (netted mono-static and multi-
static) the resulting error after the fusion is the 
intersection of the individual errors.  
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Figure 50. Netted Mono-static (left) Multi-static 
(right) Increase of Angular Coordinate Measurement 
Accuracy34 




sinθ R R eff
σ σ σ
L θ L








= ≈  
Where: 
θσ : RMS error of angle estimation in the bi-static plane 
Rσ : RMS error of range measurements  
L : Baselength (distance between radars) 
effL : Effective baselength 
                     
34Chernyak 1998, 10. 
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ΣRσ : RMS error of range sum measurements 
c : Speed of light 
Tσ : RMS error of time arrival 
Equations (7.1) and (7.2) suggest that if the range 
measurements are very accurate (e.g., wideband signals such 
as FMCW are used and thus Rσ  decreases) or the stations 
have large baselengths ( effL  increases) we can achieve a very 
low RMS error of angle estimation compared to a single 
mono-static radar.   
In cases where the baselengths are small or the range 
measurements are not that accurate, there is no significant 
improvement in the angular accuracy. In that event the 
bearing measurements of the separate stations play the 
major role in angle accuracy improvement. 
Redundant measurements of the targets coordinated can 
also be used for position accuracy refinement as well as 
for higher tracking accuracy when in a tracking mode of 
operation.  
5. Possibility of Estimating Target’s Velocity and 
Acceleration Vectors by the Doppler Method 
By performing Doppler frequency shift measurements at 
several spatially separate stations, one can estimate the 
velocity vector of a target. That fact is of great 
importance for accurate target tracking. Consider the case 
depicted in Figure 51. 
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Figure 51. Netted Mono-static (left) Multi-static 
(right) Target Velocity Vector Measurement by the 
Doppler Method35 
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Where: 
1DF : Doppler frequency measures by radar 1 
                     
35Chernyak 1998, 12. 
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2DF : Doppler frequency measures by radar 2 
1rV : Target radial velocity with respect to radar 1 
2rV : Target radial velocity with respect to radar 2 
RV : Target radial velocity  
τV : Target tangential velocity  
Fσ : RMS error of Doppler frequency measurement (assumes the 
same for both radars) 
vRσ : RMS error of target’s radial velocity 
vτσ : RMS error of target’s tangential velocity 
λ : Wavelength 
R : Target range 
L : Baselength (distance between radars) 
effL : Effective baselength 
For the above formula approximations it is assumed 
that the effective baselength is much less than the target 
range ( / 1effR L >> ). 
 
In the case of a single radar (i.e., radar 2 in the 
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From the above equations, we can see that in the case 
of single radar vRσ  increases by a factor of 2 and 
increases vτσ  by a factor of 2. By estimating the speed of 
the Doppler shift variations or by differentiating the 
velocity vector components one can get the target’s 
acceleration vector, which promotes track accuracy and 
tracking quality in general, especially when the target is 
maneuvering aggressively. 
6. Capability to Measure Three Coordinates and 
Velocity Vector of Radiation Sources 
Mono-static and bi-static radars can determine only 
signal direction of arrival (DOA) when operating in a 
passive mode with a frequency compatible radiating target 
(bearing of the radiation source). In contrast, MSRSs in 
passive mode can obtain three coordinates as well as their 
derivatives. This can be done by triangulation and/or 
hyperbolic methods. As discussed in paragraphs 4 and 5, an 
MSRS comprised of four or more stations can obtain all 
three components of the source velocity vector simply by 
Doppler frequency shift measurements. Using triangulation 
we can estimate the source velocity by differentiating the 
position estimates only.   
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The aforementioned capability (determination of 
targets coordinates and velocity vector) is a very 
important feature especially in the case of self-screening 
jamming where the target is revealed by its own jammer 
(home on jammer). 
7. Increase of Resolution Capability 
In order to demonstrate this capability we will 
consider a simple case scenario involving an MSRS comprised 
of two mono-static radars that have the same angle and 
range resolution.   
 
Figure 52. Angular Resolution of MSRS36 
We assume that in the aforementioned setup radar 1 
cannot resolve the two targets because they lie in the same 
angle and range resolution cell, whereas radar 2 can 
resolve them. The equivalent angular resolution of the two 
                     
36Chernyak 1998, 15. 
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radars, when target range R  is several times greater than 





≈ =  
Where: 
/ΔRδ c F= : Angular resolution of each radar (assume same 
radar) 
c : Speed of light 
ΔF : Radar signal bandwidth  
effL : Effective baselength 
 
If instead of two mono-static radars we had one mono-
static (transceiver) and one receiving station, then, 
assuming / 1effR L >> , the equivalent angular resolution of the 





≈ =  
It is obvious from the formulas (7.10) and (7.11) that 
when the product ΔeffL F  is large enough, the beamwidth of an 
MSRS is much less than the beamwidth of a usual antenna 
(i.e., for parabolic reflectors 3dBδθ BW> ). In cases where 
the angle between the baseline L  and the target direction 
is small, the effL  decreases significantly and the product 
ΔeffL F  is decreased as well resulting in lower angular 
resolution. 
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In MSRSs that perform passive triangulation, the 
resolution is determined by the intersection of the antenna 
beamwidths. When / 1effR L >>  the respective formulas for range 







        ሺ7.13ሻδθ Rδα≈  
Where: 
δα : Antenna beamwidth of receiving stations 
 
In MSRSs that use the hyperbolic method the resolution 
is determined by the extent of the of the envelope’s main 
lobe of the signal mutual correlation function (expressed 
as delay 1/Δδτ F≈  or range difference /ΔδR c F≈ ). When 
/ 1effR L >> , the respective formulas for range resolution and 











R δ R R cδR
L L F
≈ ≈  
 
It has to be noted that high spatial resolution can be 
achieved only for spatially correlated signals at the 
inputs of the stations; when stochastic signals at the 
inputs of the stations are uncorrelated spatial resolution 
cell cannot be formed. 
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8. Increase of Target Handling Capacity 
Handling capacity is the maximum number of targets 
that a given radar can handle in a certain time interval. 
Mechanical scanning radars scan in a constant rate 
determined by the antenna servo electronics. Their handling 
capacity is limited by the processing hardware and 
software. Electronically scanning radars have better 
handling capacity than do mechanical ones, by using 
electronically scanning antennas. Their handling capacity 
is limited by the processing hardware and software, and by 
their power and accuracy characteristics. Since processing 
resources of such radars are usually very high, the main 
limiting factor is power. An approximate formula that 
describes the relation of target handling capacity versus 





P T kP T
n
E E
= =  
Where: 
tn : Number of simultaneous tracked targets 
trP : Mean power allowed for target tracking ( tr aveP kP= ) 
T : Average time interval between illuminations to maintain 
track 
ΔE : Transmitted energy per illuminations  
aveP : Average radar power 
k : Coefficient determining the fraction of average radar 
power used for radar tracking ( 1k < ) 
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It is suggested from equation (7.16) above that an 
MSRS having several transmitting stations can achieve 
higher aveP , so it can have increased target handling 
capacity. Even in the case of the same aveP  an MSRS, by 
better position measurement accuracy and velocity vector 
estimation, can increase significantly the time interval 
between illuminations T . This further increases target 
handling capacity 
9. Increase of “Signal Information” Body 
Signal information refers to the information extracted 
from the target echoes (geometrical and physical target 
characteristics, target movement about its center of mass, 
etc.). When the target is observed by many stations almost 
simultaneously, its signal information body is 
significantly larger than when the target is observed by 
one mono-static radar. By measuring amplitudes, phases and 
polarization parameters of signals received by spatially 
separate stations (MSRS stations), a target’s size, form 
and relative movement (about its center of mass) can be 
estimated with higher accuracy and in a shorter time 
interval (as demonstrated in the previous paragraphs). 
10. Increase of Jamming Resistance 
MSRSs can use the same anti-jamming methods used by 
mono-static radars on an individual (per station) basis. To 
effectively increase their resistance to jamming, MSRSs 
have several inherent features and can make use some other 
specific techniques. 
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a. Resistance to Sidelobe Jamming 
Sidelobe cancellation can be easily performed in 
an MSRS37, whereas it is more difficult for a mono-static 
radar.  In this way, sidelobe noise-like jamming can be 
effectively defeated. 
b. Resistance to Main Lobe Jamming 
When the MSRS station is a transceiver station, a 
jammer can effectively jam its main lobe (using various 
techniques as against a mono-static radar) resulting in the 
loss of target information. This state of play changes 
dramatically in favor of the station when the station is 
passive (receiving only or in transceiver in passive mode), 
because the direction from the jammer to the station is not 
known. 
In the case of main lobe jamming of a number of 
spatially separate stations (transceiving stations whose 
bearing can be located by the jammer), the jammer has to 
divide its available power to all of those stations 
(spreading its power to a much larger solid angle). The 
result is low jamming signal power density at each station, 
which is relatively easier for each station to overcome. 
The same effect occurs when the stations are passive and 
the jammer cannot determine station direction; it therefore 
                     
37Sidelobe cancelation can be performed by adaptive interference 
cancelation. This function monitors the received signal and identifies 
interference when present. Several antenna elements (the actual 
radiating and receiving components) are combined to form a null or 
cancelation in the direction of the interference. That procedure is 
easier to perform in an MSRS that already has many transceiving 
components (antennas of each of the nodes) than in a mono-static radar. 
There are ways to perform this function in a mono-static radar that has 
Active Electronically Steering Array (AESA) antenna in combination with 
additional antennas (specific for this purpose), but in the case of an 
MSRS it is an inherent feature of the radar net. 
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has to spread its power to a large solid angle, again 
resulting in low jamming power density at each station. 
When the MSRS stations also transmit in different 
frequencies, then the jammer is in an even worse situation, 
because apart from the wide solid angle it has to spread 
its power to different narrow frequency bands, which 
further decreases the jamming power density at each 
station. Such MSRSs are virtually immune to narrowband 
jamming and much less vulnerable to deception and 
repetitive pulse jamming. 
In the special case of spatially coherent and 
short-term spatially coherent MSRSs, which have the 
capability of canceling noise-like interferences without 
suppressing target echoes, targets can be detected even in 
the presence of intensive main lobe jamming by either 
jammers in close proximity to the target (stand-off 
jamming) or aboard the target (self-screening jamming). 
11. Increase of Clutter Resistance 
When transmitting and receiving stations of an MSRS 
are spatially separate, the intersection volume of their 
main lobes may be much less than the main lobe of a mono-
static radar. In this way clutter returns (ground clutter) 
are smaller than a mono-static radar, because the 
intersection volume is usually far away from the receiving 
station. Even highly directional reflectors (like corner 
reflectors) are not efficient against this type of radar 
because the energy reflected back aims toward the 
transmitter, not the receiver. In the case of clutter 
falling in the intersection of the transmitter station’s 
main lobe and the receiver station’s sidelobe (or vice 
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versa), the reduction in clutter depends only on the 
respective antennas’ (transmit or receive) sidelobe 
pattern. That is the reason for keeping sidelobe level low 
in such radars. 
For MSRS that use spatially separated transceiving 
stations operating in different frequency ranges, 
narrowband chaff clutter is not efficient because it will 
clutter the specific frequency range it’s designed for but 
leave the target visible to MSRS stations that do not 
operate in this frequency range. 
MTI techniques used in mono-static radars can also be 
used in MSRSs, however MSRSs present some additional 
advantages. A target that presents zero radial velocity to 
mono-static radar performing MTI processing can be hidden 
from the radar. However, in the case of an MSRS, this 
target will not present zero radial velocity to all 
stations and so it will be tracked. 
Another advantage has to do with radars performing 
Doppler processing. A target’s speed can coincide with the 
“blind” speeds of a mono-static Doppler processing radar, 
but an MSRS station can operate in different PRFs and/or 
transmission frequencies, eliminating such effect. 
12. Increase of Survivability and Reliability 
MSRSs comprised of many stations can be dispersed 
spatially and can be redundant; therefore, the system has a 
significantly higher probability of survival than does a 
mono-static radar. Even the destruction or equipment 
failure of one or several stations does not lead to the 
total loss of information, but only to a decrease in 
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performance, as there are still other stations available. 
This effect is often called “graceful degradation”. The 
possibility of reconfiguring an MSRS after an attack or 
failure enhances its graceful degradation and its 
reliability as well. 
In the special case of “silent” receiving stations the 
probability of interception is much lower, making them even 
less vulnerable to an attack (e.g., anti-radiation 
missiles).  
Mobile MSRSs can re-locate quickly, which lessens the 
probability of a successful attack against them. 
MSRSs that use transceiving stations (which can be 
intercepted), may be positioned in a less dangerous zone, 
use LPI waveforms, use decoy emitters or several netted 
transmitters with irregular switching between them. 
The survivability of an MSRS can be further improved 
if decentralized signal and data processing is used.     
13. Technical and Operational Advantages 
MSRSs that use separate transmitting and receiving 
stations do not require receiver protection RF components 
(circulators, duplexers, etc.). The required dynamic range 
of receivers may be significantly reduced, since the 
dynamic range of reflected signals received by them is much 
lower compared with signals of mono-static radars. 
14. Detection of Non-LOS Targets 
Due to terrain obscuration, ground-based or low-flying 
mono-static radar systems may not have a line of sight 
(LOS) to the target and therefore cannot provide detection, 
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whereas an MSRS with several stations can cover areas 
without losing targets. This is feasible because the 
probability of obtaining an LOS to the target (by at least 
one station) is greatly improved due to the spatial 
dispersion of the stations. 
C. DISADVANTAGES OF MULTISITE RADAR SYSTEMS 
The disadvantages of an MSRS system over a mono-static 
radar or a number of radars not integrated in a system are 
as follows (Chernyak 1998, 22-24; Pace 2009, 346-347). 
1. Centralized Control of Spatially Separate 
Stations 
The control of an MSRS depends on the type of MSRS 
(especially with respect to the degree of spatial coherency 
as mentioned in paragraph A.2 above and its information 
fusion level as mentioned in paragraph A.3 above). It can 
vary from simple control (target distribution among several 
groups of radars, tracks processing, etc.) to complex 
control (coordinated scanning of space, choice of 
operational frequencies and waveforms, position control of 
mobile stations, joint processing of signals, etc.). To 
achieve high survivability of an MSRS, partial 
decentralization of system control is important. 
2. Necessity of Data Transmission Conduits 
All MSRSs demand reliable data transmission conduits 
for data or signal transmission from the stations as well 
as control information from the fusion center. As discussed 
in chapter VII, section A, paragraph 3, the capacity of 
such transmission conduits is determined mainly by the 
information fusion level the MSRS requires. The type of 
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such data transmission conduits (wired or wireless) is 
determined by station location and mobility characteristics 
(stationary or mobile). Data transmission conduits are 
essential for the operation of any MSRS and additional 
considerations must be made with regard to protection 
against interference, physical protection, redundancy and 
so on. 
3. Additional Requirements for Synchronization, 
Phasing of Spatially Separate Stations, 
Transmission of Reference Frequencies and Signals 
Joint information processing (information fusion) 
requires some kind of synchronization between the stations 
and the fusion center (the accuracy of synchronization 
depends on the type of MSRS). For cooperative type MSRSs 
(as mentioned in paragraph A.4.b above), the transmitted 
frequency and signal waveform must be known by all 
receiving stations, which can be accomplished by either 
signal or special commands for station alignment 
transmission via the data transmission lines. Precise 
target coordinate measurements require precise 
synchronization (no more than a fraction of the inverse of 
signal bandwidth).  
For coherent signal processing (MTI or Doppler 
measurements), a common reference frequency is required in 
each station to couple the transmitter and receiver 
heterodyne frequencies. It is also needed for correlation 
processing of received signals in active or passive/active 
MSRSs. The common frequency may be transmitted by the 
fusion center via the data transmission lines or by using a 
highly stable frequency standard at each station. 
  179
In spatially coherent MSRSs, in addition to precise 
synchronization and reference frequencies, phase 
synchronization is also required (the maintenance of phase 
relations among stations). 
4. Increased Requirements to Signal and Data 
Processors and Computer Systems 
It is obvious that by increasing the signal 
information body, as generally happens with an MSRS, there 
is a need for additional processing power compared to a 
mono-static radar (as mentioned in paragraph B.8 above). 
Factors that increase the computational effort of an MSRS 
compared to a mono-static radar are: the necessity for 
coordinate conversion from the local coordinate system of 
the station(s) into a common coordinate system for the 
MSRS; the data association of measurements (plots, tracks) 
from the various stations and targets determined and 
maintained at the fusion center; and the fact that most of 
the geometrical computational efforts (both at the stations 
or at the fusion center, depending on the type of the MSRS) 
are much more complicated than the ones of a mono-static 
radar.  
5. Necessity for Accurate Station Positioning and 
Mutual Alignment 
A main task of the fusion center is to correctly 
process the coordinate information coming from various 
stations in order to construct target tracks. To do so the 
stations’ positions must be known and stations must be 
aligned. Errors in station position determination as well 
as the orientation of the local (station) coordinate system 
axes directly influence the accuracy of the output 
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information (target location determination) of the MSRS. 
The use of Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers is the 
solution for accurate position data.  
6. Need for Direct LOS Between Stations and Targets 
Unless the MSRS is comprised of Over the Horizon Radar 
(OTHR), its coverage is limited by the need for LOS between 
stations and targets. A target should be simultaneously 
visible by several stations of an MSRS (transmitting and 
receiving or transceiving) in order for fusion to be 
effectively applied. 
7. High Cost 
MSRSs comprised of several spatially separate 
stations, data transmission lines, and information fusion 
centers are more complex and expensive than mono-static 
radar. However for the comparison to be fair we have to 
compare systems with similar capabilities and 
characteristics. In this context some MSRS characteristics 
are not achievable by mono-static radars, whereas others 
can be achieved but will dramatically increase the 
complexity and cost of the mono-static radar. Note that 
MSRSs with simple stations of the same type are less 
expensive than a mono-static radar with similar 
characteristics. Also note that significant benefits can be 
obtained at a low cost when an MSRS is created by 
integrating several mono-static radars or by adding remote 
receiving station to these radars. 
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D. SUMMARY 
Although in previous years the implementation of MSRSs 
posed certain technical difficulties, nowadays it has 
become feasible due to recent advances in large bandwidth 
wireless networks, high capacity data transmission lines, 
multichannel electronically scanned antennas, high-speed, 
low-cost digital processors, and precise synchronization 
systems (Teng, et al. 2007). But, there are technical 
challenges that have yet to be addressed. The most 
important is the time and frequency synchronization for 
coherent operation. By using GPS as a reference-timing 
signal, the network can be made coherent. Another important 
challenge is data fusion and registration of the various 
data streams, which requires reliable and high-capacity 
communication links in the network (Derham, et al. 2007). 
Table 11 summarizes the MSRS advantages among the 
types of MSRSs. The table’s color is coded best to worst as 
follows: green means that the specific subtype has this 
advantage to the highest degree; yellow means that this 
subtype has this advantage to a lesser degree than those 
marked in green; red means that this subtype has this 
advantage to a lesser degree than those marked in yellow. 
Table 12 summarizes the MSRS disadvantages for the 
types of MSRSs. It is color coded worst to best as follows: 
red means that the specific subtype has this disadvantage 
to the most serious degree; yellow means that this subtype 
has this disadvantage to a lesser degree than those marked 
green; green means that this subtype has this disadvantage 
to the least degree. 
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The purpose of the color coding of the two tables is 
to show the relative differences for advantages and 
disadvantages between MSRS subcategories. When all subtypes 
have the same color (either green for advantages of red for 
disadvantages), there is no relative difference between 
them with respect to the advantage or disadvantage. When 
there are different colors among subtypes, then there is 





















































































































































































































































































































Form coverage area                   
Power                   
Detection of stealth targets                   
High accuracy of position 
estimation       
            
Possibility of estimating 
target’s velocity and 
acceleration vectors 
      
            
Measurement of radiating 
sources position and velocity       
            
Increase in resolution                   
Increase of target handling 
capacity       
            
Increase of signal 
information body       
            
Increase in jamming 
resistance       
            
Increase in clutter 
resistance       
            
Increase in survivability and 
reliability       
            
Technical and operational 
advantages       
            
Detection of non-LOS targets                   
















Station location and 




































































































































































































































































































Centralized control of 
spatially separate stations       
            
Necessity of data 
transmission lines       
            
Synchronization, phasing and 
reference frequencies       
            
Increased requirements for 
signal and data processors 
and computer systems 
      
            
Accurate system positioning 
and alignment       
            
Need of direct LOS between 
target and stations       
            
High cost                   
Table 12.   Summary of MSRS Disadvantages for Types of MSRSs 
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VIII. SIMULATION SCENARIO 
Having discussed the theoretical background of the LPI 
principle and issues pertaining to netted and non-netted 
configuration of LPI systems, in this chapter we attempt to 
evaluate the efficiency of the latter, using the network 
topology depicted in Figure 53. 
 
Figure 53. Simulation Network Topology 
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Figure 53 depicts a five node IADS, consisting of five 
identical LPI radars whose task is to provide early warning 
in a radius of 100km.  
Prior to launching LPIsimNet, we set the LPI radar 
characteristics based on the requirements for detection 
range, resolution range, and the operating central 
frequency of our design as shown in Table 13. 
 
Characteristic Symbol Value 
Radar Operating Frequency f  9.375 GHz 
Radar Required Range Resolution38 ΔR  1 m 
Radar Required Detection Range R  100 km 
Radar ERP ERP  10 Watt 
Radar Antenna Gain , T RG G  30 dB 





2 sq. Meters 
Target Intercept receiver antenna Gain 
IG  
0 dB 
Table 13.   LPI Radar & Target Characteristics 
Commencing from the design requirements of Table 13, 
we calculated the specific parameters of the scenario: 
The required modulation bandwidth (ΔF ) for a range 
resolution of Δ 1R m=  is: 
                     
38 Assuming that the target against which the IADS wants to provide 
an early warning is an F-16, with wingspan 9.8m, the range resolution 
we want to achieve at max range is approximately 1m. 
  187
83 10
Δ Δ Δ 150
2Δ 2 1
cF F F MHz
R m
⋅= ⇒ = ⇒ =⋅  
 





3 10d d d
R kmt t t m
c
⋅= ⇒ = ⇒ =⋅  
 
The modulation period mt  is: 
5.5 5.5 0.667 sec 3.6685 secm d m mt t t m t m≈ ⇒ = ⋅ ⇒ =  
 
And the effective modulation bandwidth 'ΔF : 





F F F MHz F MHz
t
= − ⇒ = − ⇒ =
 
 





Δ Δ Δ 1.22
2Δ 2 122.73 10
cR R R m
F
⋅= ⇒ = ⇒ =⋅ ⋅  
 
The coherent processing interval ot  is: 
3.6685 0.667 3.0015 seco m d o ot t t t t m= − ⇒ = − ⇒ =  
 
The spectral width of the beat frequency Δw  is: 
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1 1
Δ Δ Δ 0.3332
3.0015 seco
w w w kHz
t m
= ⇒ = ⇒ =
 
 
The velocity resolution Δv  is:  
3Δ 0.032 0.3332 10
Δ Δ Δ 5.3312
2 2 sec
λ w mv v v⋅ ⋅= ⇒ = ⇒ =
 
 
The effective time bandwidth product (or processing 
gain [PG ]) is: 
' 3 6Δ 3.0015 10 122.73 10 368,374.1 55.66oPG t F PG PG dB
−= ⇒ = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⇒ = =  
 
Assuming that the closing speed of target is 




1 1 18 3
2 Δ 2 2 100 10 122.73 10 2 300
27.241
0.0323 10 3.0015 10b b bo
R F Vf f f MHz
ct λ −
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅= − ⇒ = − ⇒ =⋅ ⋅ ⋅  
' 3 6
' ' '
2 2 28 3
2 Δ 2 2 100 10 122.73 10 2 300
27.279
0.0323 10 3.0015 10b b bo
R F Vf f f MHz
ct λ −
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅= + ⇒ = + ⇒ =⋅ ⋅ ⋅  
 
The maximum beat frequency 'maxbf is: 
' '
max 2 27.279b bf f MHz= =  
 
The sampling frequency sf  is: 
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' '
max 22 2 54.558s b b sf f f f MHz= = ⇒ =  
 
The number of samples within the coherent processing 
interval FN  is: 
54.558 3.0015 sec 163,756F F Fs oN f t N MHz m N= ⇒ = ⋅ ⇒ =  
 
The Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) size 'N  is: 
' ' 182 2 262,144 163,756x FN N N= ≥ ⇒ = = ≥  
 
The unambiguous range of our LPI radar unR  is: 
' 'Δ 262,144 1.22 319,815.68 319.816un un unR N R R R m km= ⇒ = ⋅ ⇒ = =  
 
Since the unambiguous range (319.816km) is much higher 
than the requested detection range (100km), the designer 
can limit the range cells within the FFT by means of 
filtering the input to the FFT. 
In order to better comprehend the simulation results 
that will follow, we have to calculate the LPI radar 
sensitivity and, based on that calculation, determine the 
required SNR at the input of the LPI radar receiver to be 




Assuming all losses equal to 1, the LPI radar 
sensitivity Rδ  is: 
2 2
Τ 2
3 4 3 3 4
0.1 1000 1000 0.032 2 1




P G G λ σ L
δ δ
π R L L π
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅= ⇒ = ⇒⋅ ⋅ ⋅  
200.103205 10 209.86Rδ Watt dBW
−⇒ = ⋅ = −
 
 
The SNR required at the input of the LPI radar 













⋅= ⇒ = ⇒⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅  
105.4366 10 92.65RiSNR dB
−⇒ = ⋅ = −  
 
where we assumed that the noise factor at the LPI radar’s 
receiver is 5 3.1623RF dB= =  and the input bandwidth of the LPI 
radar receiver is matched to the LPI radar 
waveform: Δ 150RiB F MHz= = . 
In order to check whether the intercept receiver with 
the design characteristics we set at Table 13 can detect 
the LPI emitter within the desired range, we separately 
calculated the maximum intercept range ImaxR  using Equation 
(2.8).  
The results we get for various values of sensitivity Iδ  




sensitivity Iδ  
Maximum intercept range 
ImaxR  
 -60.00 dB      25.46 m 
 -80.00 dB     254.65 m 
-100.00 dB   2,546.48 m 
-120.00 dB  25,464.78 m 
-131.88 dB 100,000.00 m 
Table 14.   Maximum Detection Range vs. Intercept Receiver’s 
Sensitivity 
Studying Table 14, we notice two issues: 
• The LPI radar is capable of detecting the target 
at the desired range, as long as the required SNR 
at the input of the receiver is greater than -
92.65 dB ( 92.65RiSNR dB≥ ); and  
• The intercept receiver cannot detect the LPI 
radar emissions at the maximum LPI radar 
detection range unless it has a sensitivity less 
than -131.88 dB ( 131.88Rδ dB< − ).  
 
Having established the parameters of our design, and 
in order to enhance the level of realism, we assume that 
nodes 2 and 3 have lower decision tempo and connectivity 
values than do nodes 1, 4, and 5. In order to incorporate 
these values into a simulation scenario, and to evaluate 
the information network metrics and the SNR advantages of 
the network topology chosen, we utilize the LPIsimNet 
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software, a collection of MATLAB files developed by Chen 
and Pace, that can set up a sensor network with a given 
configuration and number of communication nodes (Chen, 
2007; Chen and Pace, 2008).  
For the purposes of our analysis, we examined the 
configuration of Figure 53 in three scenarios of increasing 
complexity: 
The first scenario involves a 5-node LPI network and a 
self-jammer. 
The second scenario replaces the self-jammer with a 
stand-off jammer and a target. 
The third scenario uses two stand-in jammers (UAVs).  
Each scenario is run in three stages (time indexes), 
representing the time steps taken by the jammer/target as 
it approaches the IADS. To thoroughly examine the jamming 
effect, our analysis is structured along two levels: the 
first involves the visual representation of the SNJR 
contour chart on each step of the scenario under 
examination. By doing so, we aim to provide the reader with 
a tool for rapid visual comparison between the different 
configurations. The second level pertains to numerical 
analysis. Its purpose is to present precise data for 
mathematical analysis and final conclusions. To present 
both levels, we have utilized the LPIsimNet software. The 
latter’s results (SNR, JSR, S/(J+N)) are presented first 
for the non-netted and then for the netted configuration. 
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A. SCENARIO 1: 1 SSJ 
1. Scenario 1 Time Index 1 
a. `SNR – Non-Netted 
 
Figure 54. Non-Netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=1 
For target at (80, 50): 
Node Radar Echo(W)    Noise(W)    SNR 
1 4.4646.10-21 10-12 4.4646.10-9 
2 1.1161.10-21 10-12 1.1161.10-9 
3 2.0644.10-21 10-12 2.0644.10-9 
4 1.3212.10-21 10-12 1.3212.10-9 
5 4.4646.10-21 10-12 4.4646.10-9 
    Max SNR = 4.4646.10-9= -83.5022 dB 
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b. `SNR – Netted 
 
 
Figure 55. Netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=1 
For target at (80, 50): 
Node Radar Echo(W)    Noise(W)    SNR 
1 1.6626.10-21      10-12 1.6626.10-8 
2 8.313.10-21       10-12 8.313.10-9 
3 1.1306.10-21 10-12 1.1306.10-8 
4 9.0446.10-21      10-12 9.0446.10-9 








SNR (dB) -83.5022 dB -72.082 dB 11.42 dB 
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c. `JSR – Non-Netted 
 
 
Figure 56. Non-netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=1 
For target at (80, 50): 
Node Jamming Power(W)    Radar Echo (W)   JSR 
1 1.9075.10-11 4.4646.10-21    4272566008.8821
2 9.5376.10-12 1.1161.10-21    8545132017.7642
3 1.2971.10-11 2.0644.10-21    6283185307.1796
4 1.0377.10-11 1.3212.10-21    7853981633.9745
5 1.9075.10-11 4.4646.10-21    4272566008.8821
 
    Min JSR = 4272566008.8821 = 96.3069 dB 
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d. `JSR – Netted 
 
Figure 57. Netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=1 
For target at (80, 50): 
Node Jamming Power(W)    Radar Echo (W)  JSR 
1 1.9075.10-11 1.6626.10-20    1147305587.7772
2 9.5376.10-11 8.313.10-21     1147305587.7772
3 1.2971.10-11 1.1306.10-20    1147305587.7772
4 1.0377.10-11 9.0446.10-21    1147305587.7772








JSR (dB) 96.3069 dB 83.6071 12.6998 dB 
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e. `S/(J+N) – Non-Netted 
 
Figure 58. Non-netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time 
Index=1 
For target at (80, 50): 
Node Radar Echo Noise Power Jamming Power SNJR 
1 4.4646.10-21 10-12 1.9075.10-11 2.2239.10-10 
2 1.1161.10-21 10-12 9.5376.10-12 1.0592.10-10 
3 2.0644.10-21 10-12 1.2971.10-11 1.4776.10-10 
4 1.3212.10-21 10-12 1.0377.10-11 1.1613.10-10 
5 4.4646.10-21 10-12 1.9075.10-11 2.2239.10-10 





f. S/(J+N) – Netted 
 
Figure 59. Netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time Index=1 
For target at (80, 50): 
Node Radar Echo Noise Power Jamming Power SNJR 
1 1.6626.10-20  10-12 1.9075.10-11   8.2819.10-10 
2 8.313.10-21 10-12 9.5376.10-10   7.8889.10-10 
3 1.1306.10-20 10-12 1.2971.10-11   8.0922.10-10 
4 9.0446.10-21 10-12 1.0377.10-11   7.95.10-10 
5 1.6626.10-20 10-12 1.9075.10-11 8.2819.10-10 








SNJR (dB) -96.5288 dB -83.926 dB 12.6028 dB 
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2. Scenario 1 Time index 2 (5 LPI Radar + 1 SSJ) 
a. SNR Non-Netted 
 
 
Figure 60. Non-netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=2 
Analysis of SNR without Network at Time Index = 2 
For target at (65, 50): 
Node Radar Echo(W)    Noise(W)    SNR 
1 6.9503.10-21      10-12 6.9503.10-9 
2 2.4128.10-21      10-12 2.4128.10-9 
3 5.2849.10-21      10-12 5.2849.10-9 
4 2.5206.10-21      10-12 2.5206.10-9 
5 6.9503.10-21      10-12 6.9503.10-9 
 
    Max SNR = 6.9503.10-9= -81.58 dB 
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b. SNR Netted 
 
Figure 61. Netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=2 
For target at (65, 50): 
Node Radar Echo(W)    Noise(W)    SNR 
1 2.8242.10-20       10-12 2.8242.10-8 
2 1.664.10-20        10-12 1.664.10-8 
3 2.4627.10-20       10-12 2.4627.10-8 
4 1.7008.10-20       10-12 1.7008.10-8 
5 2.8242.10-20       10-12 2.8242.10-8 
 








SNR (dB) -81.58 dB -69.4022 dB 12.1778 dB 
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c. JSR Non-Netted 
  
Figure 62. Non-netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=2 
For target at (65, 50): 
Node Jamming Power(W)    Radar Echo (W)  JSR 
1 2.38.10-11 6.9503.10-21    3424335992.4129
2 1.4023.10-11         2.4128.10-21    5811946409.1411
3 2.0754.10-11         5.2849.10-21    3926990816.9872
4 1.4333.10-11         2.5206.10-21    5686282702.9975
5 2.38.10-11           6.9503.10-21    3424335992.4129
 






d. JSR Netted 
 
Figure 63. Netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=2 
For target at (65, 50): 
Node Jamming Power(W)    Radar Echo (W)  JSR 
1 2.38.10-11           2.8242.10-20    842726958.2774 
2 1.4023.10-11         1.664.10-20     842726958.2774 
3 2.0754.10-11         2.4627.10-20    842726958.2774 
4 1.4333.10-11         2.4627.10-20    842726958.2774 
5 2.38.10-11           2.8242.10-20    842726958.2774 
 








JSR (dB) 95.3458 dB 82.2672 dB 13.0786 dB 
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e. S/(J+N) Non-Netted 
  
Figure 64. Non-netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time 
Index=2 
For target at (65, 50): 
Node Radar Echo Noise Power Jamming Power SNJR 
1 6.9503.10-21 10-12 2.38.10-11    2.10-10 
2 2.4128.10-21 10-12 1.402310-11 1.6061.10-10 
3 5.2849.10-21 10-12 2.0754.10-11 2.4294.10-10 
4 2.5206.10-21 10-12 1.4333.10-11 1.6439.10-10 
5 6.9503.10-21 10-12 2.38.10-11 2.8025.10-10 
 





f. S/(J+N) Netted 
 
Figure 65. Netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time Index=2 
For target at (65, 50): 
Node Radar Echo Noise Power Jamming Power SNJR 
1 2.8242.10-20 10-12 2.38.10-11     1.1388.10-9 
2 1.664.10-20 10-12 1.4023.10-11   1.1076.10-9 
3 2.4627.10-20 10-12 2.0754.10-11   1.1321.10-9 
4 1.7008.10-20 10-12 1.4333.10-11   1.1092.10-9 
5 2.8242.10-20 10-12 2.38.10-11     1.1388.10-9 
 








SNJR (dB) -95.5245 dB -82.4976 dB 13.0269 dB 
  205
3. Scenario 1 Time index 3 (5 LPI Radar + 1 SSJ) 
a. SNR – Non-Netted 
 
Figure 66. Non-netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=3 
For target at (50, 50): 
Node Radar Echo(W)    Noise(W)    SNR 
1 8.2577.10-21   10-12 8.2577.10-9 
2 6.1368.10-21  10-12 6.1368.10-9 
3 1.7858.10-20   10-12 1.7858.10-8 
4 4.8862.10-20 10-12 4.8862.10-8 
5 8.2577.10-21 10-12 8.2577.10-9 
 
    Max SNR = 1.7858e.10-8= -77.4816 dB 
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b. SNR –Netted 
 
Figure 67. Netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=3 
For target at (50, 50): 
Node Radar Echo(W)    Noise(W)    SNR 
1 4.213.10-20   10-12  4.213.10-8 
2 3.6319.10-20 10-12  3.6319.10-8 
3 6.1956.10-20 10-12  6.1956.10-8 
4 3.2407.10-20   10-12  3.2407.10-8 
5 4.213.10-20   10-12  4.213.10-8 
 








SNR (dB) -77.4816 dB -66.6768 dB 10.8048 dB 
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c. JSR – Non-Netted 
 
Figure 68. Non-netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=3 
For target at (50, 50): 
Node Jamming Power(W)    Radar Echo (W)  JSR 
1 2.5942.10-11 8.2577.10-21    3141592653.5898
2 2.2364.10-11 6.1368.10-21    3644247478.1642
3 3.815.10-11 1.7858.10-20    2136283004.4411
4 1.9956.10-11 4.8862.10-21    4084070449.6667
5 2.5942.10-11 8.2577.10-21    3141592653.5898
 
    Min JSR = 2136283004.4411 = 93.2966 dB 
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d. JSR – Netted 
 
Figure 69. Netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=3 
For target at (50, 50): 
Node Jamming Power(W)    Radar Echo (W)  JSR 
1 2.5942.10-11         4.213.10-20     615770607.2805 
2 2.2364.10-11         3.6319.10-20    615770607.2805 
3 3.815.10-11          6.1956.10-20    615770607.2805 
4 1.9956.10-11         3.2407.10-20    615770607.2805 
5 2.5942.10-11         4.213.10-20     615770607.2805 
 







JSR (dB) 93.2966 dB 80.9045 dB 12.3921 dB 
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e. S/(J+N) – Non-Netted 
 
Figure 70. Non-netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time 
Index=3 
For target at (50, 50): 
Node Radar Echo Noise Power Jamming Power SNJR 
1 8.2577.10-21 10-12 2.5942.10-11  3.065.10-10 
2 6.1368.10-21 10-12 2.2364.10-11  3.8457.10-10 
3 1.7858.10-20 10-12 3.815.10-11      4.5615.10-10 
4 4.8862.10-21 10-12 1.9956.10-11    2.3317.10-10 
5 8.2577.10-21 10-12 2.5942.10-11    3.065.10-10 
 





f. S/(J+N) –Netted 
 
Figure 71. Netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time Index-3 
For target at (50, 50): 
Node Radar Echo Noise Power Jamming Power SNJR 
1 4.213.10-20 10-12 2.5942.10-11   1.5637.10-9 
2 3.6319.10-20 10-12 2.2364.10-11 1.0.10-9 
3 6.1956.10-20 10-12 3.815.10-11    1.5825.10-9 
4 3.2407.10-20 10-12 1.9956.10-11   1.5465.10-9 
5 4.213.10-20 10-12 2.5942.10-11   1.5637.10-9 
 









SNJR (dB) -93.409 dB -81.073 dB 12.336 dB 
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Β. SCENARIO 2: 1 STAND-OFF JAMMER & 1 TARGET 
1. Scenario 2 Time Index 1 
a. SNR – Non-Netted 
 
Figure 72. Non-netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=1 
For target at (60, 50): 
Node Radar Echo(W)    Noise(W)    SNR 
1 7.6347.10-21 10-12 7.6347.10-9 
2 3.2257.10-21 10-12 3.2257.10-9 
3 7.6347.10-21 10-12 7.6347.10-9 
4 3.1465.10-21   10-12 3.1465.10-9 
5 7.6347.10-21   10-12 7.6347.10-9 
 
    Max SNR = 7.6347.10-9= -81.1721 dB 
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b. SNR – Netted 
 
Figure 73. Netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=1 
For the target at (60, 50): 
Node Radar Echo (W)    Noise(W)    SNR 
1 3.2768.10-20 10-12 3.2768.10-8 
2 2.1299.10-20 10-12 2.1299.10-8 
3 3.2768.10-20 10-12 3.2768.10-8 
4 2.1036.10-20 10-12 2.1036.10-8 
5 3.2768.10-20 10-12 3.2768.10-8 
 








SNR (dB) -81.1721 dB -68.5189 dB 12.6532 dB 
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c. JSR – Non-Netted 
 
Figure 74. Non-netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=1 
For target at (60, 50): 
Node Jamming Power(W)    Radar Echo (W)  JSR 
1 1.7964.10-11 7.6347.10-21    2352932896.9714
2 9.5095.10-12 3.225.10-21 2948083808.8287
3 1.2951.10-11 7.6347.10-21    1696357488.2551
4 1.021.10-11 3.1465.10-21    3244722585.3052
5 1.796.10-11 7.6347.10-21    2352932896.9714
 






d. JSR –Netted 
 
Figure 75. Netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=1 
For target at (60, 50): 
Node Jamming Power(W)    Radar Echo (W)  JSR 
1 1.7964.10-11 3.2768.10-20    548216783.1287 
2 9.5095.10-12 2.1299.10-20   446473788.393 
3 1.2951.10-11 3.2768.10-20    395239339.9933 
4 1.021.10-11 2.1036.10-20    485331725.6893 
5 1.7964.10-11 3.2768.10-20    548216783.1287 
 








JSR (dB) 92.2952 dB 79.797 dB 12.4982 dB 
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e. S/(J+N) – Non-Netted 
 
Figure 76. Non-netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time 
Index=1 
For target at (60, 50): 
Node Radar Echo Noise Power Jamming Power SNJR 
1 7.6347.10-21 10-12 1.7964.10-11 4.0259.10-10 
2 3.2257.10-21 10-12 9.5095.10-12 3.0693.10-10 
3 7.6347.10-21 10-12 1.2951.10-12 5.4724.10-10 
4 3.1465.10-21 10-12 1.021.10-11 2.807.10-10 
5 7.6347.10-21 10-12 1.7964.10-11 4.0259.10-10 
 





f. S/(J+N) –Netted 
 
Figure 77. Netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time Index=1 
For target at (60, 50): 
Node Radar Echo Noise Power Jamming Power SNJR 
1 3.2768.10-20 10-12 1.7964.10-11   1.7279.10-9 
2 2.1299.10-20 10-12 9.5095.10-12 2.026.10-9 
3 3.2768.10-20 10-12 1.2951.10-11   2.3488.10-9 
4 2.1036.10-20 10-12 1.021.10-11    1.8766.10-9 
5 3.2768.10-20 10-12 1.7964.10-11   1.7279.10-9 
 








SNJR (dB) -92.6182 dB -80.1288 dB 12.4894 dB 
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2. Scenario 2 Time Index 2 
a. SNR – Non-Netted 
 
Figure 78. Non-netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=2 
For target at (45, 50): 
Node Radar Echo(W)    Noise(W)    SNR 
1 8.095.10-21 10-12 8.095.10-9 
2 8.7764.10-21 10-12 8.7764.10-9 
3 2.9397.10-20 10-12 2.9397.10-8 
4 6.0323.10-21 10-12 6.0323.10-9 
5 8.095.10-12 10-12 8.095.10-9 
 




b. SNR –Netted 
 
Figure 79. Netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=2 
For target at (45, 50): 
Node Radar Echo(W)    Noise(W)    SNR 
1 4.7033.10-20   10-12 4.7033.10-8 
2 4.8972.10-20   10-12 4.8972.10-8 
3 8.9629.10-20 10-12 8.9629.10-8 
4 4.0601.10-20 10-12 4.0601.10-8 
5 4.7033.10-20   10-12 4.7033.10-8 
 








SNR (dB) -75.3169 dB -65.6341 dB 9.6828 dB 
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c. JSR – Non-Netted 
 
Figure 80. Non-netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=2 
For target at (45, 50): 
Node Jamming Power(W)    Radar Echo (W)  JSR 
1 2.2003.10-11         8.095.10-21     2718090550.4659
2 1.3922.10-11         8.7764.10-21    1586359166.5851
3 2.0653.10-11         2.9397.10-20    702560415.2673 
4 1.3887.10-11         6.0323.10-21    2302130378.0091
5 2.2003.10-11         8.095.10-21     2718090550.4659
 




d. JSR –Netted 
 
Figure 81. Netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=2 
For target at (45, 50): 
Node Jamming Power(W)    Radar Echo (W)  JSR 
1 2.2003.10-11         4.7033.10-20    467817995.0508 
2 1.3922.10-11         4.8972.10-20   284291689.5865 
3 2.0653.10-11         8.9629.10-20    230431678.4694 
4 1.3887.10-11         4.0601.10-20    342041207.0007 
5 2.2003.10-11         4.7033.10-20    467817995.0508 
 







JSR (dB) 88.4668 dB 78.2229 dB 10.2439 dB 
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e. S/(J+N) – Non-Netted 
 
Figure 82. Non-netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time 
Index=2 
For target at (45, 50): 
Node Radar Echo Noise Power Jamming Power SNJR 
1 8.095.10-21 10-12 2.2003.10-11 3.5191.10-10 
2 8.776.10-21 10-12 1.3922.10-11 5.8813.10-10 
3 2.9397.10-20 10-12 2.0653.10-11 1.3576.10-9 
4 6.0323.10-21 10-12 1.3887.10-11 4.052.10-10 
5 8.095.10-21 10-12 2.2003.10-11 3.5191.10-10 
 




f. S/(J+N) –Netted 
 
Figure 83. Netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time Index=2 
For target at (45, 50): 
Node Radar Echo Noise Power Jamming Power SNJR 
1 4.7033.10-20 10-12 2.2003.10-11   2.0447.10-9 
2 4.8972.10-20 10-12 1.3922.10-11   3.2818.10-9 
3 8.9629.10-20 10-12 2.0653.10-11   4.1393.10-9 
4 4.0601.10-20 10-12 1.3887.10-11   2.7272.10-9 
5 4.7033.10-20 10-12 2.2003.10-11   2.0447.10-9 
 







SNJR (dB) -88.6722 dB -78.4656 dB 10.2066 dB 
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3. Scenario 2 Time Index 3 
a. SNR – Non-Netted 
 
Figure 84. Non-netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=3 
For target at (30, 50): 
Node Radar Echo(W)    Noise(W)    SNR 
1 6.1368.10-21 10-12 6.1368.10-9 
2 3.0539.10-20 10-12 3.0539.10-8 
3 2.0644.10-19 10-12 2.0644.10-7 
4 1.0195.10-20 10-12 1.0195.10-8 
5 6.1368.10-20 10-12 6.1368.10-9 
 
    Max SNR = 2.0644.10-7= -66.852 dB 
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b. SNR –Netted 
 
Figure 85. Netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=3 
For target at (30, 50): 
Node Radar Echo (W)    Noise(W)    SNR 
1 6.9466.10-20 10-12 6.9466.10-8 
2 1.5496.10-19 10-12 1.5496.10-7 
3 4.0291.10-19 10-12 4.0291.10-7 
4 8.9535.10-20 10-12 8.9535.10-8 
5 6.9466.10-20 10-12 6.9466.10-8 
 







SNR (dB) -66.852 dB -61.0439 dB 5.8081dB 
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c. JSR – Non-Netted 
 
Figure 86. Non-netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=3 
For target at (30, 50): 
Node Jamming Power(W)    Radar Echo (W)  JSR 
1 2.4087.10-11         6.1368.10-21    3924974653.5797
2 2.1884.10-11         3.0539.10-20    716607743.2427 
3 3.7242.10-11         2.0644.10-19    180398946.8708 
4 1.8818.10-11         1.0195.10-20    1845860091.197 
5 2.4087.10-11         6.1368.10-21    3924974653.5797
 




d. JSR –Netted 
 
Figure 87. Netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=3 
For target at (30, 50): 
Node Jamming Power(W)    Radar Echo (W)  JSR 
1 2.4087.10-11 6.9466.10-20    346739681.7191 
2 2.1884.10-11 1.5496.10-19    141222154.1727 
3 3.7242.10-11 4.0291.10-19    92433347.4377 
4 1.8818.10-11 8.9535.10-20    210174948.4691 
5 2.4087.10-11 6.9466.10-20    346739681.7191 
 







JSR (dB) 82.5623 dB 75.4629 dB 7.0994 dB 
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e. S/(J+N) – Non-Netted 
 
Figure 88. Non-netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time 
Index=3 
For target at (30, 50): 
Node Radar Echo Noise Power Jamming Power SNJR 
1 6.1368.10-21 10-12 2.4087.10-11 2.4462.10-10 
2 3.0539.10-20 10-12 2.1884.10-11 1.3345.10-9 
3 2.0644.10-19 10-12 3.7242.10-11 5.3983.10-9 
4 1.0195.10-20 10-12 1.8818.10-11 5.1442.10-10 
5 6.1368.10-21 10-12 2.4087.10-11 2.4462.10-10 
 




f. S/(J+N)– Netted 
 
Figure 89. Netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time Index=3 
For target at (30, 50): 
Node Radar Echo Noise Power Jamming Power SNJR 
1 6.9466.10-20 10-12 2.4087.10-11 2.769.10-9 
2 1.5496.10-19 10-12 2.1884.10-11   6.7716.10-9 
3 4.0291.10-19 10-12 3.7242.10-11   1.0536.10-8 
4 8.9535.10-20 10-12 1.8818.10-11   4.5179.10-9 
5 6.9466.10-20 10-12 2.4087.10-11   2.769.10-9 
 







SNJR (dB) -82.6774 dB -75.6283 dB 7.049 dB  
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C. SCENARIO 3: 2 STAND IN JAMMERS 
1. Scenario 3 Time Index 1 
a. SNR – Non-Netted 
  
Figure 90. Non-netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=1 
For target at (80, 50): 
Node Radar Echo(W)    Noise(W)    SNR 
2 1.1161.10-21 10-12 1.1161.10-9 
3 2.0644.10-21 10-12 2.0644.10-9 
4 1.3212.10-21 10-12 1.3212.10-9 
5 4.4646.10-21 10-12 4.4646.10-9 
 
    Max SNR = 4.4646.10-9= -83.5022 dB 
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b. SNR – Netted 
 
Figure 91. Netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=1 
For target at (80, 50): 
Node Radar Echo(W)    Noise(W)    SNR 
2 6.0808.10-21 10-12 6.0808.10-9 
3 8.2698.10-21 10-12 8.2698.10-9 
4 6.6159.10-21 10-12 6.6159.10-9 
5 1.2162.10-20 10-12 1.2162.10-9 
 








SNR (dB) -83.5022 dB -74.7981 dB 8.7041 dB 
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c. JSR – Non-Netted 
 
Figure 92. Non-netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=1 
For target at (80, 50): 
Node Jamming Power(W)    Radar Echo (W)  JSR 
2 6.9891.10-12         1.1161.10-21    6261820912.0461
3 4.6117.10-12         2.0644.10-21    2233896340.3644
4 4.9881.10-12         1.3212.10-21    3775371748.1475
5 7.383.10-12          4.4646.10-21    1653677775.5514
 





d. JSR –Netted 
 
Figure 93. Netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=1 
For target at (80, 50): 
 
Node Jamming Power(W)    Radar Echo (W)  JSR 
2 6.9891.10-12         6.0808.10-21    1149379756.2493
3 4.6117.10-12         8.2698.10-21    557654005.671 
4 4.9881.10-12         6.6159.10-21    753965576.7226 
5 7.383.10-12          1.2162.10-20    607077010.1143 
 







JSR (dB) 92.1845 dB 82.4897 dB 9.6948 dB 
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e. S/(J+N) – Non-Netted 
 
Figure 94. Non-netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time 
Index=1 
For target at (80, 50): 
Node Radar Echo Noise Power Jamming Power SNJR 
2 1.1161.10-21 10-12 6.9891.10-12 1.3971.10-10 
3 2.0644.10-21 10-12 4.6117.10-12   3.6788.10-10 
4 1.3212.10-21 10-12 4.9881.10-12   2.2064.10-10 
5 4.4646.10-21 10-12 7.383.10-12 5.3258.10-10 
 





f. S/(J+N)- Netted 
 
Figure 95. Netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time Index=1 
For target at (80, 50): 
Node Radar Echo Noise Power Jamming Power SNJR 
2 6.0808.10-21 10-12 6.9891.10-12 7.6113.10-10 
3 8.2698.10-21 10-12 4.6117.10-12 1.4737.10-9 
4 6.6159.10-21 10-12 4.9881.10-12 1.1048.10-9 
5 1.2162.10-20 10-12 7.383.10-12 1.4507.10-9 
 







SNJR (dB) -92.7362 dB -83.1963 dB 9.5399 dB 
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2. Scenario 3 Time Index 2 
a. SNR – Non-Netted 
 
Figure 96. Non-netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=2 
For target at (65, 55): 
Node Radar Echo(W)    Noise(W)    SNR 
2 2.1941.10-21 10-12 2.1941.10-9 
3 5.548.10-21 10-12 5.548.10-9 
4 3.0702.10-21 10-12 3.0702.10-9 
5 1.0195.10-20 10-12 1.0195.10-8 
 
    Max SNR = 1.0195.10-8= -79.9163 dB 
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b. SNR – Netted 
 
Figure 97. Netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=2 
For target at (65, 55): 
Node Radar Echo(W)    Noise(W)    SNR 
2 1.3008.10-20 10-12 1.3008.10-8 
3 2.0685.10-20 10-12 2.0685.10-8 
4 1.5387.10-20 10-12 1.5387.10-8 
5 2.8039.10-20 10-12 2.8039.10-8 
 








SNR (dB) -79.9163 dB -71.1283 dB 8.788 dB 
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c. JSR – Non-Netted 
 
Figure 98. Non-netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=2 
For target at (65, 55): 
 
Node Jamming Power(W)    Radar Echo (W)  JSR 
2 8.9448.10-12         2.1941.10-21    4076774915.7844
3 6.9522.10-12         5.548.10-21     1253087303.8055
4 7.5613.10-12         3.0702.10-21    2462799115.4328
5 9.172.10-12          1.0195.10-20    899683794.9771 
 




d. JSR – Netted 
 
Figure 99. Netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=2 
For target at (65, 55): 
Node Jamming Power(W)    Radar Echo (W)  JSR 
2 8.9448.10-12         1.3008.10-20    687640094.5942 
3 6.9522.10-12         2.0685.10-20    336099360.6127 
4 7.5613.10-12         1.5387.10-20    491395673.1209 
5 9.172.10-12          2.8039.10-20    327109815.3063 
 








JSR (dB) 89.5409 dB 80.2129 dB 9.328 dB 
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e. S/(J+N) – Non-Netted 
 
Figure 100. Non-netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time 
Index=2 
For target at (65, 55): 
Node Radar Echo Noise Power Jamming Power SNJR 
2 2.1941.10-21 10-12 8.9448.10-12 2.2063.10-10 
3 5.548.10-21 10-12 6.9522.10-12 6.9768.10-10 
4 3.0702.10-21 10-12 7.5613.10-12 3.5861.10-10 
5 1.0195.10-20 10-12 9.172.10-12 1.0022.10-9 
 





Figure 101. Netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time Index=2 
Analysis of SNJR with Network at Time Index = 2 
For target at (65, 55): 
Node Radar Echo Noise Power Jamming Power SNJR 
2 1.3008.10-20 10-12 8.9448.10-12   1.308.10-9 
3 2.0685.10-20 10-12 6.9522.10-12   2.6012.10-9 
4 1.5387.10-20 10-12 7.5613.10-12   1.7973.10-9 
5 2.8039.10-20 10-12 9.172.10-12    2.7565.10-9 
 







SNJR (dB) -89.9903 dB -80.7247 dB 9.2656 dB 
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3. Scenario 3 Time Index 3 
a. SNR – Non-Netted 
 
Figure 102. Non-netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=3 
For target at (50, 60): 
Node Radar Echo(W)    Noise(W)    SNR 
2 4.4646.10-21 10-12 4.4646.10-9 
3 2.016.10-21 10-12 2.016.10-8 
4 8.5982.10-21 10-12 8.5982.10-9 
5 2.016.10-20 10-12 2.016.10-8 
 




b. SNR –Netted 
 
Figure 103. Netted SNR Contour Chart at Time Index=3 
For target at (50, 60): 
Node Radar Echo(W)    Noise(W)    SNR 
2 2.9635.10-20 10-12 2.9635.10-8 
3 6.2974.10-20 10-12 6.2974.10-8 
4 4.1126.10-20 10-12 4.1126.10-8 
5 6.2974.10-20 10-12 6.2974.10-8 
 








SNR (dB) -76.955 dB -67.0618 dB 9.8932 dB 
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c. JSR – Non-Netted 
 
Figure 104. Non-netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=3 
For target at (50, 60): 
Node Jamming Power(W)    Radar Echo (W)  JSR 
2 1.2933.10-11         4.4646.10-21    2896787150.5551
3 5.8009.10-12         2.016.10-20     287736411.3834 
4 1.2305.10-11         8.5982.10-21    1431176785.5706
5 1.0191.10-11         2.016.10-20     505501347.6305 
 





d. JSR –Netted 
 
Figure 105. Netted JSR Contour Chart at Time Index=3 
For target at (50, 60): 
Node Jamming Power(W)    Radar Echo (W)  JSR 
2 1.2933.10-11         2.9635.10-20    436410669.8761 
3 5.8009.10-12         6.2974.10-20    92115461.446 
4 1.2305.10-11         4.1126.10-20    299216053.5551 
5 1.0191.10-11         6.2974.10-20    161830369.937 
 








JSR (dB) 84.5899 dB 76.4457 dB 8.1442 dB 
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e. S/(J+N) – Non-Netted 
 
Figure 106. Non-netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time 
Index=3 
For target at (50, 60): 
Node Radar Echo Noise Power Jamming Power SNJR 
2 4.4646.10-21 10-12 1.2933.10-11   3.2043.10-10 
3 2.016.10-20 10-12 5.8009.10-12   2.9644.10-9 
4 8.5982.10-21 10-12 1.2305.10-11   6.4621.10-10 
5 2.016.10-20   10-12 1.0191.10-11   1.8015.10-9 
 
    Max SNJR = 2.9644.10-9= -85.2807 dB 
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f. S/(J+N) –Netted 
 
Figure 107. Netted SNJR Contour Chart at Time Index=3 
For target at (50, 60): 
Node Radar Echo Noise Power Jamming Power SNJR 
2 2.9635.10-20 10-12 1.2933.10-11   2.127.10-9 
3 6.2974.10-20 10-12 5.8009.10-12   9.2597.10-9 
4 4.1126.10-20 10-12 1.2305.10-11   3.0909.10-9 
5 6.2974.10-20 10-12 1.0191.10-11   5.6271.10-9 
 








SNJR (dB) -85.2807 dB -76.967 dB 8.3137 dB 
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Max SNJR  
(Non-Netted)or 









Netted -83.9260 dB -92.65 dB YES 





Netted -82.4976 dB -92.65 dB YES 











Netted -81.0730 dB -92.65 dB YES 





Netted -80.1218 dB -92.65 dB YES 





Netted -78.4656 dB -92.65 dB YES 











Netted -75.6283 dB -92.65 dB YES 





Netted -83.1963 dB -92.65 dB YES 





Netted -80.7247 dB -92.65 dB YES 











Netted -76.9670 dB -92.65 dB YES 
Table 15.   Summary of Simulation Results 
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Having all other parameters constant (radar 
positions, radar characteristics, target RCS, target 
movement, etc.) and changing only the type of operation 
(netted versus non-netted mode of operation), the preceding 
results are heavily dependent on the jammer characteristics 
(jammer ERP, jammer capability), the jammer’s distance from 
the radar nodes and the Target’s distance from the radar 
nodes. 
A careful study of Table 15 indicates that the 
netted configuration has no problem detecting the target in 
any scenario and at any time step. In fact, the netted 
configuration has a significant advantage over the non-
netted one, not only in terms of higher SNR, JSR and SNJR 
values, but also by achieving 100% detection probability. 
For the analysis of the non-netted configuration 
we examine each scenario separately: 
• Non-Netted Scenario 1 
Scenario 1 is a pure Self Screening Jamming (SSJ) 
scenario where the target and jammer coincide. In this 
specific scenario, the on-board jammer has a moderate ERP 
(10 Watts) and a good (0.75) jamming capability. In time 
steps 2 and 3 of the non-netted configuration, the jamming 
was effective and there was no detection by the radar grid. 
This can be explained by two factors: (1) the jammer is on-
board the target so there is no additional free space loss-
-as, for instance in the case of Stand-off Jamming (SOJ); 
and (2) the jammer has good ERP jamming capabilities.  
If we examine more closely time step 1 of 
scenario 1 we’ll see that even though there is target 
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detection, the SNJR is slightly higher than the threshold 
value (0.1212 dB higher than RiSNR ). 
• Non-Netted Scenario 2 
Scenario 2 is a pure SOJ scenario, where the 
target and the jammer have an offset (jammer behind 
target). In this scenario, the Jammer has the same 
characteristics as in scenario 1; the only difference is 
its offset with the target. The analysis of scenario 2 
LPIsimNet data indicates that all radar nodes could easily 
detect the target. This can be explained by the offset 
between the target and the jammer: given the fact that the 
target is closer to the radar nodes, it provides higher 
returns than the stand-off jammer can effectively mask. A 
stand-off jammer with higher ERP and jamming capability 
could probably prevent the target detection in the non-
netted operation. 
• Non-Netted Scenario 3 
Scenario 3 is a stand-in jamming scenario, where 
two slow moving stand-in jammers are used. Both jammers 
were selected to have low jamming capability (0.3) and low 
ERP (1 Watt), but they are much closer to the radar nodes. 
At time step 1 the radar nodes fail to detect the target. 
This can be attributed to two factors: (1) the small 
initial distance between the jammers and the radar nodes 
(less jamming power losses) and (2) the large initial 
distance between the target and the radar nodes (low signal 
returns due to losses).  
The detection at time steps 2 and 3 can be explained 
by the fact that the target is approaching the radar nodes 
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faster than the stand-in jammers do; this causes the 
target’s returns into the radar nodes to increase faster 
than the jamming power does. Two stand-in jammers with 
higher ERP and/or jamming capability or at closer distance 
to the radar, or moving at higher speed could probably 
prevent the target detection in the non-netted operation. 
In all scenarios the netted version has an 
additional effect on SNJR that varies from +7.049 dB 
(minimum improvement) to +13.0269 dB (maximum improvement) 
which in layman terms--keeping the noise power the same in 
all cases)--means that jamming power into the radar 
receiver has to be from 5.069 to 20.077 times higher in 
order to mask the target. 
This advantage of the netted configuration ,set 
against the non-netted configuration is mathematically 
explained in the work of Hume and Baker, and Papoutsis, 
Barker and Griffiths (Hume and Barker, 2001; Papoutsis, et. 
al, 2003): By netting several radars, and assuming that all 
radars are transmitting and are capable of receiving apart 
from their own echo the echoes from the other radars and 
that there is network synchronization, we get an increase 
in SNR by the square of the number of the total number of 
radar systems comprising the network. The formula for the 
SNR of the netted radar system is: 
( )








ERP µ A ν
SNR
πR Noise νπR= =
=∑ ∑  
Where: 
rERP ሺ ሻµ : Effective radiated power of radar µ . 
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eሺ ሻA ν : Effective antenna area of radar ν .  
ሺ ሻNoise ν : Noise power of radar ν . 
µR : Range from radar µ  to target. 
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IX. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis provides a comprehensive view of two major 
elements in Electronic Warfare: LPI assets and network 
configurations. With the existing scholarly efforts dealing 
individually with either of these two elements being not 
only extensive but also constantly updated, we attempted to 
fill the literature gap and provide a more comprehensive 
work discussing and linking both areas within the same 
work.39 
The simulations to achieve our data were performed 
with MATLAB-based software, using a standardized data set 
(LPIsimNet). Utilizing this tool, it was possible to 
numerically prove that the netted LPI IADS is less 
vulnerable to jamming attack than a non-netted LPI IADS. 
Although the results are not surprising (we expected a 
netted LPI IADS to be less susceptible to jamming than a 
non-netted one), the accuracy of the output data is 
affected by several factors pertaining to the limitations 
of the software used. 
Running the LPIsimNet, we noted that the absence of a 
parameter precisely describing the ease of flow between the 
assets is among the most notable factors affecting the 
accuracy of the output data. To account for this parameter, 
LPIsimNet requires a value for the “capability of 
                     
39 The 2008 paper of Chen and Pace presents a basic framework for 
simulation of network enabled radar systems, but, apart from being 
limited in breadth, its scope is limited in the evaluation of the 
jamming effect in general radar topology. Y. Q. Chen and Phillip E. 
Pace, “Simulation of Information Metrics to Assess the Value of 
Networking in A General Battlespace Topology,” in Proc. of the IEEE 
International Conf. on System of Systems Engineering (IEEE, June 2008). 
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information” of each of the nodes utilized;40 however, this 
parameter lacks a mathematical formula for its precise 
calculation. In the absence of such a formula, and in order 
to reflect the reduced capabilities of nodes 2 and 3 in our 
simulation scenario, we arbitrarily assumed that their 
“capability of information” was 0.7 instead of 1 
(maximum).In order to enhance the computation accuracy and 
provide real operational results, the extraction of a 
mathematical formula computing precisely the “capability of 
information” is recommended for future work. 
A second parameter that affects the output data of the 
simulation pertains to the RCS, as LPIsimNet assumes that 
the RCS of the target/jammer remains the same throughout 
its approach towards the radar grid. Such an arbitrary 
assumption generates extra inaccuracies, as the RCS is 
affected by several parameters.41As detailed computation of 
the netted vs. non-netted configuration performance was 
outside the scope of this paper, no alteration of the 
existing program code was attempted. In this context, the 
introduction of a real time RCS computational tool--within 
the LPIsimNet code if feasible-is highly recommended as a 
means to enhance the realism of the scenarios and provide 
more realistic results for existing assets. 
Our work asserts that networks of radar systems 
present many advantages compared to the traditional concept 
                     
40 The min value for the “capability of information” input is 0, and 
the max value is 1. 
41 Among the major factors are: the material of which the target is 
made; the absolute size of the target; the relative size of the target 
(that is, in relation to the wavelength of the illuminating radar); the 
incident angle, which depends upon the shape of the target and its 
orientation to the radar source; the reflected angle; the strength of 
the radar emitter; and the distance between the radar and the emitter. 
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of autonomous radar assets. Simple independent networks 
offer a subset of these advantages and are a logical first 
step. More sophisticated coherent networks offer the 
ultimate in performance. However, further research is 
required to truly establish the merits of this mode of 






















APPENDIX. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF PHASE MODULATING 
TECHNIQUES, FREQUENCY SHIFT KEYING TECHNIQUES AND 
NOISE TECHNIQUES 
A. PHASE MODULATING TECHNIQUES 
1. BPSK Codes 
BPSK is a phase shift technique primarily used in the 
communication sector rather than as modulation technique 
for LPI radar. In BPSK modulation two output phases are 
generated for a single carrier frequency. One output phase 
represents the logic 1 and the other the logic 0. When the 
input digital changes state (1 to 0 or 0 to 1) the phase of 
the output carrier shifts between two angles that are 180° 
apart. 
This can easily been seen in Figure 108 (red arrows). 
 
Figure 108. Figure BPSK Modulation 
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The typical BPSK codes used for BPSK modulation are 
the Barker Codes. The binary Barker sequences are finite-
length discrete time sequences with constant magnitude and 
a phase of either  = 0kφ  or =kφ π . The only known lengths 
of Barker sequences are = 2,3,4,5,7,11,13cN . The nine different 
Barker codes along with their respective peak sidelobe 
level (PSL) with respect to main lobe level can be seen in 
Table 16 below(Pace 2009, 128): 
Code 
Length 
Code Elements PSL (dB) 
2 - + ,  + - -6.0
3 + + - -9.5
4 + + - +, + + + - -12.0
5 + + + - + -14.0
7 + + + - - + -  -16.9
11 + + + - - - + - - + - -20.8
13 + + + + + - - + + - + - + -22.3
Table 16.   Barker Codes 
Another BPSK technique is to use Compound Barker 
Codes, which creates a sequence by implementing a Barker 
code within a Barker code. In this way we can create a 
larger sequence code that has a sequence of: 
= = 2 ሺA.1ሻcompoundc c c cN N N N  




+ + - + 
Embedded 
Code 
+ + - + + + - + + + - + + + - +
Final 
Code 
+ + - + + + - + - - + - + + - +
Table 17.   Compound Barker Code for 4cN =  
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In Figure 109, by using the MATLAB LPIT TOOLBOX, we 
see an example of a Barker code BPSK wave modulated by a 7 
code length Barker code and added white Gaussian noise, 
with parameters: =1cf kHz , =7sf kHz , = 0SNR dB , =7cN . 
 
Figure 109. BPSK Signal Modulated by Barker Code (length 
7) 
Compound Barker codes give a very large length of code 
sequences that can improve range resolution and also give a 
higher compression gain, but their peak sidelobes are not 
proportionally decreased (due to this higher compression 
gain)(Pace 2009, 128). 
There are three major disadvantages with the use of 
Barker codes. 
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• There are only few (9) known Barker code 
sequences that have a very limited length and thus limit 
the range resolution. 
• Even in the case of compound Barker codes that 
can have very large sequences of codes their peak sidelobes 
are not proportionally decreased due this high compression 
gain. 
• They are very sensitive to Doppler shifts. The 
Doppler shift of the return waveform can compress the 
waveform within the filter such that the matched filter 
gives incorrect results.  
2. Polyphase Codes 
Polyphase sequences are finite length, discrete time 
complex sequences with constant magnitude and variable 
phase kϕ . Polyphase coding is the phase modulation of the CW 
carrier by a polyphase sequence that has a number of 
discrete phases (Pace 2009, 133). 
Various codes satisfy the above criteria; Polyphase 
Barker codes, Frank, P1, P2, P3 and P4 codes. Polyphase 
codes derive from approximating a stepped (in the case of 
Frank, P1 and P2) or linear (in the case of P3 and P4) 
frequency modulation waveform, where the phase steps vary 
as needed to approximate the underlying waveform, but the 
time spent at any given phase state is constant. A short 
description of the polyphase codes follows. 
a. Polyphase Barker Codes 
Polyphase sequences that satisfy the Barker 
criteria are under investigation in order to try finding 
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longer sequences. Various algorithms have been used and/or 
developed in order to develop longer polyphase Barker 
codes. Currently ≤63cN  codes have been discovered (Pace, 
2009, 134).  
b. Frank Code 
Frank code, developed by R.L. Frank in 1963, has 
been used successfully in LPI radar. The Frank code is 
derived from a step approximation to a linear frequency 
modulation waveform using M  frequency steps and M  samples 
per frequency. Its length (or processing gain) is = 2cN M . 
The phase of the Frank code is given by the following 
formula (Pace 2009, 143): 
= − −, 2 ሺ 1ሻሺ 1ሻ ሺA.2ሻi j πφ i jM  
Where: 
,i jφ : Phase of the thi  sample of the thj  frequency 
=1,2,...,i M    
=1,2,...,j M  
 
In Figures 110 and 111, by using the MATLAB LPIT 
TOOLBOX, we see a Frank code modulated CW wave, signal 
phase and code phase diagrams, with parameters: =1cf kHz , 
=7sf kHz , = 0SNR dB  and =16M . 
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Figure 110. Frank Code Phase 
 
Figure 111. Signal Phase (Modulated by Frank Code) 
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c. P1 Code 
P1 code is similar to the Frank code. It is also 
derived from a step approximation to a linear frequency 
modulation waveform using M  frequency steps and M samples 
per frequency. Its length (or processing gain) is = 2cN M . 
The phase of the P1 code is given by the following formula 
(Pace 2009, 148): 
− ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − − − + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦, ሺ2 1ሻ ሺ 1ሻ ሺ 1ሻ  ሺA.3ሻi j




,i jφ : Phase of the thi  sample of the thj  frequency 
=1,2,3,....M  
=1,2,...,i M    
=1,2,...,j M  
In Figures 112 and 113, by using the MATLAB LPIT 
TOOLBOX, we see a P1 code modulated CW wave, signal phase 
and code phase diagrams, with parameters: =1cf kHz , =7sf kHz , 




Figure 112. P1 Code Phase 
 
Figure 113. Signal Phase (Modulated by P1 Code) 
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d. P2 Code 
P2 code is similar to P1 code, but  should be 
even and the starting phases are different than with P1 
code. It is also derived from a step approximation to a 
linear frequency modulation waveform using M  frequency 
steps and M  samples per frequency. Its length (or 
processing gain) is = 2cN M . The phase of the P2 code is 
given by the following formula (Pace 2009, 152). 
−= − − − −, ሺ2 1 ሻሺ2 1 ሻ   ሺA.4ሻ2i j




,i jφ : Phase of the thi  sample of the thj  frequency 
=2,4,6,....M  
=1,2,...,i M    
=1,2,...,j M  
 
In Figures 114 and 115, by using the MATLAB LPIT 
TOOLBOX, we see a P2 code modulated CW wave, signal phase 
and code phase diagrams, with parameters: =1cf kHz , =7sf kHz , 
= 0SNR dB  and =16M . 
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Figure 114. P2 Code Phase 
 
Figure 115. Signal Phase (Modulated by P2 Code) 
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e. P3 Code 
P3 code is derived by converting a linear 
frequency modulation waveform to baseband. That is done by 
using a synchronous oscillator on one end of the frequency 
sweep and sampling the in-phase (I) and quadrature (Q) 
channels at the Nyquist rate (the sampling frequency ≤2sf W  
where W  is the highest frequency of the signal) resulting 
in a single sideband detection. The phase of the P3 code is 
given by the following formula (Pace 2009, 152): 






iφ : Phase of the thi  sample 
cN : Compression ratio 
=1,2,..., ci N    
In Figures 116 and 117, by using the MATLAB LPIT 
TOOLBOX, we show a P3 code modulated CW wave, signal phase 
and code phase diagrams, with parameters: =1cf kHz , =7sf kHz , 
= 0SNR dB  and =32M . 
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Figure 116. P3 Code Phase 
 
Figure 117. Signal Phase (Modulated by P3 Code) 
  269
f. P4 Code 
P4 code is similar to P3 code, but the oscillator 
that does the sampling of the in-phase (I) and quadrature 
(Q) channels has an offset between I and Q channels, 
resulting in coherent double sideband detection. Again, the 
sampling is done at the Nyquist rate (the sampling 
frequency ≤2sf W  where W  is the highest of the signal). The 
phase of the P4 code is given by the following formula 









iφ : Phase of the thi  sample 
cN : Compression ratio 
=1,2,..., ci N    
 
In Figures 118 and 119, by using the MATLAB LPIT 
TOOLBOX, we show a P4 code modulated CW wave, signal phase 
and code phase diagrams, with parameters: =1cf kHz , =7sf kHz , 
= 0SNR dB  and =32M . 
  270
 
Figure 118. P4 Code Phase 
 
Figure 119. Signal Phase (Modulated by P4 Code) 
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3. Polytime Codes 
Polyphase codes derive from approximating a stepped 
(in the case of Frank, P1 and P2) or linear (in the case of 
P3 and P4) frequency modulation waveform, where the phase 
steps vary as needed to approximate the underlying 
waveform, but the time spent at any given phase state is 
constant. For polytime codes there is different process; 
the underlying waveform is quantized into a user-selected 
number of phase states. So for polytime codes the phase 
states are fixed, but there are varying time periods at 
each phase state (Pace 2009, 163). There are four polytime 
sequences as follows. 
a. T1(n) 
T1(n) is generated from a stepped frequency 
waveform where n is the number of phase states used to 
approximate the underlying waveform. The formula of the 
phase of the polytime sequence T1(n) is as follows(Pace 
2009, 163). 
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪= −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭1
2
ሺ ሻ mod ሺ ሻ ,2     ሺA.7ሻT




n : Number of phase states in the code sequence 
k : Number of segments in the T1 code sequence 
T : Overall code duration 




In Figures 120 and 121, by using the MATLAB LPIT 
TOOLBOX, a T1(2) code modulated CW wave, stepped frequency 
phase shift and time domain waveform, with parameters: 
=1cf kHz , =7sf kHz , = 0SNR dB , = 2n , = 0.016secT , =Δ 250F Hz  and 
= 4k  are depicted. 
 
Figure 120. T1(2) Stepped Frequency Phase 
 
Figure 121. T1(2) Modulated Signal Time Domain Waveform 
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b. T2(n) 
T2(n) is generated from a stepped frequency 
waveform where n is the number of phase states used to 
approximate the underlying waveform. The formula of the 
phase of the polytime sequence T2(n) is as follows(Pace 
2009, 165). 
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞− +⎪ ⎪= −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭2
2 2 1
ሺ ሻ mod ሺ ሻ ,2    ሺA.8ሻ
2T




n : Number of phase states in the code sequence 
k : Number of segments in the T1 code sequence 
T : Overall code duration 
= −0,1,2,..., 1j k : Segment number in the stepped frequency 
waveform 
 
In Figures 122 and 123, by using the MATLAB LPIT 
TOOLBOX, a T2(2) code modulated CW wave, stepped frequency 
phase shift and time domain waveform, with parameters: 
=1cf kHz , =7sf kHz , = 0SNR dB , = 2n , = 0.016secT , =Δ 250F Hz  and 
= 4k  are depicted. 
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Figure 122. T2(2) Stepped Frequency Phase 
 
Figure 123. T2(2) Modulated Signal Time Domain Waveform 
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c. T3(n) 
T3(n) is generated from approximations of a 
linear  frequency model, where n is the number of phase 
states used to approximate the underlying waveform. The 
formula of the phase of the polytime sequence T3(n) is the 
following (Pace, 2009, 169): 




ሺ ሻ mod ,2     ሺA.9ሻ
2T m




n : Number of phase states in the code sequence 
ΔF : Modulation bandwidth 
mt : Modulation period 
 
In Figures 124 and 125, by using the MATLAB LPIT 
TOOLBOX, we see a T3(2) code modulated CW wave, stepped 
frequency phase shift and time domain waveform, with 
parameters =1cf kHz , =7sf kHz , = 0SNR dB , = 2n  and =Δ 250F Hz .  
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Figure 124. T3(2) Stepped Frequency Phase 
 
Figure 125. T3(2) Modulated Signal Time Domain Waveform 
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d. T4(n) 
T4(n) is generated from approximations of a 
linear  frequency model, where n is the number of phase 
states used to approximate the underlying waveform. The 
formula of the phase of the polytime sequence T4(n) is the 
following (Pace 2009, 169): 




ሺ ሻ mod ,2    ሺA.10ሻ
2 2T m




n : Number of phase states in the code sequence 
ΔF : Modulation bandwidth 
mt : Modulation period 
 
In Figures 126 and 127, by using the MATLAB LPIT 
TOOLBOX, a T4(2) code modulated CW wave, stepped frequency 
phase shift and time domain waveform, with parameters 
=1cf kHz , =7sf kHz , = 0SNR dB , = 2n  and =Δ 250F Hz . 
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Figure 126. T4(2) Stepped Frequency Phase 
 
Figure 127. T4(2) Modulated Signal Time Domain Waveform 
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B. FREQUENCY SHIFT KEYING (FSK) TECHNIQUES 
1. Costas Codes 
Costas codes were developed by J.P. Costas. They are a 
sequence of frequencies that provide unambiguous range and 
Doppler measurements while minimizing the cross talk 
between frequencies. They have peak sidelobes that are down 
from the mainlobe by a factor of 1/ FN  ( FN  is the number of 
contiguous frequencies within a band B  and each frequency 
lasts pt  seconds)(Pace 2009, 191).  
There are various methods to construct a Costas 
sequence, such as the Welch construction, the Lempel 
construction, the Golomb construction, Taylor’s 4T  
construction, and the 4G  and 5G  constructions. An 
exhaustive search to find all x n n  Costas arrays (which has 
currently been completed for ≤26n ), as well as others being 
developed (Golomb 2006), is not within the scope of the 
present thesis to enumerate. 
Instead, by using the MATLAB LPIT TOOLBOX, for the 
known Costas sequence { }2, 4, 8, 5, 10, 9, 7, 3, 6, 1 ሺ ሻkHz , for 
= 0SNR dB , = 0.1secpt , =15sf kHz  we present in Figures 128 and 





Figure 128. I Channel PSD with Noise SNR=0dB 
 
Figure 129. I Channel PSD with No Noise 
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2. Hybrid FSK/PSK Technique 
The proposed technique(Pace 2009, 195) combines an FSK 
technique (Frequency Hoping using Costas sequences) with a 
PSK technique. The FH LPI radar waveform has FN  frequencies 
within a bandwidth B . Every frequency lasts pt  seconds in 
duration. The proposed hybrid technique subdivided each 
subperiod pt (that one of the FN  frequencies is transmitted) 
into BN  phase slots, each with duration bt . The 
mathematical relationships of the proposed scheme are: 
= =   ሺA.11ሻB p b BT t t N  
 =   ሺA.12ሻT F BN N N  
 = =   ሺA.13ሻp F b B FT t N t N N  
Where: 
pt : Duration of each frequency   
bt : Duration of each phase slot 
FN : Number of frequencies     
BN : Number of phase slots 
T : Total code (FSK/PSK) period    
BT : PSK code period 
The formula of the complex envelope of the transmitted 
CW FSK/PSK wave is the following (Pace 2009, 196): 




kφ : One of the PSK codes 
jf : One of the  FSK frequencies 
In Figures 130 and 131, by using the MATLAB LPIT 
TOOLBOX, we present the plot of PSD of a FSK (Costas) CW 
LPI waveform and an FSK(same Costas)/PSK(Barker) CW LPI 
waveform with the parameters: Barker code length 5, Costas 
sequence { }3, 2, 6, 4, 5, 1 ሺ ሻkHz  , =15sf kHz , = 0SNR dB  and = 0.006secpt . 
 
 
Figure 130. FSK (Costas Only) PSD 
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Figure 131. Hybrid FSK (Costas)/PSK (Barker) PSD 
3. Matched FSK/PSK Technique 
This type of technique generates FSK/PSK signals 
optimally matched to an arbitrary target’s spectral 
response. Radar uses FSK/PSK signal but instead of 
selecting the frequency from a Costas sequence (as in the 
Hybrid case above), the frequencies are selected by a 
random process with a probability density function which is 
based on the target’s spectral content. In this way the 
frequencies transmitted more frequently by the radar are 
the ones that correspond to the spectral peaks of the 
target’s spectral response (Skinner 1994).  
These kinds of signals can be considered as spread 
spectrum signals, but instead of trying to equally spread 
the power over the given spectrum bandwidth, more energy is 
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focused at frequencies of special interest with respect to 
the target’s spectral response. 
The resulting FH sequence appears random to an 
intercept receiver, so it is considered an LPI waveform. 
However, there is one characteristic that can enhance LPI 
behavior--the reuse of frequencies (due to the spectral 
response of the target that it is trying to match), which 
increases the possible number of sequences even more 
(Skinner 1994). 
C. NOISE TECHNIQUES 
1. RNR 
RNR was first introduced by Narayanan. A Gaussian 
noise waveform is transmitted; target detection is 
accomplished by cross-correlating the received signal with 
a time-delayed and frequency shifted replica of the 
transmitted signal in the heterodyne correlation receiver 
(Narayanan 1998). RNR waveforms are not suitable for 
unambiguous range rate estimation due to their extended 
Doppler spread parameter (Dawood 2003). 
The signal characteristics employed in RNR are the 
following (Pace 2009, 213,217): 
XMIT complex form:       = + 2ሺ ሻ ሾ ሺ ሻ ሺ ሻሿ     ሺA.15ሻcj πf tS t X t jY t e   
XMIT real part:     = −ሺ ሻ ሺ ሻcosሺ2 ሻ ሺ ሻsinሺ2 ሻ     ሺA.16ሻt c cS t X t πf t Y t πf t  
RCV real part: 




cf : Carrier frequency  
ሺ ሻ, ሺ ሻX t Y t : Gaussian processes (zero mean and bandwidth B) 
= − + ≈ −ሺ ሻ/ሺ ሻ 1 2 /α c v c v v c    
v : Relative velocity of the target 
= + −'ሺ ሻ ሾሺ1 ሻ ሻdX t AX α t t     
= + −'ሺ ሻ ሾሺ1 ሻ ሻdY t AY α t t  
2A : Power reflection coefficient   
dt : Return signal delay 
2. RNFR 
RNFR was first introduced by Liu. A Gaussian noise 
wave is modulated linearly by a FMCW waveform. A portion of 
the transmit signal is used as a local oscillator input to 
the receiver, where the correlation between target return 
and transmitted signal takes place (L. X. Guosui 1991). 
RNFR has good distance measurement capability, but the CW 
leakage makes it difficult to measure speed and detect long 
range targets (L. H. Guosui 1999). 
The signal characteristics employed in the RNFR are 
the following (Pace 2009, 223-224): 
XMIT signal:        = +ሺ ሻ cosሾ ሺ ሻሿ    ሺA.18ሻce t E ω t θ t     
RCV signal:  = + − + −ሺ ሻ cosሾሺ ሻሺ ሻ ሺ ሻሿ    ሺA.19ሻR R c d d de t E ω ω t t θ t t  
Where: 
=2c cω πf : Carrier angular frequency  
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E : Amplitude of transmitted signal 
= ∫ 1 1
0
ሺ ሻ ሺ ሻ
t
fθ t D ξ t dt : Angular deviation of FMCW modulation  
fD : Angular frequency per volt of the FMCW chirp  
1ሺ ሻξ t : Noise voltage of a stationary process with zero mean 
RE : Amplitude of echo signal   
dt : Return signal delay 
dω : Doppler angular frequency 
3. RNFSR 
RNFSR is very like RNFR but it also uses an additional 
sine signal, at frequency mf  that modulates the noise 
source. The composite signal is then modulated by the FMCW 
waveform. The additional sine helps minimize the leakage 
from the transmitter to the receiver that happens to the 
RNFR as described previously (L. X. Guosui 1991). Even with 
the addition of sinusoidal modulation, the RNFSR cannot 
measure the speed of a moving target or detect a long range 
target (as does RNFR), but it is suitable for short-range 
applications (harbor control, missile fuse systems, UAV 
landings, etc.) (Pace 2009, 229). 
The signal characteristics employed in the RNFR are as 
follows (Pace 2009, 229): 
XMIT signal:       = + +1 2ሺ ሻ cosሾ ሺ ሻ ሺ ሻሿ    ሺA.20ሻce t E ω t θ t θ t  
Where: 
=2c cω πf : Carrier angular frequency 
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E : Amplitude of transmitted signal 
= =∫1 1 1 1
0
Δ




Fθ t F ω t dt ω t
ω
: Angular frequency deviation 
of sine modulation 
= ∫2 2 2
0
ሺ ሻ ሺ ሻ
t
fθ t D V t dt : Angular frequency deviation of FMCW 
modulation 
fD : Angular frequency per volt of the FMCW chirp  
2ሺ ሻV t : Noise voltage of a stationary process with zero mean 
4. RBPC 
Random binary phase code emitters use a random phase 
modulation, of binary phase code 0 or π radians, of a 
carrier to achieve LPI noise characteristics. To improve 
the performance of the RBPC emitter, we can use several 
pulse compressors in series. The maximum measurable Doppler 
frequency is defined by the length of the single pulse 
compressor. RBPC can detect long range targets and high 
speed targets, has good Doppler sensitivity and overcomes 
the limitations of RNFR and RNFSR radar with respect to 
long range detection and speed measurements; however the CW 
leakage problem still remains(Pace 2009, 235). 
Some characteristics of the RBPC are as follows. 
Range Resolution:          =Δ     ሺA.21ሻ
2
bctR  
Maximum Range:         =max   ሺA.22ሻ2
c bN ctR  
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(M pulse compression in series)   =max   ሺA.23ሻ2
c bMN ctR  






bt : Subcode width    
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